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SUMMARY  
Advance decisions to refuse medical treatment (“ADRTs”) have been recognised in English law 
through a series of cases which arose at the end of the Twentieth Century and subsequently by the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. ADRTs allow adults, with the requisite mental capacity, to refuse forms of 
medical treatment that they anticipate being provided with at a time when they have lost mental 
capacity in respect of the anticipated treatment. The most frequently advanced argument for the 
recognition of these instruments is to respect and extend personal autonomy and/or self-determination. 
However, this thesis treats that particular normative ground as but one among a number of factors 
which have been crucial to the emergence of ADRTs. It is argued that the advancement in medical 
capabilities for prolonging life in its final stages is a sine qua non of ADRTs in practical terms. The 
demographic and financial pressures in which end-of-life care is provided add impetus to the 
argument for the recognition of ADRTs. However, it is suggested that the political environment in 
which ADRTs have emerged has also been of fundamental significance to their recognition in law. 
Using Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality it will be shown ADRTs have been developed 
within advanced liberal programmes of government, in response to the inability of the traditional 
approaches of those forms of government to govern individuals who lack capacity at the end of life. 
The employment of this theory provides a novel perspective on the debates which have raged in this 
area of law and bioethics, allowing for a focus on the population, as well as the individual, and a focus 
on practices rather than on the outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare law and bioethics are frequent sites of debate over various dilemmas 
encountered in medical practice and contain many areas of fierce contestation (e.g. stem cell 
research, organ donation, abortion, euthanasia). One matter which is now relatively free 
from such dispute is that of contemporary refusal of medical treatment. Few would suggest 
today that an adult with mental capacity should have treatment given to him or her against 
his or her will.1 It is widely recognised that medical treatment given to such persons must be 
provided on the basis of informed consent2 and the most frequently relied upon reason for 
this requirement is that it protects personal autonomy.3 However, the putative consensus on 
quickly disintegrates when considering refusals of treatment in different circumstances. This 
is particularly true when a person for whom treatment is clinically indicated lacks the mental 
capacity to make a treatment decision. In such circumstances, he or she is deemed to lack the 
ability to make an autonomous decision and therefore additional factors and principles take 
on a much heightened relevance in determining whether treatment should be provided. 
While there is broad agreement over the kinds of factors and principles which are relevant in 
the determination of such decisions, the question of how much weight to give the various 
factors (especially personal autonomy and beneficence) is eminently debateable. The 
outcomes of such debates take on added significance where the treatment decision under 
consideration pertains to life-sustaining treatment. 
Advance Decisions to Refuse Treatment (“ADRTs”) purport to provide a means by 
which we can avoid straying into this problematic zone of contested decision-making 
involving the weighing of an assortment of values and interests. In particular, these purport 
to base the recognition of such decisions on the pre-existing autonomy of the decision 
maker. ADRTs take effect for those who, while now lacking capacity, had once prudently 
considered the possibility of requiring the kind of treatment now indicated before he or she 
lost mental capacity in respect of that decision. Described in this way, on the basis of a 
simple extrapolation of the individual right to personal autonomy, we could readily 
                                                     
1 But NB J Herring, ‘Where Are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 
51 
2 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 (HL) 
3 ibid 
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anticipate that ADRTs would be welcomed by healthcare lawyers and bioethicists alike. 
However, it will be argued in this thesis that that account alone provides an inadequate basis 
for the understanding of the development and operation of ADRTs. Rather, it will be 
suggested instead that ADRTs have arisen as the result of a congress of multiple factors, 
political, economic, personal, interpersonal and populational. Taken together, these factors, 
which have resulted a crisis in end-of-life government to which ADRTs are the response. 
Consequently the emergence of ADRTs is a matter of greater complexity than that which the 
more doctrinal accounts may suggest. 
One of the most obvious areas of complexity lies in the definitional uncertainty which 
surrounds ADRTs. They have previously been known by other names in England and Wales, 
such as “living wills” and may be known by slightly different terms in other jurisdictions.4 
Any analysis that fails to clearly identify the specific jurisdictions to which it pertains carries 
a real danger of muddling various concerns together or of misattributing matters which may 
be of concern in other jurisdictions to that of England and Wales. That is why the first part 
of this thesis is devoted to elucidating the legal definition of ADRTs in England and Wales 
as the jurisdiction to which the discussion here primarily applies. Many aspects of the 
discussion may be of interest to those concerned with the law in other jurisdictions, but there 
is much variation in the manner in which ADRTs are recognised and therefore it should not 
be assumed that all aspects of the discussion will be applicable across the board.  
This part will further provide occasion to specify the particular kinds of ADRTs with 
which this thesis is concerned. Although ADRTs can be created in respect of any kind of 
‘treatment’, the focus in this thesis will be on those ADRTs which purport to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, which are the variety of ADRTs that carry the highest stakes. Getting it 
wrong in respect of such ADRTs means that either the patient will lose his or her life, 
through withholding treatment in circumstances in which he or she would have wanted 
treatment, or the patient will be kept alive through medical treatment in circumstances in 
which she or he would have wanted to have been left to die. ADRTs for the refusal of 
treatments which pertain to mental disorders will be beyond the purview of this work, so too 
will similar instruments such as Lasting Powers of Attorney (“LPAs”) and Advance Care 
Plans (“ACPs”). 
                                                     
4 see A Simon, ‘Historical Review of Advance Directives’ in Peter Lack, Nikola Biller-Andorno and 
Susanne Brauer (eds), Advance Directives (Springer Science & Business Media 2013) 
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The discussion in the first part also provides an introduction to some of the legal 
antecedents to the modern law on ADRTs. This will involve a detailed discussion of the law 
on mental capacity and the law on the contemporary refusal of treatment. Some critical 
observations shall be made at this point concerning the relationship between the general 
principle that adults with capacity have the right to refuse medical treatment for any reason, 
and a more detailed appreciation of the law, which can be realised through an examination of 
the important cases, principles and formalities. Notwithstanding the bombast and gusto with 
which the right to refuse treatment is often asserted, taking a more in-depth appreciation of 
the law reveals a much more nuanced and fragile right. This fragility colours the claim made 
by the courts in being guided to protect the right to self-determination or patient autonomy. 
A greater focus on the normative underpinnings of ADRTs will be examined in the 
second part of this thesis. Given the extent to which it is relied upon in justifying the law on 
ADRTs, the value of autonomy will be examined in particular detail. Again, at this juncture 
it will be seen that there is a great potential for confusion, as the term autonomy is capable of 
bearing a number of different meanings. The thesis as a whole draws on a wide range of 
scholarship which highlights distinctive understandings of the concept of autonomy, but the 
work of Kant and Mill will be focussed upon to illustrate the breadth of understandings of 
this concept. The reason for considering the work of these authors specifically is that their 
work is often drawn upon in philosophical literature as providing the foundation for our 
contemporary respect for autonomy. However, these philosophers had radically different 
conceptions of autonomy. Moreover, in legal discourse, the term autonomy has been 
frequently confused with that of ‘self-determination’ and this has resulted in a dearth of 
conceptual clarity. As a result, on a set of identical facts, the case can be made for both 
providing treatment and for not providing treatment based on autonomy. Ultimately, 
therefore, the claim that ADRTs act as an extension of autonomy is an untestable assertion 
in the absence of a clear and accepted definition. From this mere possibility, it is 
understandable that some have suggested that moral concepts have been deployed as much 
for their rhetorical value as for the ability to derive concrete rules from their conceptual 
depth.5  
In spite of the absence of a clear and universally accepted definition of autonomy, many 
have suggested that there is a general tendency for autonomy to be defined in highly 
                                                     
5 See e.g. J Harrington, ‘Law’s Faith in Medicine’ (2008) 9 Medical Law International 357; J 
Harrington, ‘Of Paradox and Plausibility: The Dynamic of Change in Medical Law’ (2014) 22(3) 
Medical Law Review 305 
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individualistic terms in English law. Some of those making such claims suggest that the law, 
grounded in this form of autonomy, fails to adequately reflect the way that people make 
decisions. In turn, this also leads some to claim that the law perpetuates a kind of 
undesirable individualist tendency in modern society. In addition to these generalist critiques 
of one of the foundations of the chief normative underpinning of the law on ADRTs, some 
have criticised the extrapolation of the concept of autonomy in the recognition of ADRTs. 
The law does offer certain safeguards which address some of these concerns (such as 
allowing revocation of ADRTs without formality and offering healthcare professionals a 
generous interpretative discretion). However, these critiques serve to highlight the plurality 
of meaning and expectation accorded to the concept of personal autonomy. The law, in its 
alleged incorporation of law an individualistic form of autonomy, can be criticised for 
different reasons and with different concerns in mind. Supposing that one of these lines of 
critique were accepted, there is every chance that it would not be accepted, by advocates of 
different lines of critique. On this basis, it seems unlikely that a version of autonomy will be 
arrived at that can successfully evade criticism of this kind.  
Unlike the majority of critiques of the interpretation of autonomy in law, what will be 
termed here ‘the personhood critique’, does not suggest there is anything problematic with 
relying on the principle of personal autonomy as currently recognised in law to justify 
recognition of ADRTs. Instead, this line of critique casts doubt on the possibility of 
individuals maintaining a morally significant continuity between the point in time at which 
the ADRT was created and the future point at which it comes to be relied upon. This is a 
powerful line of critique, because it accepts the basic normative premises of ADRTs, but its 
weakness is that its acceptance as a principle in this area would put it out of kilter with other 
important areas of law, such as criminal law and contract law. 
The personhood critique is revisited in the third part of this thesis, in chapter six, where 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality is presented for the purposes of offering a novel 
analytical basis for the evaluation of the development and operation of the law on ADRTs. 
Significantly however, it should be noted from the outset, that as this theory is a non-
normative, this thesis does not provide any particular practical solution to the questions 
surrounding the manner in which ADRTs should be recognised in law, or to the kinds of 
principles which should underpin their operation. Rather it problematises the supposed 
normative bases for the recognition of ADRTs and for the expectations which surround the 
way in which they operate. Debates on these matters will continue to rage precisely because 
there is no agreement on the proper basis for ADRTs other than at the general level of 
autonomy, but without an agreed definition of that concept it provides little assistance for 
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those wishing to draft legislation. This dearth of consensus, highlighted in Part II, is easily 
attributable to the pluralistic society in which these conceptual battles are joined. However, 
of itself, this conclusion leaves open the question as to why the existence of value pluralism 
should prevent the imposition of a supposedly superior conceptualisation of autonomy. An 
explanation for this state of affairs can be provided through the theory of governmentality 
and in particular the development of modern modes of government with a commitment to 
liberalism. This commitment to liberalism has arisen in consequence of a series of ‘crises of 
government’. This process was set out in chapter five, in which a detailed discussion of what 
Foucault describes as the “governmentalization of the state” is provided.6  
This discussion focuses attention on the formations of modes and practices of 
government which have arisen through problematisations and resistances that emerged at 
various points in history. This account pertains to developments in Western Europe and 
consequently a further geographical caveat must be conceded, but the employment of this 
theory in respect of the law of England and Wales is apt in that these areas lie within the 
region Foucault discusses in respect of governmentality. Through the consideration of the 
various problematisations and adjustments in modes of government, we can glean an 
explanation as to why we have arrived at a form of liberalism in which a kind of value 
pluralism is inevitable. It is not suggested that value pluralism is necessarily to be considered 
preferable to a more limited or homogenous approach towards the recognition of values in 
society, but merely explains why this state of affairs has arisen as a product of a certain 
orientation of government.  
Significantly, Foucault’s understanding of the term government is not restricted to ideas 
of state government, but includes all practices involving the “conduct of conducts”.7 This 
discussion enables us to return to the idea of autonomy, but does so with an emphasis on 
autonomy’s role in government. It is this way of conceiving of autonomy as a practice, 
which is potentially the most challenging to orthodox Healthcare law and Bioethics, where 
the movements to recognise autonomy are viewed as having a different purpose (i.e. the 
protection of Human Rights8 or the empowerment of patients vis-à-vis the medical 
                                                     
6 M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France (Palgrave Macmillan 
2009) 109 
7 See M Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in James D Faubion (ed), Power, vol 3 (Penguin Books 
2002) 341 
8 See K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Ashgate 2007) 20-25  
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profession9) is in positing the idea of autonomy not simply as a means of empowering 
patients against the paternalist drive of medicine, but as part of the ‘practices of 
government’. This idea will be fully elaborated upon in chapters six and seven. 
The final two chapters of Part III are concerned with examining the operational aspects 
of governmentality vis-à-vis ADRTs. At this stage Foucault’s description of modern 
practices of government operating through the interplay of the technologies of the self and 
the technologies of government will take prominence. Pursuant to that characterisation, the 
operation of ADRTs within each of these technological groupings will be considered in the 
final two chapters of Part III.  
An examination of ADRTs as part of the technologies of the self will be conducted in 
chapter six through a re-consideration of two prominent cases on ADRTs, Re E10 and W v 
M.11 in which the purported ADRTs were not recognised by the courts. To some this may 
indicate that the autonomy of the people in those cases was not respected and adds weight to 
the argument that ADRTs fail to extend autonomy in practice. However, in this thesis, these 
cases will be drawn upon to anchor the examination of the processes involved in the creation 
of ADRTs. Focussing on the practice demanded and fostered by ADRTs could lead to a 
different conclusion, given that the process of creating an ADRT requires an individual to 
subjectivise themselves as a responsible citizen with an interest not only in his or her future 
healthcare, but also in his or her existential disposition. The manner in which this can be 
achieved will be discussed. 
In addition to highlighting the role ADRTs play in facilitating the government of the 
self, a further role is played by the establishment of a framework on ADRTs in governing 
others. Three varieties of other, whose futures are shaped through the practices government12 
of ADRTs, can be identified as the population, the ‘future-self’ and the interpersonal other. 
Since the middle of the Eighteenth century the population became the most important object 
of government and therefore it is important to consider the effect that ADRTs have on the 
population. At this time Foucault identified biopower as a new form of power that was not 
only capable of interacting both with individuals in society, but also with the population. 
One aspect of the operation of biopower is the securitisation of the population against 
                                                     
9 See e.g. D Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (Manchester University Press 2014) 107-115; J 
Harrington, ‘Privileging the Medical Norm: Liberalism, Self-Determination and Refusal of 
Treatment’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 348 
10 Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) 
11 W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) 
12 See T Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique (Paradigm Publishers 2011) 17 
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threats. The existence of individuals whose lives can only be sustained through medical 
intervention, but who cannot make a decision for themselves about whether that treatment 
should be continued represents a kind of threat to modern governmental reason because it 
demands that a decision be made on behalf of another, rather than allowing the individual to 
determine their own interests. ADRTs facilitate the possibility of avoiding this dilemma 
through obtaining the treatment choices of individuals prior to their loss of capacity.  
The need for ADRTs is heightened by the current surroundings of the population, in 
which there are multiple pressures resulting from increased life expectancy, rising rates of 
mortality, a lack of funding for healthcare in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. In these 
circumstances, where citizens can make provision for the end of life through ADRTs, which 
have the potential to avoid delay and excessive treatment (defined in the individual’s own 
terms) the population as a whole could benefit through greater efficiency in the health 
service. However, in order to create a noticeable effect in the population requires 
interpersonal acts of government, where a citizen can be assisted in the formation of an 
ADRT. Although there are routes through which this can be achieved, they have seemingly 
proven ineffectual, in that they have not produced a great uptake in ADRTs. For those that 
do learn of their rights to create an ADRT and engage in the practice of the formation of an 
ADRT, they must engage in a process of governing their ‘future self’. Here we can return to 
an idea proposed in chapter four on the ‘future-self’ taking on a distinct form of personhood 
from the present self.  
The discussion at this juncture will differ from the earlier discussion in that it shall not 
focus on the moral case for allowing the ‘present-self’ to make legally binding decisions for 
his or her future incarnation. Rather, the focus is on the operation encouraged by the legal 
framework, to think about the future-self who has lost capacity as a kind of other. This 
objectification of the ‘future-self’ is what legitimises decisions being made on their behalf 
and further legitimises the very notion that it is legitimate to make decisions on behalf of a 
person who lacks mental capacity and that such a person lacks the right to refuse treatment 
for themselves. In this way the manner of autonomy’s recognition in law may be 
conceptually inconsistent, but it takes shape through the problematisations of government 
and is both constitutive and supportive of modern modes of government. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the development and operation of the law on advance decisions to 
refuse treatment (“ADRTs”) in England and Wales. The primary role of the first substantive 
chapter is to define the key legal terminology that will be employed throughout the 
remainder of this work as well as the legal environment in which the law on ADRTs 
operates. In providing a definitional foundation for the remainder of the thesis, this chapter 
will serve an important role in anchoring the theoretical discussion which will be developed 
in the second and third parts of this thesis. As such, the task to be engaged with here is 
largely doctrinal, but some elements of doctrinal orthodoxy will be problematised as part of 
the process of setting out the law (especially the law on capacity and its implications for the 
right to refuse treatment). 
The first part of this chapter will distinguish ADRTs from other similar instruments and 
ADRTs in other jurisdictions. Following this, the legal environment of ADRTs will be set 
out. This will involve a discussion of the law on the refusal of treatment and the law on 
mental capacity. As will be discussed, mental capacity is one of the most important 
requisites of the right to refuse treatment. Its importance for ADRTs is compounded by the 
fact that ADRTs require determinations of capacity at two points in time. Where mental 
capacity is found lacking treatment can be provided in the best interests of the patient and 
the law on the determination of best interests will be discussed. Following this, some of the 
cases that recognised ADRTs prior to the enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(“MCA”) will be discussed, before an analysis of the law on ADRTs as enacted in the 
MCA.13   
                                                     
13 Various parts of this chapter have been published in T Hayes, ‘A (Social) Room with a View (to the 
Future): Advance Decisions and the Problem of Personhood’ in Richard Huxtable and Ruud ter 
Meulen (eds), The Voices and Rooms of European Bioethics (Routledge 2015); T Hayes, ‘Informed 
Choice over Informed Consent: Cracking the Old Chesternut’ in Anthony Wrigley and Nicky Priaulx 
(eds), Ethics, Law and Society (Vol V, Ashgate Publishing 2013); T Hayes, ‘Balancing Principles, 
Forcing Food: Self-Determination and Best Interests’ (2012) 9 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 387; T 
Hayes, ‘Donation and Devolution: The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013’ in Ralf J Jox, Galia 
Assadi and Georg Marckmann (eds), Organ Transplantation in Times of Donor Shortage, vol 59 
(Springer International Publishing 2016) 
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ADVANCE DECISIONS TO REFUSE TREATMENT 
This thesis takes the advance decision to refuse medical treatment (“ADRT”) as its 
focus. It is therefore imperative to define this term clearly at the outset. In offering as clear 
and as precise a definition of ADRTs as possible, I will examine how ADRTs are framed in 
law through a detailed examination of both the case law and statutory provisions of the 
MCA. By way of disambiguation, I will also seek to distinguish ADRTs from their 
analogues.  
To begin with, the general definition of ADRTs is provided by s 24(1) MCA. It states: 
24 Advance decisions to refuse treatment: general 
(1) “Advance decision” means a decision made by a person (“P”), after he 
has reached 18 and when he has capacity to do so, that if— 
(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a specified 
treatment is proposed to be carried out or continued by a person providing 
health care for him, and 
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or 
continuation of the treatment, the specified treatment is not to be carried out 
or continued. 
This is the current definition of the ADRT in English law. It is this definition that shall 
be relied upon in this thesis when referring to either ADRTs, or simply “advance decisions”. 
Later in this chapter this basic definition will be elaborated upon in detail with reference to 
the rest of section 24 and sections 25-26 MCA. These sections describe the conditions under 
which ADRTs are recognised as valid and applicable and the interpretative rules for ADRTs, 
among other matters. 
From the outset it should be noted that ADRTs have also been known by other terms 
such as ‘advance directives’ and ‘living wills’ in the past in English law and are known by 
different terms where they are recognised outside England and Wales.14 However, as this 
thesis is based primarily on the law of England and Wales the term ‘advance decision’ in 
this thesis both for the avoidance of ambiguity and as it is the phrase now used in the 
MCA.15 
                                                     
14 see P Lewis, ‘Medical Treatment of Dementia Patient at the End of Life: Can the Law 
Accommodate the Personal Identity and Welfare Problems’ (2006) 13 European Journal of Health 
Law 219 
15 Royal College of Physicians Advance Care Planning (Concise Guidance to Good Practice Series, 
No 12, 2009) 2 
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Thus, in the absence of a clear definition, there is the potential for great confusion. This 
potential is heightened by the employment of multiple terms to express the same, or similar, 
ideas of a person being able to make decisions about medical treatment that may become 
clinically indicated for them in future. Such confusion is especially problematic in that some 
expressions of wishes regarding future treatment may be recognised as binding decisions 
and others may be seen only as of a persuasive, rather than a binding, nature. The distinction 
is that, in the latter case, healthcare professionals should have regard to the wishes that the 
patient has expressed, but if they act at variance to those wishes there will be no penalty, 
whereas, if the decision is binding, failure to respect that decision will result in the same 
legal sanctions which apply to failures to respect contemporaneous medical decisions.16 This 
is why clarity here is of great practical importance. 
Another source of confusion undoubtedly arises from the fact that outside of the 
jurisdiction of England and Wales17 (the jurisdiction upon which this thesis focuses), it is not 
universally possible to express wishes as to the refusal of treatment that are binding in law.18 
Notably, this is the case in France in relation to “directives anticipées”19 and also in Scotland 
where the Mental Health Care and Treatment (Scotland) Act20 provides for the creation of 
“advance statements”21 to which medics “shall have regard”22, but which are not binding.23  
However, England and Wales is not the only European jurisdiction in which advance 
decisions are binding. In Germany, for instance, “Patientenverfügungen” (‘living wills’) are 
legally binding.24 This means that care must be taken when discussing the way in which 
ADRTs operate in different jurisdictions in general terms.  
Problematically, some authors rely on the term “advance directives” to cover a broad 
range of instruments, such as “written statements about a person’s preferences regarding 
                                                     
16 MCA, s 26 (1) 
17 Unless otherwise indicated, where the term “English law” is used, it is to reference to the law of 
England and Wales 
18 see Lewis (n 14) 225-227 
19 Article L1111-11 Code de la Santé Publique; and see R Horn, ‘“I don’t need my patients’ opinion 
to withdraw treatment”: patient preferences at the end-of-life and physician attitudes towards advance 
directives in England and France’ (2014) 17 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 425 
20 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 13) 
21 ibid, s 275 
22 ibid, s 276(3)   
23 In relation to advance statements relating to psychiatric treatment in Scotland, see J Reilly, and JM 
Atkinson, ‘The Content of Mental Health Advance Directives: Advance Statements in Scotland’ 
(2010) 33 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 116 
24 § 1901a Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Germany) 
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possible future medical decisions”.25 Weller goes further, employing the phrase “mental 
health advance directives” as a term designed to house a number of different instruments 
such as ADRTs, advance statements and Ulysses contracts.26 While these terms might have 
some value for grouping similar kinds of instrument together, the employment of such 
generalised categories limits the potential for more precise analysis. 
Even where a relatively narrowly-defined term such as ADRT is used (to refer to legally 
binding refusals of treatment designed to take effect following the loss of capacity), there 
may still be variations in definition across different jurisdictions. This is especially likely in 
respect of the formalities that must be observed and any temporal limitations placed on the 
effectiveness of ADRTs. Consequently, there is an ongoing danger that some definitional 
rigour and precision may be lost in translation (both between languages and in translating 
the idea of the ADRT into legislation).  
The phrase ‘advance directive’ may additionally face the semantic objection that the 
legal instrument found in the MCA does not entitle the author to ‘direct’ their medical care 
following the loss of capacity. In England and Wales, all that can be done with binding force 
is to refuse treatment27 and therefore the suggestion that future treatment can be ‘directed’ is 
rather disingenuous. In this sense, what the phrase Advance Decision to Refuse Medical 
Treatment (ADRT) lacks in elegance (and succinctness) it certainly makes up for in 
precision. This provides another reason to prefer the more cumbersome phrase ‘ADRT’ in 
this thesis. 
Sadly it is not only the inherent pitfalls of translation, which lie across linguistic divides, 
problematic in the quest for accuracy. Professional cultures sometimes develop and employ 
their own terminology such as the Advance Care Plan (“ACP”)28 and Values History 
(“VH”)29. These are documents which are designed to record the treatment wishes of 
                                                     
25 MP Van Wijmen and others, ‘Advance Directives in the Netherlands: An Empirical Contribution to 
the Exploration of a Cross-Cultural Perspective on Advance Directives’ (2010) 24 Bioethics 118, 118  
26 P Weller, New Law and Ethics in Mental Health Advance Directives: The Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to Choose (Routledge 2012) 2; see T van Willigenburg and 
PJJ Delaere, ‘Protecting Autonomy as Authenticity Using Ulysses Contracts’ (2005) 30 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 395; C Andreou, ‘Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts’ 
(2008) 22 Bioethics 25; I Gremmen and others, ‘Ulysses Arrangements in Psychiatry: A Matter of 
Good Care?’ (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 77 
27 R (Burke) v The GMC [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin)  
28 see e.g. Royal College of Physicians Advance Care Planning (n 15); S Conroy and others, 
‘Advance Care Planning: Concise Evidence-Based Guidelines’ (2009) 9 Clinical Medicine 76; 
Department of Health, Advance Care Planning: A Guide for Health and Social Care Staff (The NHS 
End of Life Care Programme, 2007)  
29 see DJ Doukas and LB McCullough, ‘The Values History: The Evaluation of the Patient’s Values 
and Advance Directives’ (1991) 32 Journal of Family Practice 145 
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patients about their future medical treatment. Such documents may contain ADRTs, but 
there is no requirement for them to do so.30 In addition to stating any forms of treatment that 
the patient would wish to refuse, ACPs may also contain details of how the patient would 
like to be treated in a positive sense i.e. ways in which they would like their medical 
practitioners to treat them and the kinds of medications that they would like to be prescribed. 
Such requests are not binding.31 Moreover, providing treatment that is not considered 
clinically indicated would likely be a breach of the clinical duty of care. 
ADRTs can therefore be housed under the taxonomic umbrella of Advance Care 
Planning. To this extent, they are indeed similar to what might be termed as advance 
statements or advance directives, but the crucial distinguishing feature and sine qua non of 
ADRTs is that they are legally binding. In contradistinction, other forms of advance 
statements do not have binding force except in so far as they adhere to the relevant 
provisions of the MCA. This distinction has important consequences when there is a conflict 
between a proposed course of treatment and the anticipatory instrument and an ADRT with 
legally binding force ought to offer greater theoretical protection to the will of the patient 
than a non-binding instrument.  
Anyone seeking greater definitional clarity from the leading medical law textbooks is 
likely to be disappointed, as among them there is little consensus as to which phraseology 
should be adopted. For example, Jackson states that “Sections 24 and 25 of the MCA deal 
with advance directives, which are referred to as Advance Decisions (ADs) and defined in 
section 24”;32 Fennell adopts the terminology of the MCA in his textbook on Mental Health: 
Law and Practice;33 Brazier and Cave34 draw a distinction between advance decisions and 
advance directives,35 but do so under the in-text heading “Advance Directives” which is to 
be found in the index of their book under the heading “Advance Decisions” (in which there 
is no reference to “Advance Directives”).36 By contrast, Herring37 refers to “Advance 
Decisions” in main text38 but, rather confusingly, this passage is indexed under the heading 
“advance directives”.39 In another of Herring’s books on medical law40 (“Medical Law” 
                                                     
30 S Conroy and others, ‘Advance Care Planning: Concise Evidence-Based Guidelines’ (n 28) 
31 R (Burke) (n 27) 
32 E Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2013) 243 
33 P Fennell, Mental Health: Law and Practice (2nd ed, Jordans 2011) paras 6.55-6.56 
34 M Brazier and E Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (5th ed, Penguin Books 2011) 
35 ibid para 6.14 
36 ibid 589 
37 J Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (5th ed, Oxford University Press 2014) 
38 e.g. ibid 175-178 
39 ibid 641 
40 J Herring, Medical Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 
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2011) he uses the term “advance decision” in text and employs a compromise chimera 
phrase “advance decisions/directives” in the index.41 Jean McHale et al refer to “Advance 
Directives” in their 2007 textbook in both the index42 and the main text43 where they state 
that advance directives are “also known as living wills”.44 Some confusion on the part of 
students, practitioners and the public is therefore forgivable, but by no means commendable, 
and is certainly to be avoided if possible. That is why the term used in this thesis will be the 
mature and precise term for a refusal of consent to medical treatment, which is accepted in 
English law from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 viz “advance decision” or ADRT.  
Compounding the potential confusion that may arise through inconsistent use of 
conceptual labels and through the close proximity of certain concepts to one another, 
common understanding of ADRTs may be harmed by false information. On this point, it is 
alarming that mistruths about ADRTs have found their way into academic journals. In the 
British Journal of Social Work (a peer reviewed academic journal) Stein and Fineberg claim 
that: 
“The Advance Decisions to Refuse Treatment (ADRT) process and 
documentation also require formal legal involvement and registration in 
order to be binding (Holman and Hockley, 2010).”45 
This claim, made under the heading “Advance Care Planning in the UK” is totally false. 
In England and Wales, the validity of ADRTs is not contingent on any “formal legal 
involvement” (in fact section 24(2) states that ADRTs can be written in layman’s terms with 
no lesser binding effect) or registration and there is no formal mechanism for their 
registration. Informing others of an ADRT may of course be advisable, as might the taking 
of legal advice, but failing to do either of these things will not diminish the legal force of the 
decision at all. In addition, treating the UK as having a uniform position in respect of 
ADRTs is erroneous: the MCA only operates in England and Wales.46  
That such an erroneous claim could be published in an academic journal does not bode 
well for any expectation that healthcare professionals, social workers or indeed the general 
public, may have a clear and accurate understanding of the law. It raises the worrying 
possibility that healthcare professionals who encounter statements that purport to be ADRTs 
                                                     
41 ibid 283-284 
42 McHale J and others, Health Care Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 1182 
43 ibid 1078 
44 ibid 1078 
45 GL Stein, and IC Fineberg, ‘Advance Care Planning in the USA and UK: A Comparative Analysis 
of Policy, Implementation and the Social Work Role’ (2013) 43 British Journal of Social Work 233, 
239 
46 MCA, s 68(4) 
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and who may need to assess the purported ADRT’s validity and applicability will be misled 
or confused through having read misinformation and might therefore provide unlawful 
treatment to patients. 
Academics and healthcare professionals are not the only groups who have been 
inconsistent in the conceptual labels applied to ADRTs. It is apparent that the law courts too 
are guilty of some muddlement of the concept. It is understandable that some of the 
important cases on ADRTs did not employ the terminology that would later be used in the 
MCA. In HE v A Hospital NHS Trust,47 for instance, reference was made to ‘advance 
directives’ rather than ADRTs.48 Harder to forgive are those judgments delivered after MCA 
had come into force, but which fail to adopt the terminology of the current law. For example, 
in Re E 49 the patient’s ADRT was referred to by her solicitors as a “living will” and this 
terminology was unfortunately adopted by Senior Judge Lush.50 Although in the case 
reference was made to the terminology of the MCA, it is difficult to understand why it was 
felt necessary to employ a different label at a later stage in the judgment. Greater consistency 
in the use of conceptual labels would be welcome. 
Having gone to some effort to illustrate the variation in terminology that is used in this 
area and having suggested why the practice of employing varied terminology is problematic, 
it is apposite to turn to consider some of the law that underpins the law on ADRTs. The 
meaning and significance of mental capacity will be explored as part of this exercise at a 
later point in this chapter, as will the concept of ‘best interests’ which is significant because 
in lieu of an advance decision, treatment can be provided in accordance what is deemed to 
be in accordance with a patient’s best interests. In addition to the discussion of these 
important legal concepts, the details surrounding the recognition of advance decisions, 
which is contained in the remainder of section 24 MCA and in sections 25-26 MCA, will 
also be discussed later in this chapter. This will involve looking at when the law says that 
advance decisions can be recognised as being valid and applicable to medical treatment. 
However, before any of this, the law on consent to medical treatment must be discussed, 
because it provides the legal basis for advance decisions. This will be discussed in the next 
section.   
  
                                                     
47 [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam) 
48 [37] (Munby J) 
49 [2014] EWCOP 27 
50 [2014] EWCOP 27 [43] (Lush J) 
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LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE ENGLISH LAW ON ADVANCE 
DECISIONS 
CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The law of consent to medical treatment forms the bedrock of ADRTs, as the rights 
accorded to a patient through ADRTs are based on the patient right to refuse treatment 
contemporaneously.51 It is therefore appropriate to set out how the law currently addresses 
the question of consent to medical treatment in some detail. Greater discussion on the 
development of the law on consent to treatment will be provided in the next chapter, 
together with a discussion of the ethical underpinnings of the law in the respect for personal 
autonomy.  
Currently the law demands that any kind of touching involved in a medical procedure 
process must be approved in advance of its application.52 The most important way that the 
kind of touching that is incidental to medical treatment can be authorised is through consent. 
In acknowledging this point we are confronted with another conceptual uncertainty, as there 
is no explicit statutory definition of consent in this area of law. Consent has been defined in 
other areas of law, for example section 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 states: 
“For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and 
has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.” 
However, the precise meaning of consent varies across different areas of law and there 
have been calls for a greater level of consistency.53 Nonetheless, the common idea in the 
understanding of consent is that there is agreement and authorisation for a specified act to 
proceed, in circumstances where the party whose consent is sought is free to make a choice 
as to whether to consent or not and has the mental capacity necessary to make that 
decision.54  
In simple terms, adults who have mental capacity, in respect of a specific treatment-
decision, are entitled to refuse that treatment, with full legal force, for any reason or indeed 
for no reason at all.55 This holds true even if the refusal of treatment is likely to lead to the 
                                                     
51 MCA, s 26(1)  
52 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378 (Robert Goff LJ) 
53 C Elliott and C De Than, ‘The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Law’ 
(2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 225 
54 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 (CA) 
55 ibid 113 (Donaldson of Lymington MR) 
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death of the patient or a viable foetus (a state of affairs not “axiomatic”56 but arising by 
virtue of legal recognition).57 Arguments in favour of so-called ‘normative consent’ (which 
says that where a person has a moral duty to consent, any refusal they make is potentially 
void)58 hold no weight in English law. Moreover, the patient is under no obligation to justify 
their decision to refuse treatment to any other person.59 
Consent is recognised as ambulatory in law.60 This construction is consistent with the 
underlying principle that the law aims to protect in upholding the right of each individual to 
determine what can be done to her by way of medical intervention. This means that a person 
who withdraws their consent mid-way through a procedure ought to be able to expect that 
the procedure should be stopped within a reasonable time, because their withdrawal of 
consent during the procedure ought to have the same force as the refusal prior to the 
procedure.61 Any refusal of treatment is of course only binding in as far as the patient does 
not change their mind in the intervening period.62 
The ordinary requirement that medical procedures must be conducted on the basis of 
informed patient consent is protected through law in two ways. One aspect of legal 
protection arises through battery which is both a criminal offence in English law as well as a 
civil wrong.63 The courts have been reticent to treat medical cases where there has been a 
lack of consent under the heading of battery. In most cases, the deficiency in the consent 
procedure will not be so fundamental as to invoke a claim in battery.64 
By far the most important legal mechanism for protecting the consent process is 
negligence. Conceptually, this is unsatisfactory, as the wrong that eventuates through failing 
to ensure adequate consent before providing medical treatment is surely ought to be 
considered as a wrong not because the medical practitioner has failed to adhere to the 
                                                     
56 Contra J Samanta and A Samanta, Medical Law (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 42857 St 
George’s NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26;  Re MB (1997) 38 BMLR 175 
57 St George’s NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26;  Re MB (1997) 38 BMLR 175 
58 see B Saunders, 'Normative Consent and Opt-Out Organ Donation' (2009) 36 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 84, 85-86 
59 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B (Rev 1) [2015] EWCOP 60, [5] (Peter Jackson J) 
60 See Cooper and Schaub [1994] Crim LR 531; Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 79(2) c.42; R v Ashlee 
2006 CarswellAlta 1076 [25]  
61 Ciarlariello v Schacter [1993] 2 SCR 119, 135 
62 MCA, s 24(3)  
63 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) 882 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ) 
64 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257; Hills v Potter [1984] 1 WLR 641 
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standards of their profession (as is the basis of the claim in the tort of negligence) but rather 
that they have failed to respect the autonomy and physical integrity of the patient.65  
The development of this area of law and the values it protects will receive further 
discussion in Chapter Two. For current purposes it can be observed that the logic of consent, 
embraced by English law, prioritises the lattermost decision in time and fully accepts the 
right to revoke the decision while capacity is retained.66 The problem arises when we accept 
the idea that not all people are recognised as being autonomous and that people who are 
autonomous may lose their autonomy, through their loss of their capacity. There is no 
guarantee that those who have capacity in relation to a specific decision at one time will 
necessarily continue to have capacity in future, when they may wish to change their minds. 
And when we consider the refusal of future treatment, it has long been recognised that it is 
possible refuse treatment prospectively as well as contemporaneously.67ADRTs therefore 
provide a means of “[c]utting across the dichotomy between the competent and 
incompetent”68 through “a logical and appropriate continuation of respect for a patient's 
individual autonomy in matters of medical treatment”69 and present themselves as possible 
solution for those who fear being provided with treatment that they do not want after they 
have lost capacity. This is the strongest legal reason for accepting the right to refuse medical 
treatment.70 
The recognition of ADRTs might not only be seen as a logical extension of a legal 
principle and normative argument, but also as concession to pragmatism. It is not at all 
uncommon for people to people make decisions which are intended to take future effect, or 
apply to future conditions. Indeed, most decisions about healthcare are actually anticipatory 
decisions as there will usually be some temporal interlude between the communication of the 
                                                     
65 T K Feng, ‘Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass Or Negligence’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 149 
66 HE v Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam) [38] (Munby J) 
67 ibid; Bland (n 63) (CA) 816-817 (Butler-Sloss LJ) 
68 R (Burke) (n 27) [43] (Munby J) 
69 Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, ‘Draft Mental Incapacity Bill: Volume 1’, HL 
(2002-2003) 189-I, HC (2002-2003) 1083-I para 199; see also Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) 
[2001] 1 FLR 129 (Fam) 41; HE v Hospital NHS Trust (n 66) [37] (Munby J); W v M (n 11) [226] 
(Baker J) 
70 see AR Maclean, ‘Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-Making’ (2006) 14 Medical 
Law Review 291, 291-295; HE v Hospital NHS Trust (n 66) [37] (Munby J); W Healthcare NHS 
Trust v KH [2004] EWCA Civ 1324 [15] (Brooke LJ); R Andorno, N  Biller-Andorno and S Brauer, 
‘Advance Health Care Directives: Towards a Coordinated European Policy?’ (2009) 16 European 
Journal of Health Law 207, 208; P Lack, N Biller-Andorno and S Brauer (eds), Advance Directives 
(Springer Science & Business Media 2013) vi; C Johnston, ‘Advance Decision Making – Rhetoric or 
Reality?’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 497, 497-499; Department of Health (n 28) 10; see also R 
Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not to Treat? (Routledge 
2013) 65 
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decision and the administration of the proposed activity, be that treatment or examination, 
and the action to which the consent relates should occur at some point in the future. 
However, the kind of ADRT under discussion here are those which only take effect upon the 
loss of mental capacity, because such ADRTs necessarily cannot be revoked past the 
moment from which they take binding effect (again, unless capacity is regained).71 In this 
sense, they represent decisions which might warrant more serious thought on the part of the 
decision-maker/patient than contemporaneous treatment decisions. This would seem 
particularly appropriate, as unlike other forms of future medical decision, these ADRTs are 
applicable in circumstances in which the creator is not able to change her decision with legal 
effect during the treatment process itself (unless capacity is regained). 
One of the most prominent and limiting features of the law on consent to treatment in 
English law is that the right to refuse treatment is recognised in negative terms; patients have 
no right to demand treatment.72 This point is well illustrated by the case of R (Burke) v 
General Medical Council.73 The case arose from a challenge that was made to the 
classification of artificial nutrition and hydration as a form of medical treatment it was said 
that where doctor is asked provide treatment that is “not clinically indicated he is not 
required (i.e. he is under no legal obligation) to provide it”.74 A similar point was also made 
in Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment)75 where there was a question as to 
whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction could be used to override the “bona fide clinical 
judgment of the practitioner concerned”76 regarding whether to continue life-saving or life 
supporting treatment for a seriously ill infant with multiple morbidities. Moreover, the 
provision of treatment that is not in a patient’s best interests would be unlawful.77  
This explains why the law can protect ADRTs, but cannot treat advance requests for 
treatment as binding. If these requests for treatment were binding it would create a disparity 
between the law on anticipated treatment and the on current treatment, without justification.  
In addition to confining the law of consent to treatment to the negative right to refuse 
rather than to demand treatment, Grubb has also suggested that patient’s “probably” cannot 
                                                     
71 HE v Hospital NHS Trust (n 66) (Fam) [38] (Munby J) 
72 Re T (n 54) 112 (Donaldson MR); Bland (n 63) (HL) 864 (Goff LJ); AC v Berkshire West Primary 
Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162; R (Burke) (n 27); see also D Wendler, 'Are physicians obligated 
always to act in the patient's best interests?' (2010) 36 Journal of Medical Ethics 66 
73 [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 
74 ibid [50] (Lord Phillips MR) 
75 [1993] Fam 15 
76 ibid 26-27 (Donaldson of Lymington MR) 
77 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67 [19] (Hale LJ) 
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refuse “what is often termed as ‘nursing care’”.78 It would be unlikely that someone would 
wish to refuse this kind of palliative care in any case, but if this Grubb is correct, then 
logically, it would not be possible to refuse this kind of care through an ADRT either. This 
conclusion is also supported by the MCA code (to which anyone providing treatment to an 
incapacitated adult must ‘have regard’)79 which indicates that an ADRT cannot be used to 
refuse “basic or essential care”.80 
Perhaps the next most significant restrictions on the availability of ADRTs are that they 
cannot be created by children or by those who lack mental capacity to make the relevant 
decision.81 This reflects the rule that children generally lack the right to refuse treatment that 
is in their best interests82 and similarly, adults who lack mental capacity to make the specific 
decision in question can be provided with treatment in their best interests.83 However, there 
is no provision to allow Gillick-competent84 children to create an ADRT and it is not 
impossible to envisage circumstances in which a child may wish to create an ADRT (e.g. 
following the diagnosis of a terminal illness) and on this point English law stands in contrast 
to Belgian law under which it is not only possible for children to make ADRTs, but also to 
make advance requests for euthanasia.85  
This position is consistent with the rights that children enjoy in relation to consent to 
contemporaneous treatment. In such cases, children can consent to treatment if they can 
demonstrate that they have capacity,86 but they do not have the same rights as adults to 
refuse consent treatment. Lord Hoffmann remarked in Bland, “English law is, as one would 
expect, paternalist towards minors. But it upholds the autonomy of adults”.87 The court 
retains the power to override a refusal of treatment from a minor in his or her best interests 
where that refusal of treatment would be likely to result in serious injury or death.88  
In respect of adults, the qualification on the right to refuse treatment that has the greatest 
potential effect is that the right can only be enjoyed by those who have mental capacity. 
                                                     
78 A Grubb ‘United Kingdom: Treatment Without Consent: Adult: Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment)’ (1993) 1 Medical Law Review 83, 85 
79 MCA, s 42(4) 
80 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice (The Stationary 
Office, 2007) para 9.28 
81 MCA, s 24(1) 
82 Re W (A Minor Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1992] 4 All ER 627  
83 MCA, s 24(1); Re E (n 10) 
84 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 
85 The Belgian Act on Euthanasia Chapter III, s 4, §1 
86 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wishbech AHA [1986] 1 AC 112; R (on the application of Axon) v 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin) 
87 Bland (n 63) (CA) 827 (Hoffmann LJ) 
88 Re KW and H (Minors) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 854 
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Restricting the right to refuse treatment to those with capacity is a significant deviation from 
the trajectory of the political project aimed at granting individuals greater control and 
responsibility over their lives through choice,89 while restricting patriarchal control. Central 
among the reasons for granting the right to create ADRTs is to provide a means for resting 
back control over medical treatment during a period of incapacity. 
In the foregoing discussion I have sought to explain why the concept of mental capacity 
holds a central place in the law on consent to treatment and a fortiori to the law on ADRTs. 
In the next section, I will turn to explain how the law defines mental capacity and the tests 
the law institutes for its assessment.  
CAPACITY 
One of the most important principles of the MCA is that everyone is presumed to have 
mental capacity unless they are found to lack capacity.90 A finding that a person lacks 
capacity can only be made upon assessment and in relation to a specific decision.91As 
discussed above, a finding that an individual lacks capacity is the primary way in which any 
person can lose the right to refuse treatment (this right might also be lost in the event that the 
person is being detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) for the assessment or 
treatment of a mental disorder). As such, the construction of capacity and the rules 
governing its assessment are of great legal and practical significance.  
If a patient is found to lack capacity in respect of a specific treatment decision, she can 
be given treatment that is in her best interests notwithstanding her refusal of treatment. This 
possibility marks a radical departure from the legal rights enjoyed by adults with capacity 
and given that capacity is a quality that is dependent on a ‘functional test’ (which will be 
discussed later in this section) rather than a particular status, it is possible that any individual 
may lack capacity at a future point in time. Adult persons who satisfy the test of capacity are 
accorded the full support of the law in denying any medical intervention to which they do 
not consent.92 Patients need give no reason for any refusal of treatment and if they do give a 
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reason, there is no requirement that it be rational, or moral.93 The possibility that capacity 
might be lost in future and might be averse to receiving treatment that might otherwise be 
provided in his or her best interests is the sole raison d’être of the ADRT.   
The current law that governs mental capacity in England and Wales is found in the 
MCA. One of the central objectives of the MCA was to draw together the common law on 
capacity into one statute.94 The pursuit of that objective has meant that the MCA addresses 
matters beyond the provision of medical treatment, but those matters will be the focus of the 
discussion here. To begin with, section 1 lists some general principles that apply. 
1 The principles 
(1) The following principles apply for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that 
he lacks capacity. 
(3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success. 
(4) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because 
he makes an unwise decision. 
(5) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a 
person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. 
(6) Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to 
whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in 
a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of action. 
Perhaps the most important of these principles is that no one can be deemed as lacking 
in capacity unless this is proven in relation to a specific decision.95 This is a principle that 
reflects the pre-existing common law position.96 Its effect is that the evidential burden of 
establishing incapacity falls on the party who contests the capacity of the patient. Section 
1(3) imposes an obligation to assist a person in arriving at a decision before concluding that 
they lack capacity to decide. Section 1(4) rearticulates the common law position from Re T 
that the perceived wisdom of a decision is not to be considered as a factor in the assessment 
of capacity.97 A post-MCA example of the application in this section can be seen in Heart of 
England v JB in which it was said that the “isolated instances of eccentric reasoning” were 
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not sufficient evidence from which incapacity could be deduced.98 Section 1(5) demands that 
decisions are made in the best interests of those who lack capacity. It has been suggested that 
that section 1(5) impliedly precludes the possibility of relying on ADRTs that are not in 
accordance with the best interests where a person has changed so much since creating the 
ADRT that they might be considered to be a different person.99 However, such a reading of 
the law would render the provisions of sections 24-26 MCA redundant and is at odds with 
the way the law has subsequently been interpreted.100 On the basis that Parliament would not 
have gone to the trouble of debating and enacting redundant legislative provisions, section 
1(5) cannot be read in such a way as to require the terms of ADRTs to conform with the best 
interests test (from section 4 MCA). 
Section 1(6) sets out a principle of minimum intervention in seeking to achieve a 
person’s best interests in order to maximise the “rights and freedom of action” of the person 
being treated. The application of this principle can be seen clearly in applications for 
sterilisation which have been dismissed by the courts such as A Local Authority v K101and Re 
A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation)102 where the courts decided that there were other, 
less invasive, ways that could be employed to avoid conception. 
One principle not directly stated but which can be identified from the totality of the 
provisions in section 1, and in the MCA more generally, is that of functionalism. The 
functionalist doctrine prescribes a test for capacity based on the ability of the assessed 
person to function and can be contrasted with the status-based approach, which is grounded 
in the contention that capacity can be discerned from a person’s status (particularly in 
relation to any mental health diagnoses).103 The ‘status approach’ can be considered 
problematic because evidence of a mental disorder does not necessarily, and of itself, render 
a person incapable of making decisions. Under the auspices of the functionalism, whether 
the patient has a mental disorder is considered irrelevant (although they must be suffering an 
“impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain”104), as is all the 
patient history irrelevant. The main concern is whether the patient can satisfy prescribed 
tests which are used to identify competence to make the particular decision being faced. This 
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is related to the principle that no one is to be treated as being unable to make a decision 
merely on the basis that the decision they wish to make may be considered unwise.105 The 
functionalist credentials of the MCA are made plain in section 2 which describes when a 
person lacks capacity: 
2 People who lack capacity 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a 
matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in 
relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain. 
The MCA code of practice lists dementia, learning difficulties and the “symptoms of 
alcohol or drug use” among other things as factors which may lead to the relevant kind of 
“impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning, of the mind or brain”.106 Section 2(2) 
makes clear that the relevant kind of impairment or disturbance can be of a transient nature 
or of a longer lasting nature. The relevant kind of impairment or disturbance must be 
established as part of the assessment of capacity prior to considering the next question, 
which is whether the disturbance or impairment has caused the person to be unable to make 
a decision.  
The current test for determining whether a person is unable to make a decision is found 
in section 3 MCA and owes much to the three stage test propounded by Thorpe J in Re C107 
viz 1) whether the patient can comprehend and retain the relevant information, 2) whether 
the patient believes the information being given to them and 3) whether the patient can 
weigh and balance the information they have received in order to arrive at a decision. 
Section 3 of the MCA states: 
3 Inability to make decisions 
(1) For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for 
himself if he is unable— 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or 
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(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or 
any other means). 
The first requirement of the test is that the person being assessed must be able to 
“understand the information relevant to the decision”.108 This is aimed at ensuring that those 
making decisions are able to do so on an informed basis. The MCA makes clear that this is 
not a requirement to be able to retain the information permanently. Section 3(3) MCA states 
that no one is to be treated as being unable to make a decision where they only retain the 
relevant information for a “short period”, indeed the information need only be retained for as 
long as is necessary to make the decision.109 The prominent place of these informational tests 
reflects the great weight bestowed upon the communication of information as part of the 
consent process. The next requirement is that the person must retain that information.  
Section 3(4) provides an indication of the kind of information that is material to the 
capacity assessment. It states that the relevant information includes “information about the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of – a) deciding one way or another b) failing to make 
a decision”. In the case of A Local Authority v A110  Bodey J opined that “wider social 
consequences”111 should not be included in the purview of the information required to make 
the decision and that where a decision can be construed as a medical decision, it is the 
“proximate medical issues”112 which comprises the relevant information. 
The requirement for the information to be ‘believed’ that was espoused in Re C has not 
been replicated in s.3 of the MCA. However, it has been argued that a person who does not 
believe in the information that is presented to them would still fail the test of capacity under 
the new law on either section 3(1)(a) or section 3(1)(c).113 The belief criterion found in the 
pre-MCA version of the test for capacity was also alluded to in the 2014 case A NHS 
Foundation Trust v Ms X (By Her Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor)114 as part of a 
capacity assessment made by Dr A (a consultant psychiatrist who was held out as being 
experienced in making such assessments).115 This insistence on the belief criterion was 
erroneous, but of no material consequence in that case.   
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One important objection to the reliance on these tests for capacity is that whether the 
patient can satisfy the tests may be heavily influenced by the adequacy of the 
communication and presentation of that information by the healthcare  professional 
(“HCP”).116 Chapter Three of the MCA Code of Practice sets out how people should be 
helped to make decisions. It explains how information can be presented to make it easier for 
patients to understand and how people should be given time and support to make their 
decisions. The aspiration is very noble, but it is by no means certain that this advice is 
adopted in practice and unless a case is brought to the attention of a court or an ethics 
committee, it is unlikely that a capacity assessment will be scrutinised.  Consequently there 
is a considerable component of what is being tested here which is not entirely attributable to 
the patient. In this respect, these first two criteria could also serve as a test for the 
competence of the HCPs communication; however the substantive consequence of failing 
the test is only directly felt by the patient, and not the HCP.  
The third requirement in the assessment criteria is that the patient must be able to weigh 
and balance the information given to them. This criterion is said to require “emotional 
competence”117 on the part of the patient. However, the patient’s ability to demonstrate this 
will be looked at from the perspective of, in the first instance, the assessor, and ultimately, 
the court and these perspectives are value-laden prisms.118 It may be difficult for the assessor 
to detach themselves from their own opinion on what weight should be given to the relevant 
factors (particularly as the assessor is likely to be the HCP who has proposed the particular 
treatment).119  This may be a particular risk where the outcome of the decision may risk the 
life of the patient.120 This is perhaps the most controversial element of the test for capacity, 
because it intrudes so far into the patient’s judgement process and gives the appearance of 
prescribing certain decision-making criteria of the kind that cannot be required of those with 
mental capacity.121 Herein lies the paradox: one who has capacity is free to make an 
unbalanced judgement, but where capacity is under examination, evidence that the material 
decision is unbalanced is evidence, in part, that capacity is lacking. 
In a more fundamental sense, we might ask why a person should be required to weigh 
and balance information before making a decision. What is wrong with making snap 
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decisions? What is wrong with making decisions on the basis of intuition without comparing 
alternative possibilities? Indeed, society promotes some decisions to be made under 
conditions which are known to militate against rationality. For example, it is commonly 
thought that people get married because they have fallen in love, but (even accepting the 
empirical veracity of this) we know that love can become delusional122 and yet “we allow 
people to  consent to marriage who are ‘madly’ in love”.123 Arguably, the bias in favour of 
the decisions involving weight and balance promotes a certain kind of decision-making and 
excludes the making of ‘irrational’ decisions. This is to be contrasted with the way in which 
the principle of individual autonomy is construed in law as allowing a person to make a 
decision for any reason, even ones which are irrational, or no reason at all.124 Coupled with 
this, the foundation of the MCA (which has codified the old law125 and many of the 
principles already to be found in the common law126) is the doctrine of functionalism.127 The 
functionalist aspirations of the MCA can be seen in the provisions that ensure that people 
should not be treated as though they lack capacity based on assumptions relating to their 
behaviour.128 Instead the focus is on the ability to process information (s.3) and this focus 
prevents untested behavioural assumptions being used to deny a person’s capacity. 
Although the functionalist approach can be implied in the written law, this is no 
guarantee that functionalism will be realised in practice. Where the reasons underlying a 
decision are deemed to be absurd or irrational, there would seem to be a greater likelihood 
that capacity will be scrutinised more closely. And given that those who will be placing it 
under scrutiny (at least in the first instance) by those who have some cause to doubt 
capacity, it would seem that there would be a greater likelihood that capacity would be 
found lacking. Because whatever picture of disinterested functionalism is painted, assessing 
capacity is ultimately a normative endeavour129 and by denying capacity under certain 
conditions, but not others, a view is declared regarding which kind of decisions are good, as 
well as which kind of conditions are necessary for good decision-making.  
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Suspicions over the true commitment to a functionalist standpoint may be fuelled by part 
of the recommendations of Joint Parliamentary Committee’s report on the Mental Incapacity 
Bill130, which stated: 
We recognise that advance decisions which they may not otherwise wish to 
make may be made by those suffering from depression, stress or other 
conditions that would affect their judgment... We therefore recommend that 
the Codes of Practice should require doctors to satisfy themselves that any 
advance refusal of treatment is valid and applicable.131  
The implied message is that people who are suffering from depression or even mere 
stress are not competent to make valid advance directives and that HCPs can rely on 
evidence of such a state of mind at the material time in order to avoid being bound by any 
such decision. Plainly this message is at odds with the functionalist approach and the spirit 
of the provisions of section 4 of the MCA. It might also be questioned whether a true 
functionalism is really possible in practice. 
Moreover, special concerns have been raised over the assessment of capacity of 
psychiatric patients132 and Haywood has also argued that in practice it may be difficult to 
dissociate the existence of a mental disorder from the assessment of capacity because “there 
is a view among judges that the very nature of the underlying mental illness from which a 
patient is suffering makes it impossible to meet the functional requirement of using and 
weighing the relevant information to make a decision”.133 This lends to the suspicion that 
test for capacity is not merely a scientific test of cognitive functionality, but a “moral” 
test.134 
Concerns over the strict adherence to functionalist pretentions aside, the MCA also adds 
a new stage to the old common law test from Re C: the requirement that the patient must be 
able to communicate their decision. The MCA explanatory notes also suggest that section 
3(1)(d) is a “residual category” and that it will “only affect a small number of persons”.135 At 
face value this provision seems sensible, but in practice, the ability to communicate a 
decision may be affected by factors which are beyond the control of the patient. In order to 
attempt to counteract the possibility that a person could be unfairly denied her or his 
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opportunity to make a choice, the MCA imposes an obligation to take “all practicable steps” 
have been taken to help the person to make the decision. It is slightly unclear as to what all 
practical steps may mean in day-to-day reality with all the time pressures of modern medical 
practice. If a very restrictive view is taken as to what constitutes “all practicable steps”  a 
person with a stammer,  for example, may be rendered incompetent by an impatient or 
unsympathetic HCP. This requirement also could deny the legal rights of some patients, such 
as those in a persistent vegetative state, who might be able to communicate, where they can 
be provided with the technological means to do so.136 
Theoretically these problems are set to arise frequently as capacity should be established 
prior to each occasion on which consent is sought and as has already been discussed, any 
patient wishing to create an ADRT must have capacity and it must be shown that they have 
lost capacity before the ADRT will come into actual effect. However, the Code of Practice137 
states that a full assessment should only be made where capacity is in doubt.138 Again 
though, it seems implicit that the party casting doubt will be an HCP and the discretion that 
this affords them surely beholds a significant retention of systemic paternalism. So it can be 
seen that the repeated invocation of the tests for incapacity could be used instrumentally, in 
order to create self-doubt in the mind of the patient and pressurise them to comply. For if an 
HCP decides to test the patient’s capacity following their refusal to undergo a specific form 
of treatment, even if the patient is found to have capacity, an air of suspicion will have been 
raised over his or her mental capacity. This suspicion may be implied in the written records 
that the doctor makes and may be transmitted to other healthcare professionals, which may, 
in turn, influence their perception of the patient.139 The influence of this suspicion is 
heightened by the fact that it is made by a well-respected class of person (a doctor or HCP) 
and is made during the course of a professional activity which considered of great social 
utility: the practice of medicine. The ultimate consequence may be that the patient will be 
found to lack capacity and those who test for capacity may find the result they sought. 
The courts have noted that there is a danger that those who perform capacity 
assessments may have a bias towards protecting the patient, because that is one of the central 
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functions of their job.140 Moreover, it should be remembered that the assessment of capacity 
is something that happens routinely without going to court141 and many assessments of 
capacity are unlikely to receive legal scrutiny. Problems such as these pre-existed the MCA 
framework, particularly in relation to decisions where life-saving treatment was being 
refused, people were found to lack in capacity e.g. Re E.142 This brought into plain view the 
tension between the law’s commitment to autonomy and its commitment to the sanctity of 
life.143 However, it has also been suggested that in other cases, such as Re C, the courts have 
not found capacity lacking where the patient has refused life-saving treatment, because the 
life of that particular patient is implicitly not considered to be of sufficiently great value.144 
The possibility that there could be some truth in such a suggestion demands that we give 
greater thought to the level of discretion available to HCPs and the courts in determining 
capacity.  
This is not to suggest any malevolent attitude on the part of the HCP, but when HCPs 
carry out capacity assessments, they will be doing so in a particular environment, with a 
particular professional identity and may thus embody certain values, which, in turn, may 
have some effect on their assessment.145 This is not the fault of HCPs it is merely to be 
expected. But we must therefore be alive to the fact that the decision to declare another 
person incapable of making a specific decision may be motivated by personal opinion 
regarding what is best for that person. If it is known that a certain kind of treatment is 
commonly indicated as being within a person’s best interests in a given situation as is facing 
the patient under assessment, which the assessor also considers best for the patient, there 
may be some motivation to find the patient lacking in capacity, because then the best 
interests treatment could be provided (even if it went against the will of the patient). Indeed, 
in relation to mental disorders, it has been found that where treatment is refused, capacity is 
found to be lacking on more than 90% of instances.146 At first sight, ADRTs might be 
thought of as a way to nullify such a problem, for if the HCP (assessor) does consider there 
to be a lack of capacity in relation to a specific decision, then the ADRT, in so far as it 
speaks to the circumstances of the decision, should take effect. However, if the patient does 
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have such an ADRT, there may be a motivation, in addition to finding the patient incapable 
of making the relevant decision, to find fault with the ADRT. One way to do this would be 
for the HCP to cast doubt on the capacity of the same person both at the time that they 
present themselves, but also at the time that they created the ADRT itself. A successful 
argument in relation to both of these factors would result in the ability to provide treatment 
to the patient in accordance with her best interests. 
Added to the concerns that HCPs may be motivated to find capacity lacking, there 
remains the considerable concern that those assessing capacity may not know how to assess 
it correctly.147 For instance, in NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Treatment)148 the 
consultant psychiatrist who interviewed the patient who had signed an ADRT said: “I say 
she does not have the capacity because she is affected by [borderline] personality 
disorder”.149A person is not to be deemed to lack capacity merely on the strength of a 
diagnosed mental disorder. However, similar objections might be raised against Wall P’s 
judgment in DH NHS Foundation Trust v PS150 where he concluded from a psychiatrist’s 
report that PS did not have mental capacity “to make decisions concerning her future 
medical treatment”.151 The MCA is concerned with capacity at the point of making a specific 
decision152, not future decisions in general. 
MENTAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND ADRTS 
Various problems with these criteria, which cannot be explored in detail here153, but 
given that the test for capacity is of such importance for the validity of ADRTs something 
must be said. This is because assessment of capacity is relevant on at least two separate 
occasions for ADRTs: at the moment of their creation154 and at the moment of their 
application.155 This double relevance of assessment compounds problems associated with 
each separate aspect of the test. But there is an additional difficulty here, because at least one 
assessment of capacity is likely to be retrospective (unless the patient had their ADRT 
witnessed by an HCP or had other evidence that they had capacity at the material time) this 
means that the assessment must be made based on current information about a previous state 
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of mind, which may often be sparse and incomplete. This requires assessors to make 
important judgments with limited evidence.156 
This places anyone wishing to create an ADRT in an invidious position, because they 
must express their decision in a clear and precise way if it is to be recognised as valid157 and 
naturally the author may wish to offer the reasons for their decision to demonstrate that they 
comprehend the kind of medical treatment which they are minded to decline. However, in 
doing so, it would be legitimate to have concern that the reasons given might not be 
considered sound or rational by others. Indeed, anyone making an ADRT will necessarily 
reason differently from what they anticipate others would consider to be in their best 
interests. In turn, it is possible that such people may be discouraged from making an ADRT, 
if they consider that their decision, or the reasons for it, may cast doubt on their mental 
constitution.  
At the beginning of this section, it was emphasised that the concept of capacity and the 
rules surrounding its assessment are of great importance for the law on ADRTs, because 
mental capacity is a fundamental condition on the creation of ADRTs. Its importance is so 
great in this area, because a person must have capacity to create an ADRT158 in the first 
place and must lack mental capacity before the ADRT can take binding effect as a refusal of 
treatment.159 It is for this reason that it has been vital to look at some of the defects in the law 
on capacity and its assessment. The commonality of the concerns that have been identified 
and discussed thus far is their paternalism. Providing greater power and discretion to HCPs 
in the assessment of capacity and of the validity of ADRTs increases the fragility of the 
patient’s right to autonomy in practice insofar as ADRTs are designed to increase patient 
autonomy (or self-determination, or choice, or empowerment etc). These themes will be 
considered further in the second part of this thesis. 
However, any fears of patient’s the will being substituted with that of the HCP can be 
somewhat allayed, because where capacity is lacking, treatment can only be given if it is in 
accordance with the best interests of the patient.160 The modern conceptualisation of best 
interests is designed at creating a significant protective boundary from the decision-making 
of the HCP. Furthermore, as shall be seen in the next section, the patient’s own views have 
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taken on an even more prominent role since the enactment of the MCA. This change is well 
aligned with the more general move towards increased patient rights and patient choice.161 
Given this, it becomes crucial to explore further the meaning of the legal conceptualisation 
of best interests. 
BEST INTERESTS 
In stark contrast to the legal position that governs mentally competent adults, persons 
who lack capacity can be given treatment if that treatment is shown to be in their ‘best 
interests’.162 Indeed, HCPs are under a duty to provide patients with treatment that is 
clinically indicated and in best interests of the patient.163 Therefore, it is important to have 
some appreciation of how best interests are determined.  
Best interests treatments were once determined in accordance with the Bolam test.164 
This test required a doctor to be able to prove that, under the same circumstances, “a 
responsible body of medical men” 165  would have thought the same treatment to be proper, 
for the court to recognise that they had acted in accordance with their duty of care. As such, 
it was very difficult for the claimant to prove that any treatment given was not in his or her 
best interests. This gave doctors near total control in deciding what treatment to administer 
where capacity was lacking.166  
It has been argued that Bolam could have been interpreted imposing a normative 
standard on the medical profession (i.e. setting a standard to which practitioners should 
adhere), but it was instead interpreted as merely placing an onus on medical practitioners to 
prove that their actions were in accordance the standard of care that was observably normal 
in practice.167 Such an interpretation would have enabled the courts to intervene more readily 
to regulate medical standards through the imposition of external norms. However, 
subsequent legal developments, particularly the case of Bolitho, have largely achieved that 
goal and have  reined-in the power of medics in the determination of best interests by 
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introducing the onto the Bolam test the rider that demands that the standards of medical 
practice must withstand logical scrutiny.168  
Section 4 of the MCA now stipulates a number of factors that must be taken into account 
in the assessment of best interests. Notably, it has made extra-clinical matters relevant such 
as the emotional and social impact of the treatment to consider in the determination of best 
interests.169 Significantly, HCPs are now under a duty to consider the preferences of the 
individual and to take reasonable steps to establish what those preferences would have been 
where that person cannot express them for themselves.170  
These various factors are to be assessed in relation to the ‘balance sheet’ approach 
advocated in Re A (Male Sterilisation)171, which involves consideration of the pros and cons 
of each particular possible treatment, which fall within the range of treatments available 
under a Bolam assessment172, on a balance sheet before deciding on whether the treatment 
should be provided.173  
This appears to be an even-handed and sensible way of finding out what is in a person’s 
best interests. However, the decision as to what weight to give these preferences is 
ultimately one for the courts to make. Mr Justice Munby made clear in ITW v Z that the 
weight that would be given to patient preferences would vary from case to case.174 He also 
suggested that the weight that should be attached to the patient’s own views could vary with 
the degree of their incapacity and an assessment as to whether the views are sensible.175 
Such a position can be read in contrast to the fierce defences of the right to refuse treatment 
espoused some cases on consent to treatment. 
The question of how much weight to accord to the patient’s own wishes becomes 
particularly acute when there is a conflict between the wishes of the patient and medical 
opinion.  Clearly, for all its simplistic appeal, the ‘balance sheet’ approach still requires the 
taking of normative decisions and therefore reasons which may be very important to some 
people may be accorded ‘no weight’ on the normative outlook of HCPs or the courts. This is 
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illustrated in the case of NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Treatment ).176 The court 
was asked to grant an interim declaration against the patient’s purported ADRT and to 
permit her carers to administer treatment. The declaration was granted because, after 
balancing a number of factors, the scales tipped in favour of providing treatment (which was 
considered life-saving).  In his judgment, Judge Charles gave “no weight” and no “great 
weight” respectively for the two reasons that she provided in refusing treatment (she thought 
that her blood was evil and she thought that the patient was in a vicious cycle of 
circumstance which she felt she could not endure) in the assessment of her best interests.177 
This notwithstanding the fact that factors which relate to the patient’s views and beliefs are 
required to be taken into account (according to the MCA code of practice178) in the 
assessment of best interests. In this case, it appeared that this requirement did not present 
any kind of obstacle to the overriding of her wishes. If such factors can be quite so easily 
dismissed, it must be questioned exactly how much of a safeguard this new requirement is. 
Examples such as these show a certain reluctance to retreat too far from traditional 
paternalistic reasoning. Jackson highlights the central tension surrounding the competing 
tests for capacity as being the desire to retain individual control and autonomy over 
decision-making and the desire to protect the vulnerable from harm.179 However, if we 
accept the premise that mental capacity should determine the legal right to refuse 
treatment180 then the erroneous acceptance of consent of someone who in fact lacks capacity 
could be as harmful as wrongfully finding someone lacking in capacity and providing them 
with treatment which they do not want. Though this may not be recognised by the legal 
system as tort lawyers would immediately demand to know what harm has been done in the 
former situation, because if the patient was not capable of consenting, then the same 
treatment could have been provided in their best interests in any case, and the HCP has a 
duty to provide treatment which is clinically accepted. Therefore there is likely to be little 
difference between any treatment provided and any treatment that would have been provided 
following a ‘best interests’ assessment. The suspicion therefore remains that as long as the 
patient agrees with medical opinion, their mental capacity is unlikely to be contested in 
court. 
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The same paternalistic rational which underlies the rhetoric of protecting the vulnerable, 
which Jackson discusses,181 is similar to that which is used to justify the provision of 
treatment without consent in emergency situations.182  
Where, for example, a surgeon performs an operation without his 
consent on a patient temporarily rendered unconscious in an 
accident, he should do no more than is reasonably required, in the 
best interests of the patient, before he recovers consciousness. I can 
see no practical difficulty arising from this requirement, which 
derives from the fact that the patient is expected before long to 
regain consciousness and can then be consulted about longer term 
measures.183 
Though this statement of law pre-dates the MCA, the same immunity still presumably 
subsists for HCPs under the doctrine of necessity.184 This situation could be greatly 
complicated if it were unclear as to whether the injury was, in fact, accidental in nature. 
Would the same reasoning hold in a situation where it was clear that the injured party had 
attempted suicide? In such a situation, the will of the injured party was to die and thus a 
deliberate decision to intervene and attempt to prevent their death is surely a violation of 
their autonomous wishes. However, the MCA Code states that “if the person is clearly 
suicidal, this may raise questions about their capacity to make an advance decision”185, 
which suggests that an attempted suicide is commonly a decision taken without capacity. 
The same may be true for emergency surgery to repair a partially severed limb, where the 
patient had tried to remove the limb themselves pursuant to their apotemnophilia.186  
However, the very idea that we (or the courts), as an extraneous entity, can arrive at a 
determination that person’s best interests is internally contradicted in medical law.187 As a 
proposition, it plainly relies on an objective yardstick in its suggestion that those other than 
the patient themselves can define ‘best interests’ for the patient. This idea sits uneasily with 
the way in which the law on the refusal of treatment has developed to protect self-
determination188 and informed consent.189 These developments are normatively subjectivist: 
the patient themselves should be able to refuse treatment they believe is not in their best 
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interests rather than a medical professional. The development of ADRTs is an 
acknowledgement that individuals may well not agree with the objective determination of 
what is best for them.190 The increasing importance of the consideration of the individual 
preferences and wishes in the determination of best interests can be seen as a further 
indication of the problematic nature of an objective standard of best interests and this theme 
will be taken up in the second and third parts of this thesis. Consequently, as will be 
discussed, the modern manifestation of best interests as a legal standard demonstrates a 
much greater sensitivity to those subjective interests than ever before. 
Some of the most difficult cases in which the court must make a decision on behalf of a 
person who lacks capacity arise from applications for the sterilisation of the patient. A Local 
Authority v K was one such case.191 K was a 21 year old woman with Down’s syndrome and 
learning difficulties. Her parents were concerned that, as she became sexually active, there 
was a risk that she may become pregnant and would be unable to cope with motherhood. At 
first, hormone-based contraceptives were trialled, but these produced behavioural difficulties 
in K. In consequence, her parents wanted thought that it would be best for K to be sterilised. 
However, the Court of Protection found that this would not be in K’s best interests, because 
it was a more invasive and a more permanent step than was required to achieve the goal of 
preventing her pregnancy. This provides an illustration of the kinds of concerns that the 
courts must balance. 
Similar difficult decisions had also been discussed in earlier cases, such as Re A 
(Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation).192 At the time of the judgment A was a 28 year old 
man who had Down’s syndrome and an intellectual impairment that bordered on severe. He 
was being cared for by his mother who was 63, but there was a concern that if she became 
incapable of caring for him (her own health was deteriorating) and he were then moved into 
a residential care facility, that he might fraternise with other people and might become 
sexually active.  
One of the interesting aspects of this case, in terms of the procedure that was adopted in 
determining best interests, was Lord Thorpe’s use of a ‘balance sheet’ approach. This 
involved the listing of all of the benefits of the operation, set against a list of all of the 
disbenefits of the operation, before judging as at to whether the benefits outweighed the 
disbenefits. As this was a pre-MCA case, Lord Thorpe was not bound to consider all of the 
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factors listed in section 4 and as a consequence of this did not consider the past or present 
views of the patient.193  
Difficulties can also arise in demonstrating that a particular procedure is in the best 
interests of the patient themselves where the primary beneficiary of the procedure may 
appear to be another person. One pre-MCA example of this is Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone 
Marrow Donation).194 It was held to be in the best interests of a patient who lacked capacity 
to donate bone marrow to her sister, who was suffering from a form of leukaemia. The 
rationale was that if Y’s sister were to die, it would be very harmful for Y’s mother with the 
result that she may not be able to maintain contact with Y. If all this were to come to pass, it 
would have been socially and psychologically detrimental to Y’s health.   
In Re S and Another (Protected Persons)195 Judge Hazel Marshall QC opined that the 
MCA has effected “a whole sea change in the attitude of the law to persons whose mental 
capacity is impaired”.196 Following the MCA entering into force, determining what form of 
treatment may be provided patient’s best interests is a judgment to be made in accordance 
with the process that is set out by section 4 MCA, which states the following: 
4 Best interests 
(1) In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a person’s best 
interests, the person making the determination must not make it merely on 
the basis of—  
(a) the person’s age or appearance, or 
(b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others 
to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best interests. 
(2) The person making the determination must consider all the relevant 
circumstances and, in particular, take the following steps. 
(3) He must consider— 
(a) whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity in 
relation to the matter in question, and 
(b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be. 
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(4) He must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the 
person to participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as 
possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him. 
(5) Where the determination relates to life-sustaining treatment he must not, 
in considering whether the treatment is in the best interests of the person 
concerned, be motivated by a desire to bring about his death. 
(6) He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 
(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any 
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
had capacity, and 
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do 
so. 
(7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult 
them, the views of— 
(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in 
question or on matters of that kind, 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and 
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court, as to what would be in 
the person’s best interests and, in particular, as to the matters mentioned in 
subsection (6). 
(8) The duties imposed by subsections (1) to (7) also apply in relation to the 
exercise of any powers which— 
(a) are exercisable under a lasting power of attorney, or 
(b) are exercisable by a person under this Act where he reasonably believes 
that another person lacks capacity. 
(9) In the case of an act done, or a decision made, by a person other than the 
court, there is sufficient compliance with this section if (having complied 
with the requirements of subsections (1) to (7)) he reasonably believes that 
what he does or decides is in the best interests of the person concerned. 
(10) “Life-sustaining treatment” means treatment which in the view of a 
person providing health care for the person concerned is necessary to sustain 
life. 
(11) “Relevant circumstances” are those— 
(a) of which the person making the determination is aware, and 
(b) which it would be reasonable to regard as relevant. 
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Section 4(1) reflects the MCA’s commitment to the ‘functional approach’ to capacity in 
that it prohibits decisions from being taken on the basis of a person’s age, appearance or 
their behaviour. This means that assessments should be conducted through the examination 
of particular observations (which section 4(2) demands the assessor to have in 
contemplation) and conclusions should not be drawn on the mere basis of generalised, 
prejudicial, assumptions about certain people or groups (although it is questionable whether 
this is possible in practice)197. Section 4 also serves as a reminder that once capacity is lost, it 
is not necessarily lost forever. Thus, section 4(3) emphasises the need for those making 
decisions on best interests to consider whether the person will regain capacity and when they 
are likely to do so. 
Even though the corollary of the loss of capacity is the loss of the right to make a legally 
binding refusal of treatment, the MCA makes it clear that the person to whom the treatment 
decision will apply should be involved in the decision-making process as far as possible 
even if she or he is not permitted to determine the outcome of the decision.198 A related 
requirement which keeps the best interests assessment focussed on the patient is to be found 
in the requirement to consider the patients past and present wishes.199 A good example of the 
approach of the courts can be seen in the case of A local Authority v JH.200 In that case there 
was a question as to whether it was in the best interests of an elderly woman to remain at 
home with her husband or to be taken into a care home. It was suggested that the care home 
could have provided better medical and nursing care, but JH wanted to remain at home with 
her husband of thirty years and the judgment was swayed by JH’s strong desire to remain at 
home. More recently, in Re N the strong in indication that N would not have wished to have 
been kept alive in an MCS led to the determination that treatment should be withdrawn.201 
These cases illustrate how patient preferences can sometimes be the deciding factor, even 
when they run counter to the medical conception of what would be best.  
In Re S and Another (Protected Persons)202 Judge Hazel Marshall QC suggested that the 
way the MCA is structured indicates that “the views and wishes of P in regard to decisions 
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made on his behalf are to carry great weight”.203 In R (Burke) v General Medical Council204 
it was said that the MCA emphasises the need to “see the patient as an individual”.205  
Mr Justice Munby gave further detail as to the weight to the patient’s wishes in Re M 
(Statutory Will)206 remarking that the patient’s wishes may carry “preponderant” weight.207 
Despite this rhetorical support, other cases have given less prominence to the views of the 
patient.208 In Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v TH209 the patient, TH, 
was described as someone who had a general dislike of authority and as a “non-tactile 
person”.210 TH was a drummer, but became unable to continue playing after developing 
Ataxia. It was reported that he “hated the fact that he had to rely on people”211 and that he 
wanted to leave hospital and go home to die.212 Despite these strong feelings TH had not 
made an ADRT,213 thus these feelings could only comprise one component of the assessment 
of best interests that must be put into the matrix of best interests.214  
This requirement to consider the patient’s views and interests was absent from old 
common law approach to the assessment of best interests.215 Its inclusion within the MCA 
has been welcomed by Donnelly, but she also sounded a warning about the evidential 
difficulties that may arise in ascertaining past (and perhaps present) wishes.216 Cases such as 
A Primary Care Trust v P illustrate the potential for family members to influence the 
construction of the patient’s preferences. 217  
The problem of the influence of those close to the patient may be compounded by the 
requirement of section 4(7), which stipulates that the views of certain other people must be 
sought as part of the process of determining best interests. The categories persons whose 
views must be considered are listed in section 4(7). The list includes anyone nominated by 
the person (in respect of whom the decision is being made) with an interest in that person’s 
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welfare and any donee of a lasting power of attorney (“LPA”) or any court appointed 
deputy. 
LASTING POWERS OF ATTORNEY 
The confines of space preclude a detailed discussion of LPAs, and indeed, because their 
existence has a different ethical and political basis to that of ADRTs, they are not of direct 
relevance to this thesis. However, as instruments which may be created alongside ADRTs, a 
brief discussion of LPAs is certainly warranted at this juncture.  
LPAs are instruments which give authority to a nominated person (or persons), i.e. the 
donee or donees of an LPA, to make decisions on behalf of a person should they lack 
capacity in future (or, more precisely, if they should be reasonably thought to lack 
capacity).218 They can be created by adults with capacity.219 However, decisions made under 
an LPA must be made in accordance with the best interests of the patient220  and therefore 
the power conferred under and LPA is lesser than the power that a patient has to decide on 
their own medical treatment contemporaneously or anticipatorily. This requirement is 
consistent with section 1(6) MCA which states the principle that all decisions made on the 
basis of the MCA must be made in accordance with the best interests of the person to whom 
the decision applies.  Thus, although there are similarities between LPAs and ADRTs, they 
present their own particular set of challenges.  
Sometimes the court may appoint a deputy to make decisions on behalf of someone who 
lacks capacity.221 The powers that the deputy has are similar to those that can be possessed 
by the donee of an LPA, but can be defined by the court in a specific case. The main 
difference is that the donee of an LPA is nominated by the person to whom it may apply, 
whereas the deputy is appointed by the court.222 
In practice, those who are concerned with their end of life care may wish to make an 
LPA as well as an ADRT. However, great care must be taken when creating both kinds of 
instrument. This is because section 25(2)(b) states that an ADRT will not be valid if powers 
are subsequently conferred on the donee of an LPA in respect of the same areas of medical 
treatment as those covered by the ADRT. Furthermore while the creation of both LPAs and 
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ADRTs (concerning the refusal of life-sustaining treatment) require written documentation, 
LPAs require registration before they are deemed to have been created under section 9(2)(b) 
of the MCA. In Re E223  the documentation was completed on the same day, but the LPA 
was registered subsequently and consequently invalidated the ADRT. The court remedied 
the problem in this case by re-validating the ADRT through a court order (using section 
24(4) MCA). But, this was only possible as the matter came before the court prior to the 
need for the ADRT to be relied upon. If the patient had already lost capacity and the 
specified treatment had become indicated, the LPA would have taken precedence over the 
ADRT. 
Section 4(5) reiterates one of central the principles of the MCA: that a decision made 
under the MCA cannot be motivated by a desire to hasten death. This section is clearly 
designed with the right to life Art 2 ECHR in mind and to support the ethical principle which 
asserts that life has a special value.224 It does not mean, however, that doctors are obliged to 
continue treatment at all costs.225 
Section 4(9) states that where the matter is not brought before a court, it will be 
sufficient for a person providing treatment to demonstrate that they have arrived at the 
decision as to the kind of treatment that should be given, having complied with sections 
4(1)-(7), where the provider of treatment reasonably believes that the treatment is in the best 
interests of the patient. This means that the treatment provider will be judged by an objective 
standard. By contrast, life sustaining treatment is defined subjectively in accordance with 
what the person providing treatment considered as necessary to sustain the patient’s life.226 
A discussion of section 4(10) is absent from the explanatory notes, but the lack of any 
objective gloss is notable and provides medical practitioners with a wide discretion.   
For all of the specific requirements of section 4 MCA, there remains, in the 
determination of what is in a person’s best interests, considerable scope for variations in 
approach, depending on the values that are given priority. This is because even after all of 
the matters in section 4(1)-(7) have been contemplated, there is no guidance as to what 
weight to give each of the factors that must be considered. As lady Hale remarked in Aintree 
NHS Hospital v James227  “[b]eyond this emphasis on the need to see the patient as an 
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individual, with his own values, likes and dislikes, and to consider his best interests in a 
holistic way, the Act [the MCA] gives no further guidance [on determining best 
interests].”228 
The aim of this section was to set out the law on the assessment of best interests under 
the MCA and to indicate some of the important tensions and difficulties that will be 
encountered when making a determination of best interests in individual. One of the most 
notable features of the new law on best interests contained in the MCA is that it requires due 
consideration to be given to the patient’s preferences.229 However, as the discussion in this 
section indicates, the extent to which a patient’s preferences will outweigh other 
considerations is unclear. Having earlier framed ADRTs as mechanisms for avoiding the 
application of treatment in accordance with the best interests standard, it should be pointed 
out that ADRTs can play an important role in the determination of best interests where they 
have failed. 
BEST INTERESTS AND ADRTs 
The only reason for creating and ADRT is in the anticipation that a form of treatment 
may be provided in future in accordance with a best interests assessment that the patient 
would not wish to receive. ADRTs allow this kind of treatment to be refused in a way that 
will become legally binding in the event that capacity is lost and the treatment contemplated 
becomes both clinically indicated and in the best interests of the patient. Where the ADRT is 
effective there is no cause to attempt a determination of best interests.230 If the ADRT is 
defective in a material way, or if it indicates circumstances that have not arisen in the way 
that is specified, it will not be binding. However, a conclusion that the ADRT is not binding 
is not to conclude that it is entirely irrelevant, because its provisions can helpfully assist in 
the determination of best interests.231  
Examples of this are provided by Westminster City Council v Manuela Sykes (By her 
RPR and Litigation friend RS)232 and in An NHS Trust v D233  where the ADRT had not been 
correctly witnessed (a requirement under section 25(6) MCA that will be spelled out in 
greater detail below). The latter case concerned an application by the hospital trust that it 
would be lawful to withdraw medical treatment from D who was in a vegetative state with 
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“no prospect of recovery”.234 The declaration was granted on the grounds that he was in a 
PVS and to continue treatment would be “futile”235, it was also likely that D would not have 
wished to have been kept alive in the circumstances in which he found himself. 
As discussed above, in determining what course of treatment is consistent with a 
patient’s best interests the court retains significant discretion. Despite the heralding of a 
more patient-focussed best interests test through the MCA, the extent to which patient 
preferences are truly accounted for is uncertain. Part of the theoretical attraction of ADRTs 
is that they provide a greater level of certainty for patients with strong preferences to avoid 
being provided with certain forms of treatment. Thus, and having discussed the law 
concerning consent to treatment, capacity and best interests, as part of the background to the 
law on ADRTs, the task in the remainder of this chapter is to set out the provisions that 
specifically define ADRTs. 
THE COMMON LAW ON ADVANCE DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE MCA 
The law on contemporaneous refusals of treatment was discussed earlier in this chapter 
and it was suggested that this area of law forms the foundation of the law of ADRTs. The 
modern law on ADRTs is widely considered to have been heavily influenced by a paper 
written by the US lawyer Luis Kutzner.236 In his 1969 paper, he argued that patients ought to 
have the right to refuse treatment anticipatorily in the same way, and with the same legal 
force as they may refuse treatment contemporaneously (as discussed above). This reasoning 
was subsequently recognised by Mr Justice Munby in HE v Hospital NHS Trust,237 where he 
stated that: 
“An advance directive is after all nothing more or less than embodiment of 
the patient's autonomy and right to self-determination…”238  
This statement was not the first time ADRTs were recognised in English law. Indeed the 
right to create an ADRT was recognised obiter in one of the most important cases in English 
medical law Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.239 The case arose after a patient who had been 
injured in the Hillsborough disaster entered into a Vegetative State (“VS”). In the 
circumstances, the question arose as to whether the patient, Anthony Bland, should be kept 
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alive (and indeed whether the cessation of the medical treatment that was supporting his life 
would give rise to any liability). The medical practitioners treating Anthony would not face 
prosecution for withdrawing the treatment which was sustaining his life as there was no duty 
on medical practitioners to continue treatment that was not in a patient’s best interests.240 In 
Anthony’s case, the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (“ANH”) could be 
characterised as an omission to provide treatment rather than a positive act of killing.241 But 
the courts laid claim to a continuing role for themselves in this area as overseers through the 
suggestion this case should not be seen as a general precedent applicable to all PVS patients, 
but that all cases in which there is a question about the possible withdrawal of ANH from 
PVS patients should be adjudicated by the court.242 
Lady Butler-Sloss went further and (in a line of argument that will be considered in 
much greater detail in the next chapter) asserted that this right of “self-determination” 
entailed a right to make anticipatory legally binding refusals of treatment. 243 
Further notable confirmation of the possibility of creating ADRTs at common law was 
given in the 2001 case of AK.244 The patient in that case had Motor Neurone Disease 
(“MND”), a progressive and degenerative neurological condition, which can result in the 
loss of movement. He created an advance statement to refuse treatment through the only 
means of communication he had left: blinking. The decision that was created in this way was 
clear and was upheld. This result was achieved in similar circumstances under the MCA in X 
v XB.245 
The case of Re T246 gave further discussion of the parameters of the law on ADRTs. 
Miss T was injured in a road traffic accident. She was pregnant at the time of the accident 
and her child was subsequently delivered stillborn by caesarean section and because of this 
Miss T required a blood transfusion. However, Miss T was a Jehovah’s Witness (although 
there was a dispute as to her degree of commitment to the tenets of that faith) and blood 
transfusions are strictly prohibited for adherents of that faith.  
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Lord Donaldson MR restated the principle that all patients have a “right to self-
determination” but noted that this right can come into conflict with the societal interest in the 
preservation of life.247 However, he opined, in respect of individuals who retain capacity, 
that such conflicts must be resolved in favour of the rights of the individual.248 Further, Lord 
Donaldson implied that refusals of treatment can take future effect and can survive the loss 
of capacity. If the patient had made an anticipatory refusal of treatment the medical team 
must ask whether the scope of the refusal of treatment includes the circumstances that are 
presented.249 If this is the case and if the anticipatory choice is “clearly established” then it 
“would bind the practitioner”.250 
However, ADRTs arguably bring with them additional concerns beyond those which are 
at issue in ordinary refusal of treatment cases. One such concern is that ADRTs could be 
expressed in vague terms, which would then create problems as to whether any 
circumstances that later arise are within the parameters of those specified by the author. It 
would then be unclear whether the author would have wanted to refuse treatment in the 
obtaining circumstances and this would create a dilemma for medical practitioners and the 
courts in a pressured situation.  
Consequent on such concerns, the pre-MCA case law emphasised the qualities of clarity 
and specificity as requisites of the recognition of ADRTs. The case of W v KH251 illustrates 
this point. The patient, KH, had Multiple Sclerosis, required constant care and had been 
reliant on a percutaneous gastrostomy tube before it became detached. KH’s family argued 
that KH had suggested that she did not “want to be kept alive by machines”252 and were 
unanimous that she would not wish to be kept alive in these circumstances.253 However, this 
was deemed to be insufficiently clear to form the basis of a binding ADRT.  
In particular, it was suggested that the wishes that she had expressed did not cover the 
range of circumstances in which she was found.254 This meant that the wishes that she had 
expressed were not legally binding on the medical team and KH could be given treatment 
that was in her best interests, which the court at first instance determined meant that the 
reinstatement of the feeding tube.  
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W v KH therefore cautions would-be advance decision makers of the importance of 
carefully considering the precise kinds of circumstances in which they intend their advance 
decision to take effect. A similar problem was cited by the Scottish Action on Dementia 
Society’s evidence to Select Committee on Medical ethics in the US case of Evans v 
Bellevue Hospital (unreported) in which the court had suggested that the terms ‘no 
reasonable prospect of recovery’ and ‘meaningful quality of life’ were too vague.255  
This principle was taken to an even greater extent in W v M in which the patient’s 
wishes were not recognised as an ADRT because, in part, she had not specified that her 
refusal should operate in the event of being diagnosed as being in a minimally conscious 
state (MCS), as she was, as well as a vegetative state (VS).256 Her purported ADRT therefore 
lacked specificity, in spite of the fact that her condition was almost unknown to medical 
science at the time she expressed her wishes.  
These cases point to an inherent difficulty involved in advance decision-making that was 
previously highlighted by Montgomery: the author of the ADRT must make sure to have 
defined his or her wishes in sufficiently specific terms in order for a court to respect them, 
but, if the author couches his or her refusal in overly specific terms, then they run the risk 
that the circumstances that later obtain will be deemed distinguishable from those 
specified.257 It seems that this is a difficulty inherent in interpretation and perhaps the most 
that can be done is to mitigate the problem through a specification of details and 
circumstances in which the ADRT is to apply and when it is not to apply, as well as a 
statement of general values and aspirations which could be used to assist with the 
interpretation of the ADRT.  
Another concern with which the common law grappled was the possibility that a person 
could create an ADRT and then subsequently change their mind without clearly expressing 
revoking or altering his or her decision and would then be bound by a decision not reflected 
by her or his will.258 The danger would be that the person may then be bound by the ADRT 
against the final disposition of his or her will. It was for this reason that Munby J suggested 
that ADRTs that had been created a long time ago, or where there had been any suspicion 
that the author may have changed their mind, “may require especially close, rigorous and 
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anxious scrutiny”.259 The case of HE v Hospital NHS Trust260 provides some instruction as to 
the approach to be taken when a patient has an ADRT, but that since having made the 
ADRT and having lost capacity has undergone some significant change, or life event, that 
might cast doubt on their continued acceptance of the terms of their ADRT. 
The case concerned a patient, Ms AE, who had a congenital coronary defect. It was 
anticipated that her condition would give rise to the need for surgery in future. AE was 
raised in the Islamic faith, but following the separation of her parents she became a 
Jehovah’s Witness. Pursuant to her religious beliefs, AE therefore made an advance 
statement in which she sought to refuse medical treatment involving blood transfusions 
under any circumstances (it is not clear what would have happened if the terms of the ADRT 
corresponded so closely with the tenets of the religion that AE was later to renounce). 
However, once AE had lost capacity and an application was made to court regarding her Mr 
Justice Munby said that once the issue of validity of an advance decision had been raised, 
there was an evidential burden on those seeking to uphold the ADRT to prove that it was of 
continuing validity.261 In the case of AE, this burden of proof had not been discharged and 
the ADRT was therefore not upheld. 
Although some ADRTs may specify certain circumstances in which treatment is refused 
and other circumstances in which treatment is not refused. It has been suggested that it is 
possible to refuse treatment in all circumstances. Mr Justice Thorpe acknowledged in Re 
C262 that it was possible to make “a declaration of intention never to consent in future or 
never to consent in some future circumstances”263 and held that the court could use its 
inherent jurisdiction to determine the validity and applicability of advance directives.264 
However, in practice making an ADRT in such terms may leave it open to challenge on the 
grounds that the author may not have intended it to apply in the particular circumstances 
which later obtain, because they had not been contemplated. This happened in the case of 
HE, with a purported ADRT which sought to refuse treatment in any circumstances, but was 
not recognised as having continuing applicability following the author’s change of faith.265 
It is also to be noted that the common law has always recognised capacity as being a 
prerequisite to the power to create an ADRT. The case of The NHS Trust v Ms T 
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demonstrates the importance of capacity at the moment of the creation of an ADRT.266 The 
patient, T, suffered from Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”) and had a history of self-
injuring through cutting herself. She occasionally required blood transfusions following 
blood-letting, but in January 2004 she created an ADRT refusing blood transfusions. One of 
the reasons that she gave for creating the ADRT was that she believed her blood to be evil. 
This reasoning was considered to be result of a mental disorder and was taken as further 
evidence that she was unable to ‘weigh information’ to make a decision and therefore lacked 
capacity at the time she created the ADRT.267 This meant that the ADRT was void ab initio 
and she could be treated in accordance with her best interests which included providing 
blood transfusions.  
The case law in this area (on consent to treatment, capacity and best interests) has played 
a major role in informing the codified version of the law that was enacted in the MCA. Thus, 
and having discussed this case law, as part of the background to the law on ADRTs, the task 
in the remainder of this chapter is to set out the provisions that specifically define ADRTs in 
the MCA. 
ADRTS AND THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005  
The Bill that began life as the Mental Incapacity Bill was eventually enacted as the 
Mental Capacity Act in 2005. The Act came into force in 2007. As mentioned above, the 
MCA is a wide-ranging piece of legislation which covers many aspects of decision-making. 
However, the focus here will of course be on the parts of the MCA that cover advance 
decision-making.  
Given the central place advance decisions in this thesis, the full text sections 24-26 
MCA is reproduced in this section of the thesis for definitional clarity. Section 24 provides 
the basic definition of advance decisions, which is qualified and explained by sections 25 
and 26. Section 24 states the following: 
24 Advance decisions to refuse treatment: general 
(1) “Advance decision” means a decision made by a person (“P”), after he 
has reached 18 and when he has capacity to do so, that if— 
(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a specified 
treatment is proposed to be carried out or continued by a person providing 
health care for him, and 
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(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or 
continuation of the treatment, the specified treatment is not to be carried out 
or continued. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a decision may be regarded as 
specifying a treatment or circumstances even though expressed in layman’s 
terms. 
(3) P may withdraw or alter an advance decision at any time when he has 
capacity to do so. 
(4) A withdrawal (including a partial withdrawal) need not be in writing. 
(5) An alteration of an advance decision need not be in writing (unless 
section 25(5) applies in relation to the decision resulting from the alteration). 
The case of Re E provides a good illustration of the how the courts approach section 
24(1) and, specifically, the requirement that the person making the ADRT must have 
capacity to refuse the treatment specified.268 E was 32 years of age and suffered from an 
eating disorder originating from her desire to control her eating at the age of 11 following a 
period of “serious sexual abuse”269 to which she was subject since the age of four. She then 
developed eating control patterns between the ages of 12 and 13 and concurrently began 
drinking alcohol, which was later to form a dependency. Following a gap year, she was 
admitted to hospital (at the age of 26) for treatment of her eating disorder and in the 
following period up until the age of 30 she had been to “four eating disorder units and one 
alcohol treatment unit”; during this period “E spent more than half of her time in one or 
other of these placements”.270 She was then treated in the community due to a lack of 
funding for the provision of any other treatment, but this “led to a ‘revolving door’ series of 
emergency admissions for medical and psychiatric care”.271 
It was since the period of her care in the community began that she became interested in 
making an ADRT to ensure that she would not be fed against her will, if she was later 
deemed to have lost capacity. This culminated in her signing a document in July 2011 
expressing her wish not to be resuscitated or to be given any form of medical treatment and 
another advance decision document (using a standard form) in October 2011 with the 
assistance of “her mother and mental capacity advocate”.272 During this period of care in the 
community E’s body mass index (BMI) fluctuated between 11 and 12 (where it was said that 
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a “figure of less than 17.5 is in the anorexic range”273), and at the time of the proceedings her 
BMI was 11.3, a level that put her at risk of “sudden cardiac death”.274 Dr Glover (a 
consultant psychiatrist specializing in eating disorders) diagnosed her as having severe 
anorexia nervosa, unstable personality disorder (borderline subtype), a dependency on both 
alcohol and opiates, and the attendant physical effects of her behavioural patterns.275 All 
things considered, hers was an “extraordinarily complex” case.276 
E had made obvious attempts to ensure that her ADRTs were created in accordance with 
the legal requirements such that they could take legal effect. She even took the precaution of 
having her second ADRT witnessed by a mental health professional277 and had been created 
following advice from an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA) and a solicitor.278 
At this time the general view was that she had capacity, but no formal capacity assessment 
was undertaken at the time in relation to the ADRT specifically.279 Despite this, Judge Peter 
Jackson ruled that E did not have the capacity to make either ADRT at the material times.280 
In consequence, neither of E’s purported ADRTs was considered valid.  
The verdict in this case has serious implications for patients wishing to create ADRTs, 
as it seems that no assurance can be given that their ADRT will be invulnerable to challenge 
through a retrospective analysis of capacity, even if a mental health worker acts as witness. 
Mr Justice Peter Jackson had referred to E’s background as being ‘alerting’ suggesting that 
the question of capacity should receive additional scrutiny, but as Johnson suggests, this 
rationale for categorising E in this way cannot be solely due to her mental health 
problems.281 Although as a matter of practicality it might be advisable for those with mental 
health problems to ensure that their ADRTs are witnessed by a mental health professional or 
to ensure that their capacity is assessed by a mental health professional at the same time as 
the ADRT is created, this may incur extra costs. Moreover, as this case demonstrates, there 
is no guarantee such a precaution would be effective. 
                                                     
273 ibid [25] (Peter Jackson) 
274 ibid [25] (Peter Jackson) 
275 ibid [23] (Peter Jackson) 
276 ibid [24] (Peter Jackson) 
277 ibid [61] (Peter Jackson) 
278 ibid [64] (Peter Jackson) 
279 ibid [64] (Peter Jackson) 
280 ibid [59] and [65] (Peter Jackson) 
281 C Johnston (n 70) 502-503 
 52 
 
However, a different result was reached in a case with very similar facts, A NHS Trust v 
Ms X.282 Both cases involve anorexic patients who had long histories of substance misuse 
and who both strongly opposed being provided with medical treatment. Both E and Ms X 
had made ADRTs, but in the case of Ms X, her ADRT was said to have been made with 
capacity and was therefore valid. The difficulty was that at the time of the trial Ms X 
retained capacity in respect of her consumption of alcohol, but not in respect of her decision 
to eat more generally. Moreover there was a great difficulty in determining whether the 
cause of her disorder was her alcoholism or her eating disorder and so it was suggested that 
the terms of her ADRT should take effect. The judgment of Mr Justice Cobb however, 
proceeds to discuss the best interests of the patient in respect of her eating disorder, 
acknowledging that Ms X retained capacity to decide whether to drink283 and decided that it 
would not be in Ms X’s best interests to be force fed. One of the important factors in 
distinguishing the case of Ms X from E was that Ms X merely had a 5% chance of recovery, 
whereas E’s chances of recovery were estimated at 20%.284 Additionally in E’s case there 
were unexplored forms of treatment, but this was not the case with Ms X.  
Another important provision in section 24 relates to the kind of language required in 
drafting an ADRT. Section 24(2) MCA makes it possible to create ADRTs without taking 
professional advice, because although there is a requirement that any ADRT should specify 
the relevant medical decision/decisions285 to which it is intended to apply, this can be done 
in “layman’s terms” with no lesser legal effect.286 Care must be taken, however, to ensure 
that whatever terminology is used, that the language of the ADRT is sufficiently clear, 
otherwise there may be uncertainty as to whether the decision was intended to apply to the 
relevant circumstances. This is what happened in W v KH287 under the common law and as a 
consequence the ADRT was not treated as binding. The same outcome would now be 
realised by virtue of section 25(4) MCA. 
The case of W v M288 provides another example of the level of precision that the courts 
may expect from the terms of an ADRT. In this case M had expressed the view, on more 
than one occasion, that she would not wish to be kept alive by artificial means if she were in 
a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). However, M ultimately found herself not in a PVS, but 
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in a Minimally Conscious State (“MCS”) after contracting viral encephalitis and thus it was 
said that M’s earlier decision could not be taken to apply to her the circumstances in which 
she later found herself. The difficulty with this analysis is that at the time when M expressed 
her wishes the condition known as MCS was scarcely known to medical science.289 On this 
basis it sets a very, arguably an unfairly, high bar for the degree of specificity needed in an 
ADRT.  
Furthermore, M could not have known of the legal requirement for her ADRT to be 
made in writing for it to be considered binding, as even though the Transitional Order states 
that ADRTs made prior to October 2007 not comply with the provisions of the MCA in 
order to attain binding effect, there was no pre-existing common law requirement for 
ADRTs to be made in writing.290 Thus the Transitional Order imposes a retrospective 
requirement on the recognition of ADRTs made before the MCA entered into force, which 
arguably does not accord with the rule of law and the principle of legality.291  
The formalities for creating an ADRT will be considered in the next section in the 
discussion of section 25 MCA. However, at this stage it should be noted that in spite of the 
formality requirements stated in section 25 MCA, any advance decision can be withdrawn at 
any time without formality.292 As a consequence it is easier for those who change their minds 
to give effect to their change of mind, which goes some way to addressing the ethical 
concerns regarding the binding of the ‘future self’,293 but the effect may well also be that it 
creates added uncertainty for the practitioners treating the patient. 
It also means that the formalities required in respect of decisions relating to life-
sustaining treatment294  do not offer the same degree of certainty as, say, those stipulated by 
the Wills Act 1837. Usually a will cannot be retracted or varied without formality (in the 
case of the creation of a new will or codicil or some written instruction adhering to the 
formalities in section 9 Wills Act 1837)295, or a specified formal event (such as a marriage or 
a civil partnership). However, a will or codicil can also be revoked by the destruction of the 
document by the testator or his agent with the intention of it being revoked thereby.296 Thus 
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even if there is evidence that the deceased had changed his or her mind and did not wish to 
make the same dispositions as his or her will indicated, the will that accords with the 
relevant formalities must be executed notwithstanding other evidence suggesting the will did 
not accord with the testator/testatrix’s later desires. Section 24(4) of the MCA makes matters 
more complicated in relation to ADRTs, because revocation (or ‘withdrawal’ as it is termed 
in the MCA) can occur by parole.297 However, the formalities of section 26 must be 
complied with if the author of the ADRT wishes to vary (rather than entirely withdraw) her 
or his ADRT.298 The practitioner could therefore face a difficult judgment in deciding 
whether any alleged withdrawal was actually in evidence or not, or whether there had only 
been a variation in the ADRT which would require (and therefore whether there is still a 
valid ADRT). As we shall see from section 26 MCA, where there is doubt, there is a 
structural bias to decide that there is no ADRT and to provide treatment (at least prior to 
seeking a declaration from the court under section 26(4) MCA). 
Another notable factor in the MCA is the absence of a statutory time limit on ADRTs 
(this is something that has been introduced in other jurisdictions e.g. Austria)299. However, 
some prefabricated forms designed to assist people in making an ADRT contain an option 
for the author to specify a date after which the decision lapses.300 The MCA code also 
encourages people to renew their ADRTs regularly and particularly following a change in 
circumstances.301 The MCA code also warns healthcare professionals to “take special care if 
the [ADRT] does not seem to have been renewed or updated for some time”.302 
However, it is clear from the case of The X Primary Care Trust v XB303 that if a renewal 
period is specified in the ADRT and a renewal has not been completed at the date at which 
the ADRT is called upon, the failure to renew per se will not invalidate the ADRT. In X v 
XB, XB suffered from Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: ALS (MND), which was diagnosed in 
2001.304 His condition impaired his physical movement and the ventilation device that he 
required to keep him alive prevented him from speech, with the result that XB had to 
communicate through moving his eyes. This was the mode of communication through which 
XB was able to draft an ADRT. However, the ADRT that he drafted specified renewal dates 
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and an expiry date,305 which had all passed by the time that XB lost capacity. Even though 
the MCA makes no requirement of attaching any kind of time limit to an ADRT, the fact 
that such a time limit had voluntarily been included gave rise to a question as to whether the 
ADRT should be relied upon as a binding instrument. Ultimately it was decided that the 
ADRT was binding, because there was evidence from those who assisted in the drafting of 
the ADRT that no renewal or expiry dates had been agreed upon and hence it was said that 
XB had not intended the ADRT to be bound by the purported temporal limitations.306  
Though not explicitly cited in the judgment, there is a clear parallel to be drawn between 
XB’s case and Bristow J’s dictum in Chatterton v Gerson in which it was said that mere 
evidence of a signed consent form does not constitute definitive evidence of consent.307 The 
same point was confirmed in Taylor v Shropshire Health Authority.308 Another interesting 
aspect of the case was that before XB had written the ADRT, he had asked for the machine 
providing him with ventilation to be removed, but “it was explained to him that that could 
not be done”.309 It is unclear why this wish was not respected contemporaneously, especially 
as Johnston points out that his capacity to make an ADRT was never called into question.310   
The temporal gap between the creation of the ADRT and the time at which it is called 
upon may have a further powerful indirect relevance in that a greater the length of time 
between these two points, the more closely the likely scrutiny will be of the terms of the 
ADRT. This is illustrated by Mr Justice Munby’s dictum in the pre-MCA case of HE, in 
which he stated:  
“In my judgment no less rigorous an evidential approach is required where 
the inquiry is not as to the initial validity of an advance directive but (as 
here) the continuing validity and applicability of an advance directive given 
in what may be the more or less remote past. Indeed, depending upon the 
time that has elapsed, and any known changes in the patient’s circumstances 
during that time, the question of whether an advance directive admittedly 
made at some time in the past is still valid and applicable may require 
especially close, rigorous and anxious scrutiny.”311  
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Thus, although renewal may not be a strict requirement for the preservation of validity 
and applicability of ADRTs, periodic renewal is a prudent practice as failure to renew will 
invite closer scrutiny.312 
Aside from the point made in X v XB on the effect of express temporal limitations, this 
case also demonstrates that rectification of ADRTs may be possible in some cases. XB’s 
ADRT specified “non-invasive ventilation” when he was actually receiving “invasive 
ventilation”,313 but the evidence was accepted from a GP who helped in the process of 
drafting the ADRT and who claimed that he had discussed the removal of a device from XB 
that provided invasive ventilation. This oral evidence was thus permitted to contradict the 
over the written instrument in order to get to arrive at the result that XB had intended. This 
case provides further illustration of courts’ willingness to use discretion and flexibility in the 
adjudication of ADRTs.   
Having considered the general requirements of the creation of ADRTs laid down by 
section 24 MCA, the specific matters relating to ‘validity’ and ‘applicability’ must now be 
discussed. Section 25 of the MCA sets out the conditions under which advance decisions 
will take binding force. Particularly it looks at when ADRTs will not be considered valid 
and when they will not be considered applicable to the treatment that is proposed. In 
addition, it introduces special formalities on the creation of advance decisions which pertain 
to the refusal of “life-sustaining treatment”. These matters are set out in section 25 MCA 
which states: 
25 Validity and applicability of advance decisions 
(1) An advance decision does not affect the liability which a person may 
incur for carrying out or continuing a treatment in relation to P unless the 
decision is at the material time— 
(a) valid, and 
(b) applicable to the treatment. 
(2) An advance decision is not valid if P— 
(a) has withdrawn the decision at a time when he had capacity to do so, 
(b) has, under a lasting power of attorney created after the advance decision 
was made, conferred authority on the donee (or, if more than one, any of 
them) to give or refuse consent to the treatment to which the advance 
decision relates, or 
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(c) has done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance decision 
remaining his fixed decision. 
(3) An advance decision is not applicable to the treatment in question if at 
the material time P has capacity to give or refuse consent to it. 
(4) An advance decision is not applicable to the treatment in question if— 
(a) that treatment is not the treatment specified in the advance decision, 
(b) any circumstances specified in the advance decision are absent, or 
(c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which 
P did not anticipate at the time of the advance decision and which would 
have affected his decision had he anticipated them. 
(5) An advance decision is not applicable to life-sustaining treatment 
unless— 
(a) the decision is verified by a statement by P to the effect that it is to apply 
to that treatment even if life is at risk, and 
(b) the decision and statement comply with subsection (6). 
(6) A decision or statement complies with this subsection only if— 
(a) it is in writing, 
(b) it is signed by P or by another person in P’s presence and by P’s 
direction, 
(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by P in the presence of a witness, 
and 
(d) the witness signs it, or acknowledges his signature, in P’s presence. 
(7) The existence of any lasting power of attorney other than one of a 
description mentioned in subsection (2)(b) does not prevent the advance 
decision from  being regarded as valid and applicable. 
This section establishes two broad paths to failure for ADRTs in addition to those 
implied by section 24. Section 25 requires ADRTs to be valid and to be applicable to the 
particular treatment under consideration. Validity is defined in negative terms in section s 
25(2).  
There are three ways in which an ADRT can fail through invalidity under section 25(2). 
The first is where the ADRT has been revoked. This revocation must happen while the 
person who created the ADRT retains capacity, but requires no formality.314 The second way 
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the ADRT can be invalidated is through the creation of an LPA315 which gives decision-
making power over the area to which the ADRT purported to apply. The creator of an 
ADRT can also invalidate their ADRT through any conduct which is deemed to be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the ADRT. This provision gives effect to the ruling in 
HE. 
Applicability is defined in negative terms throughout sections 25(3)-(6). Section 25(3) 
states that an ADRT will not be applicable to treatment if it was made without capacity. The 
presence of capacity is one of the fundamental conditions for the creation of an ADRT as it 
is for the refusal of treatment. The requirement of capacity was discussed in relation to 
section 24 above and, in particular, in relation to re E.316  
Section 25(4) lists three ways in which an ADRT may fail due to a lack of applicability 
based on the content of the ADRT. The ADRT will not be held to be applicable if it does not 
specify the treatment to be refused. An example of this from the pre-MCA common law can 
be found in W v KH317  in which the reports about what the patient would have wanted to 
happen in the condition in which the patient found herself were inter alia insufficiently 
precise to form an ADRT. In particular there was no evidence that the patient, KH, had 
directed her mind to the question of the withdrawal of the Percutaneous Endoscopic 
Gastrostomy (“PEG”) feeding tube. 
ADRTs will also lack applicability unless the specified circumstances obtain when 
treatment becomes clinically indicated.318 This is a point well illustrated by the case of W v 
M (discussed above).319 This case suggests that, patients must demonstrate that they have 
considered the circumstances in which he or she might lose capacity in order to maximise 
the possibility that his or her ADRT will take effect at the relevant time. Alternatively, the 
author of the ADRT may wish to specify circumstances under which they would not wish to 
refuse treatment i.e. circumstances in which they would wish to receive treatment. For 
example, a person could conceivably wish to refuse any life sustaining treatment only in the 
event that when such treatment was indicated, their spouse was still alive (perhaps in order 
that they could become a posthumous organ donor for his or her spouse). Demonstrating 
sufficient balance of specificity and generality will be an ongoing challenge for authors of 
ADRTs. 
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As a further safeguard, there is a third way in which an ADRT can fail on applicability 
grounds. Specifically, if the circumstances in which capacity is lost are different from those 
which the author anticipated and, on a reasonable assessment, this variation in circumstances 
would have led the author to making a different decision, then the decision will not be 
applicable to the treatment.320  
From the preceding discussion, the conclusion of Brazier and Cave that “the task of 
making a fire-proof advance decision [is] nigh on impossible” is quite understandable.321 
They illustrate their claim with the example of someone who makes an ADRT following 
treatment they have received for a brain tumour that aims to refuse resuscitation and 
antibiotics if the cancer recurred and caused her medical situation to deteriorate.322 However, 
if the immediate need for treatment did not arise from the cancer but stemmed instead from a 
stroke or from a head injury the ADRT may not apply. This point has also been 
acknowledged by the Royal College of Physicians in respect of non-legally binding Advance 
Care Plans (“ACPs”).323 They query whether it would be better to be less specific about the 
circumstances in the ADRT, but then point out that this may lead to a lack of compliance 
with section 25(3) MCA.324 
FAILURE OF FORMALITY 
Another requirement to be satisfied by certain ADRTs is that they must comply with 
certain formalities. Sections 25(5) and (6) pertain to the special formalities applicable to 
ADRTs required for the refusal of “life-sustaining treatment” e.g. refusing “artificial 
nutrition and hydration”325. These formalities are aimed at two main, sensible, functions: the 
drawing of attention to the mind of the author that an important decision is being made and 
the function of using the formalities to provide evidence of the decision and that it represents 
the creator’s true wishes.326  
Under the MCA framework, it is possible for people to refuse treatment which would 
only be clinically indicated under, such as certain circumstances in the event of entering a 
prolonged comatose state. In contrast to the pre-MCA common law position,327 such a 
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decision would now have to be made in writing for it to be valid.328 Though this formality is 
only made necessary in relation to life-saving or life-sustaining treatment, it would appear 
sensible for patients to follow the same procedures for most major treatment decisions to 
obtain the same advantages. 
Any promotion of such a course of action would not be without its problems however, as 
the requirement of disclosing future treatment decisions to others, would open those to 
attempts to persuade the maker of the future decision to change their mind (i.e. to accept the 
treatment) and would act as an impediment to autonomous decision-making. The same 
argument could be levelled at the formality requirements for creating an ADRT to refuse 
treatment for life-saving or life-sustaining treatment, because true respect for individual 
autonomy ought not to be dependent on the willingness of others to act as witnesses.329 
Though on balance, this incursion on the principle of self-determination is relatively slight 
and it does provide practical advantages over the old common law position.330 
If the author of an ADRT fails to comply with the formalities requirements, the failed 
ADRT will not bind those seeking to provide treatment in the patient’s best interests. 
However, the provisions of the ADRT will be used in the assessment of best interests section 
4(7) MCA. This is what happened in NHS Trust v D331 where there was a failure to comply 
with section 25(5)-(6). D’s purported ADRT was a letter which he had signed that indicated 
that he refused any treatment to be given merely for the purposes of extending life, but did 
not make it explicitly clear that he wanted to refuse treatment even if doing so would shorten 
his life, nor did he comply with section 25(6)(c) in that D’s signature was not made in the 
presence of a witness. Thus D failed to comply with the formalities and the purported ADRT 
was not upheld as binding.332 Nonetheless, the wishes D expressed in the letter carried great 
weight in the assessment of best interests, upon which point it was concluded that it was not 
in D’s best interests to continue to receive medical treatment being, as he was, in a VS.333 
Similarly, in A NHS Trust v Dr A334  the patient, Dr A was a 55 year old Iranian GP with 
a history of depression who had come to the UK for a language course before making an 
application for asylum. However, his application was unsuccessful and Dr A’s passport was 
confiscated and he was held under section 136 of the mental health act 1983. After being 
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released, A went on hunger strike in protest at the rejection of his asylum claim. In a letter to 
his psychiatrist he wrote, “please don’t try to save me and I decided (sic) to refuse any 
treatment and receiving fluid (sic) or food”, but at around the same it was said that his wish 
to die was not consistently held and that he had actually thanked his doctor for saving him.335 
Importantly, although the letter was in writing, it was not witnessed and therefore was not in 
compliance with the formalities of the sections 25(5) and (6).336 As Dr A’s condition 
deteriorated, an interim declaration was granted which ruled that Dr A lacked both the 
capacity to litigate and the capacity to refuse nutrition and hydration. A full hearing was held 
subsequently and there it was again decided that Dr A did lack capacity to refuse treatment 
and that force feeding would be in his best interests.337 
However, the stringency with which the rules on formalities are enforced has been far 
from consistent. The case of Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospital Trust v LM338 was far more 
relaxed in its interpretation of the formalities requirements in section 25-26 MCA.339 Most 
surprisingly, the advance decision was upheld notwithstanding its formal deficiencies. Mr 
Justice Peter Jackson made clear that the decision was not based on best interests. The 
decision to prevent the blood transfusion was not a conclusion reached on the basis of best 
interests, because Judge Peter Jackson stated: 
"In the alternative, if LM had not made a valid, applicable decision, 
I would have granted the declaration sought on the basis that to 
order a transfusion would not have been in her best interests."340   
This suggests that the primary reason for the refusal of the blood transfusion was the 
ADRT and the opinion proffered that the blood transfusion would not be in LM’s best 
interests was expressed obiter and as an alternative. Thus the formality requirements of s 
25(5)-(6) appear to have been ignored. 
A less radical example of judicial generosity in the interpretation of these formalities can 
be found in Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC.341 In this case, the ADRT made 
by RC did not explicitly state that the author’s signature had been made in the presence of a 
witness as is required by section 25(6)(c) MCA. However, despite the lack of written 
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evidence on this point, it was found that on the balance of probabilities the signature had 
been witnessed and there was compliance with the relevant formalities. 
MENTAL CAPACITY AND MENTAL DISORDER 
An added complication can occur where the person who lacks mental capacity also has a 
mental disorder. More specifically there is a potential difficulty with the traditional legal 
right to refuse treatment and the powers available under the Mental Health Acts for the 
compulsory detention for the purposes of the treatment or assessment of a mental disorder. 
Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended) states: 
The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical 
treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is 
suffering, not being a form of treatment to which section 57, 58 or 
58A above applies, if the treatment is given by or under the 
direction of the approved clinician in charge of the treatment.  
Effectively therefore, it allows treatment to be provided to treat a mental disorder, or its 
symptoms, even where consent for the treatment is refused. The exercise of the power to 
provide treatment without consent under this section is conditional on the treatment being in 
the best interests of the patient, being a proportionate interference with the patients human 
rights (especially their right to self-determination under Art 8 ECHR) and being pursued in 
promoting the health of the patient: R (B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority.342 Section 63 
allows for treatment to be provided even if the patient has mental capacity to make a 
decision about the specific treatment option themselves while that person is detained under 
the MHA: R (on the application of PS) v (1) Dr G and (2) Dr W343  (a case on section 58, but 
the same principles are thought to apply to section 63)). On this basis, it is unremarkable that 
section 63 can be used to provide treatment in contravention of a prima facie valid and 
applicable ADRT even where it goes against a valid ADRT. 
An interesting question arose in the case of Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v 
RC as to whether the power available under section 63 is obligatory or permissive.344 It was 
held that the power is permissive and that there is no obligation on the medical professionals 
providing treatment to use the power to override the ADRT. This decision might be cited as 
a further example of the increasing importance of the will of the individual patient as 
opposed to medical power. 
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EFFECT OF VALID ADRTS 
In addition to the substantive points to consider when asking whether an ADRT is valid 
and applicable, there is also the question of when ADRTs should be recognised and when 
they do meet the requirements in sections 24-25 what effect they should have. These 
questions are addressed by section 26, which states:  
26 Effect of advance decisions 
(1) If P has made an advance decision which is— 
(a) valid, and 
(b) applicable to a treatment,  
the decision has effect as if he had made it, and had had capacity to make it, 
at the time when the question arises whether the treatment should be carried 
out or continued. 
(2) A person does not incur liability for carrying out or continuing the 
treatment unless, at the time, he is satisfied that an advance decision exists 
which is valid and applicable to the treatment. 
(3) A person does not incur liability for the consequences of withholding or 
withdrawing a treatment from P if, at the time, he reasonably believes that an 
advance decision exists which is valid and applicable to the treatment. 
(4) The court may make a declaration as to whether an advance decision— 
(a) exists; 
(b) is valid; 
(c) is applicable to a treatment. 
(5) Nothing in an apparent advance decision stops a person— 
(a) providing life-sustaining treatment, or 
(b) doing any act he reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent a serious 
deterioration in P’s condition, while a decision as respects any relevant issue 
is sought from the court. 
An ADRT which is formulated in accordance with the requirements in the MCA will 
have the same force and effect as a refusal of treatment that is made by a competent adult.345 
The law relating to contemporaneous refusals of treatment was discussed above. In 
summary, it will be recalled that mentally competent adults can refuse treatment for any 
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reason of for no reason at all346 and their refusals are legally binding. Thus, providing 
treatment which has been refused through a valid and applicable ADRT is a prima facie 
battery a breach of duty for the purposes of the tort of negligence.347 Therefore treating 
someone in contravention of a binding ADRT will give rise to the same legal consequences. 
For would-be treatment providers, such as medical professionals therefore, there is great 
importance in being able to identify when an ADRT takes effect with legal force.  
Some concessions have been made to treatment providers in section 26(2)-(3) 
recognition of the fact that serious consequences may arise from delaying the provision of 
treatment and that treatment providers may therefore have to make assessments as to the 
legal standing of particular ADRTs in highly pressured circumstances. This part of the MCA 
sets out when a person will not incur liability based on his or her assessment as to the 
validity of an ADRT. Here there is an interesting difference when it comes to two possible 
kinds of mistake that could be made in the assessment of the validity of an ADRT. Section 
26(2) states that a person will not incur liability for providing treatment if they believed that 
the ADRT was not legally binding. Whereas if the treatment provider omits to provide 
treatment in reliance on an ADRT that he or she believes to be valid, the treatment provider 
will only have a defence if she or he reasonably believed that the ADRT was invalid. These 
evidentiary tests therefore institute a structural bias in favour of the continuation or 
commencement of treatment348 and it has been argued that this provision protects “clinical 
discretion” at the expense of patient autonomy.349 
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the legal 
landscape pertaining to ADRTs, as the area of law examined in this thesis. The definition of 
ADRTs is crucial to the ongoing analysis, which is why much effort was spent in attempting 
to distinguish ADRTs from other similar instruments which will not be discussed here. In 
addition, it was made clear that the kinds of ADRTs under discussion in this thesis are those 
which purport to refuse life-sustaining treatment under the law of England and Wales.  
In order to define this area of law clearly, it has been necessary to set out the law on 
contemporaneous refusals of treatment, as this law upon which ADRTs are founded. From 
this examination it could be seen that certain patients have a very strong, but also very 
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limited, right to refuse treatment. One of the most significant limitations on the right to 
refuse treatment is that it can only be exercised by those with mental capacity. Where mental 
capacity is lacking, medical practitioners are permitted to provide clinically indicated 
treatment in accordance with the best interests of the patient. Since the enactment of the 
MCA, the concept of best interests has been reoriented to require the consideration of a 
number of a number of factors including the patient’s own wishes and feelings, but these 
wishes and feelings will not be determinative of the outcome and will rather be one factor 
among many. 
The doctrinal function of ADRTs is to provide patients the opportunity to make legally 
binding decisions, prior to the loss of mental capacity, which will become binding should 
mental capacity be lost. They offer nothing to in legal terms above to rights to refuse 
treatment contemporaneously. The only change is that this power is projected into the future 
and can apply to circumstances that have not yet arisen and indeed may never arise. 
As mental capacity is one of the most important factors in determining the basis on 
which treatment can be provided (i.e. whether it is to be provided on the basis of patient 
consent or whether it can be provided on the basis of a best interests assessment) it was 
imperative to provide a detailed discussion of the definition of mental capacity in English 
law and the rules which govern its assessment. Several contentious aspects of mental 
capacity assessment were highlighted at this juncture, including the possibility for the 
normative commitments of the assessor to enter into capacity assessments, the difficulty of 
differentiating mental disorders from matters affecting mental capacity and the manner in 
which capacity has been recognised by the court. Such difficulties place a notable 
qualification on the rhetorical bombast with which the right to refuse treatment has been 
portrayed and they take a special salience in respect of ADRTs which are dependent on the 
assessment of capacity at two points in time.  
The examination of the terms on which ADRTs are recognised in the MCA reveals 
further hurdles for those who wish to assert a right to refuse treatment in future. In particular 
the requirement to specify the circumstances in which the ADRT should apply is always 
open to interpretation and the manner in which some purported ADRTs have been 
interpreted highlights the considerable uncertainty associated with predicting whether an 
ADRT will provide the outcome sought by its creator. 
Thus, from a purely practical perspective, the degree of additional control offered by 
ADRTs is greatly dependent on a number of factors including the approach taken towards 
mental capacity and the interpretation of the terms of the ADRT. However, in order to 
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understand why the law operates as it does requires an appreciation of the arguments for 
recognising ADRTs in the first place. Although the incorporation of ADRTs into the legal 
order did not require a change to the fundamental legal principles in this area, their 
recognition was contentious from other normative perspectives. When justifying the legal 
position in respect of consent to treatment, leading commentators and members of the 
judiciary often invoke notions of autonomy and self-determination. As ADRTs are seen as a 
mere extension on the contemporaneous rights of individuals the same moral justifications 
underpin ADRTs. In terms of understanding the rationale for the law on ADRTs it is 
therefore imperative to examine the meaning of these concepts of self-determination and 
autonomy. This task will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
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PART II  
THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF ADRTS 
Having set out the law on ADRTs in the first part of this thesis, the task of the second 
part is to examine the normative underpinnings of the law and some of the ways in which 
those underpinnings have been contested.  
There are a number of reasons why it might be said to be important to recognise 
ADRTs, but, as will be discussed in this part of the thesis, special emphasis has been placed 
on respect for autonomy and self-determination as grounds for the development of the law. 
ADRTs perform a temporal extension of the idea that everyone should be able to determine 
what should be done with their own body, to enable people to make decision about what 
should happen to their bodies following a future loss of capacity. That being the case, a 
considerable part of the discussion will be comprised of a discussion of the meaning and 
development of the concepts of autonomy and self-determination.  
Given the extent of the reliance placed on personal autonomy, it might be though that 
the law would have developed a clear idea of the meaning of that term. However, the 
concept of autonomy itself remains heavily disputed. A significant line of critique has been 
generated around the claim that autonomy has been conceptualised in an overly 
individualistic manner and this critical analysis would apply a fortiori to ADRTs to the 
extent that they are justified by an extended version of autonomy. Another important claim 
is made by those who accept the individualistic nature of autonomy, but who claim that it 
cannot form the normative basis for ADRTs, because the individual to whom an ADRT may 
apply will not necessarily be the same as (or sufficiently similar to) the individual that 
created the ADRT in the first place. This forms a powerful ‘personhood argument’ which is 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
Behind this discussion is the position advocated here, which is that the normative 
concepts of autonomy and self-determination have clearly been important for the 
development of the law, but that there are other important factors which have been 
instrumental in the development of the law too: the advances in medical technology enabling 
life to be sustained in circumstances of low function; the political organisation of society in 
accordance with an advanced liberal rationality; the aging population; the financial crisis and 
scarcity of resources available for healthcare. These are themes which will be more fully in 
Part III. This part of the thesis provides a challenge to the orthodox overemphasis of the 
importance of autonomy for the development of the law on ADRTs.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NORMATIVE BASES FOR ADRTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter set out the law on advance decisions to refuse treatment 
(“ADRTs”) in England and Wales. There it was explained that the law on ADRTs is 
parasitic on the law that regulates consent to treatment, because, in legal terms, ADRTs do 
no more than temporally extend the right of patients to refuse treatment contemporaneously 
into the future. Specifically, ADRTs extend this right beyond a time at which there is a loss 
of mental capacity. That being the case, it was necessary to explain English law’s definition 
and approach towards the concept of ‘mental capacity’. Pursuant to this explanation, the 
substantive law from the MCA and the common law was set out. Some critical discussion 
was offered on the possibility of realising the truly functionalist approach towards capacity, 
to which the law aspires, within the legal framework of the MCA and in relation to other 
difficulties associated with the way in which capacity can be assessed under the MCA.  
The concept of ‘best interests’ was also discussed in order to illustrate the determination 
of the kinds of treatment that can be provided to a person who lacks capacity without 
consent. This discussion further highlighted the changes wrought by the MCA. Of particular 
significance has been the fact that it introduced an explicit requirement to incorporate patient 
wishes as part of the determination of best interests. It was suggested that the elevation of 
the importance of patient wishes is indicative of a move towards greater patient choice and 
control in the ‘medical encounter’,350 which is often referred to as ‘patient empowerment’351 
(a theme that will further be discussed in the third part of this thesis).  
Still, the very possibility of treatment being provided to a patient against his or her will, 
even in the name of his or her ‘best interests’, is anathema to the post-war political project of 
protecting the rights of patients and of patient empowerment.352 As a result, ADRTs serve as 
remedial instruments, which purport to allow patients to assert control over the kind of 
medical treatment that they may receive following a loss of mental capacity. For those who 
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have strong preferences relating to their future treatment, ADRTs therefore may offer a 
degree of reassurance against the possibility of being given unwanted treatment.353 
Theoretically, the level of control that ADRTs offer is significant, in that individuals are free 
to refuse any form of treatment through an ADRT that could be refused contemporaneously 
and in addition, a refusal of treatment through an ADRT offers the same level of protection 
as a contemporaneous refusal of treatment. Moreover, individuals have the right to make this 
kind of refusal pre-emptively, meaning that they do not need to wait for the medical 
circumstances warranting treatment to occur combined with an invitation from a medical 
practitioner to make a decision about the treatment for that condition. This possibility may 
be considered empowering of itself. 
However, it was suggested that the way the law is framed and the experience of those 
who have created ADRTs illustrates that the guarantee offered by ADRTs is fragile in a 
number of important respects.354 ADRTs are heavily contingent on the assessment of 
capacity, because their operation requires mental capacity to be tested at two points in time 
(at the point of authorship and at a future time when there are doubts about the patient’s 
capacity to decide) and these capacity tests may be conducted by any person involved in the 
treatment or care of the patient. Those who perform those tests may have an imperfect 
understanding of the law355 and whatever steps may be taken to ensure adequate legal 
knowledge, their judgment may be swayed by their own interests.356 There are also a number 
of formality requirements (outlined in Chapter One), which, if not adhered to, may cause the 
ADRT to fail. Similarly an ADRT will not take effect unless the specified treatment 
becomes clinically indicated in the specified circumstances and the question of whether this 
has happened is a crucial question of interpretation.357 Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 
One, there is a structural bias in the drafting of the MCA to promote the provision of life 
saving treatment over applying the ADRT.358  
In this chapter, the underlying normative bases for the recognition of ADRTs will be 
explored in more detail. A number of possible bases for recognising ADRTs will be 
suggested in the first section. However, the argument most frequently relied upon in law and 
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bioethics centres on the alleged tendency of ADRTs to increase or ‘extend’ the right to 
personal autonomy or self-determination.359 Thus, the predominant focus will be on the 
examination of this claim. Part of this examination will involve considering how autonomy 
is protected in relation to consent to treatment, as the legal foundation of ADRTs. Here it 
will be argued that the legal understanding of autonomy varies and is not precisely defined 
in accordance with philosophical ideas. 
NORMATIVE BASES FOR ADRTS 
“Counsel all agree that the right to reject treatment extends to deciding not to 
accept treatment in the future by way of advance directive or "living 
will."”360 
"The basis for the moral (and legal) validity of advance 
directives is the patient’s right to autonomy, also known as the right to self-
determination."361 
A number of reasons have been suggested as to why individuals ought to be entitled to 
the right to refuse treatment pre-emptively through ADRTs. In the previous chapter it was 
suggested the right to refuse treatment and the very existence of ADRTs in law indicates that 
an objective determination of treatment through the best interests test is actually not what the 
law considers best for the patient, rather it is only ‘best’ in the absence of an ADRT. On this 
reading of the law, there is a tacit acceptance of the argument that the (proto-)patient362 is a 
better person to decide what kind of treatment they should receive than the medical 
practitioner. ADRTs therefore establish a lawful basis to support this normative 
commitment. 
It has also been argued that present welfare can be increased through the creation of an 
ADRT, because the author will thereby be able to assure themselves that her life will not be 
prolonged in circumstances in which she would not have wished to have been kept alive.363 
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The degree to which this holds true is likely to vary between individuals and may depend on 
the intimacy of the author’s familiarity with the law on ADRTs and precariousness of the 
guarantee offered by an ADRT (see previous Chapter). 
Similarly, it has been suggested that establishing the right to create ADRTs provides an 
opportunity for dialogue between medical professionals and patients.364 Although, of course, 
it should be remembered the validity of ADRTs is not contingent upon prior medical advice. 
As such, this reason appears rather as a possible side benefit, rather than a core argument. 
A seldom articulated reason for people to make ADRTs, which will be further discussed 
in Chapter Seven, is in order to alleviate ‘burdens’ at the end of life. This may refer to the 
ethical difficulty of arriving at an ethically sound treatment decision on behalf of another 
person who is at the end of life. However, the idea of burden may also refer to the brutal 
economics of the situation in which there is a choice between the continuation or the 
cessation of treatment and care of a person with a terminal condition. In this sense, and 
particularly within a collectively funded healthcare system, the creation of an ADRT may be 
considered laudable as an act of solidarity. Such arguments are rarely aired in such terms to 
avoid the risk of being interpreted as suggesting that those who require care, support and 
possibly expensive forms of treatment are a burden on society (especially as a similar 
argument was used by the Nazis). In addition, there is no evidence that ADRTs do reduce 
healthcare expenditure (although most research in this area focuses on ACPs rather than 
ADRTs and some countries do employ provisions which prevent financial incentives being 
given to those that create ADRTs e.g. Germany). 
Other reasons for recognising ADRTs might be considered close cousins of those 
deployed in support of the recognition of autonomy. Some may argue that ADRTs should be 
recognised as part of a broader programme of patient empowerment, which has as its goal 
the redistribution of decision-making authority from doctor to patient and the limitation of 
medical power.365 They may be considered good in order to provide individuals with the 
opportunity to consider their own preferences and to take greater responsibility for their own 
health. 
It has been argued that Human Rights law is essential to the development of medical law 
as a discipline366  and the normative power of Human Rights law has been relied upon in aid 
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of the recognition of ADRTs.367 This is tied to the individual right to determine what should 
happen to their body in accordance with the right of self-determination, protected by Art 8 
ECHR. However, the degree of overlap between this goal of protecting Human Rights and 
the goal of respecting autonomy is dependent on how autonomy is defined. This point will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
All of the legal developments promoting patient’s legal rights to refuse treatment have 
been accompanied and to some extent supported by a growing recognition in the value of the 
concept autonomy in bioethics.368 In order to better understand the legal development of 
autonomy it is important to consider how the value has been developed as a moral principle 
in the disciplines allied to bioethics.  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF AUTONOMY AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
The purpose of this section is to provide some explanation of the key terms ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘self-determination’. Providing a comprehensive account of the historical 
transformations in defining these terms would require far greater space than is available 
here, but it is hoped that by focussing on the thought of two of the most influential authors 
philosophers on this subject, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, an insight may be 
gleaned into the difficulties associated with defining these concepts. One of the aims is to 
highlight the contested nature of these concepts that have been relied upon so heavily in law 
and also to dispel any suggestion that the development of these concepts can be viewed as 
the product of a neat process of logical rationalisation or indeed that we have arrived at a 
position in which there is any agreement on the meaning of these concepts. Further 
discussion of some of the political problems with the individualistic form of autonomy 
which is alleged to have prevailed in law and bioethics will be provided in the next chapter.  
To begin, it is trite to observe that, in its core sense, autonomy concerns the government 
of the self. The word autonomy is derived from the Greek auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos 
meaning ‘government’.369 At this linguistic level of analysis, autonomy can be contrasted 
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with heteronomy which describes government exercised by others.370 The term ‘autonomy’ 
was first used in relation to city states,371 was later used by Kant in relation to decisions372 
and others argue that it is a quality that persons can possess.373 The literal meaning therefore 
suggests that the individual is in control of the decisions that they make rather than any third 
party. On this simple understanding then, respecting autonomy entails respecting the 
decision of the decision-maker without making decisions on the other person’s behalf. In 
respect of medical treatment, this principle would therefore suggest that medical treatment 
should only be given with the continuing agreement of the patient. Respect for autonomy 
would equally demand that a decision to refuse treatment should be a matter for the 
individual. Protecting autonomy in law may therefore guard against the possibility of doctors 
conducting experiments on patients without consent. 
Many have argued that the concept of autonomy is more complex and nuanced than 
this374 and that the simple right of individual choice, as regards matters which primarily 
affect them, is better described as a right of “self-determination”.375 In straightforward terms, 
‘self-determination’ describes the right of an individual to determine what is done to them. 
In context of medical law, it was defined by Lord Scarman as “the right of a patient to 
determine for himself whether he will or will not accept the doctor's advice” and indeed any 
particular form of treatment.376 Self-determination is, therefore, a close cousin of autonomy, 
but the two concepts are distinguishable (depending on which conception of autonomy – of 
which there are many377 – is used as a comparator).  
Perhaps the most widely-known and cited conceptualisations of autonomy in medico-
legal and bioethical literature are those of Immanuel Kant378 and John Stuart Mill. However, 
though they may have shared a research interest, these two philosophers arrived at very 
different conceptions of autonomy. Despite this, the distinctions between their positions 
have not always been clearly acknowledged by commentators who draw upon this work.  
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Part of the blame for the confusion may well lie at the door of the authors of one of the 
seminal bioethical texts of the Twentieth Century, “Principles of Biomedical Ethics”, 
because arguably Beauchamp and Childress’ discussion of autonomy "fused the Kantian 
concept of respect for persons with John Stuart Mill's quite different notion of liberty ... 
Folding together the distinct views of Kant and Mill blurred the edges of both the Kantian 
and the Millian notions”.379 Highlighting some of the differences between certain approaches 
to autonomy380 will help to explain why the term use of the term ‘autonomy’ without further 
specification can elicit such confusion. 
KANTIAN AUTONOMY 
Kant clearly viewed the rational will as the foundation of moral action.381 He argued that 
“[o]nly a rational being has the power to act in accordance with the representation of laws, 
that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will [wille]”.382 Simultaneously, Kant posited 
categorical imperative (“CI”) a priori as a norm and argued that rational agency depended 
upon an adherence to this norm.383 Kant expressed the CI in several different ways in an 
attempt to better explicate its meaning.  
The first expression of the CI was that all moral decisions must be capable of general 
application, such they are capable of being applied as a law.384 Consequently suicide is 
impermissible in Kant’s moral framework,385 because if suicide were to be universalised as 
law, human existence would cease.386 Secondly, the CI suggests that a person cannot use 
themselves, as a moral agent, as a means to an end: “Act so that you treat humanity whether 
in your own person or in that or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means 
only”.387 Thus, a person cannot sell themselves into slavery. Kant further asserts that all 
rational agents are ends in themselves and should never be treated as mere means to other 
ends. The third expression of the CI is “all maxims that proceed from our own making of 
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law ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature”.388 This 
places greater emphasis on the collective good of protecting the conditions in which 
autonomy can be exercised and aspiring towards a society in which individuals can act 
autonomously.389 
Kant was deliberate in his usage of the term ‘autonomy’ and was careful to define it as 
part of the CI. He said  
“[t]he principle of autonomy is therefore: choose only in such a way 
that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in 
the same volition. (g 4: 440; ii, ¶ 80)”.390  
This definition pertained to the individualised character of autonomy, but Kant was also 
concerned with the operation of autonomy in society, where he acknowledged that 
“[a]utonomy is meaningfully exercised among other autonomous agents, whose rational 
capacities serve as a constraint on, and confirmation of, its exercise.”391 Thus, in spite 
charges of individualism levelled at Kant, he acknowledged that the meaningful exercise of 
autonomy requires sensitivity to the fact that moral action occurs in communities of other 
agents whose capacity for rational action should not be impinged upon.  
Having outlined Kant’s conceptualisation of autonomy, a similar outline can be provided 
in respect of mill’s work in the next section. This will provide an opportunity to contrast the 
approaches of the two philosophers and the definitions of autonomy that they provide.  
MILLIAN AUTONOMY 
Mill was one of the chief proponents of liberal thought in the Nineteenth Century. 
However, his approach to the question of autonomy differed quite significantly from Kant’s. 
Indeed, most notably, he rarely employed the term autonomy,392 but in spite of this, his work 
has been routinely drawn upon by commentators for the purposes of defining and 
conceptualising autonomy.393 The reliance on Mill’s ideas in the definition of autonomy 
indicates the importance of liberal thought to the definition of autonomy and this is a theme 
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that will be taken up in the third part of this thesis with the examination of Foucault’s work 
on governmentality. 
One of Mill’s most important contributions to political philosophy was his establishment 
of the Harm Principle. Through this principle Mill set out the limits of legitimate state 
interference in the actions of its citizens in the following way:  
“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others”.394  
Thus, Mill argued that the decisions of each adult person should be respected on the 
basis that no other entity, including the state, has the right to interfere in the lives of an 
individual, unless that individual causes harm to others. From this, Mill drew the conclusion 
that “[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”.395 
It is therefore clear that the individual occupies a central role in Mill’s theory.396 It 
would be mistaken, however, to characterise Mill’s argument as based on unbridled 
individual self-determination. Mill did believe that there should be some restriction on 
individual action. For instance, he considered that it would be legitimate to interfere with the 
actions of certain persons, such as children397 and suggested that people could be compelled 
to do certain acts.398  
Further, we can observe that Mill’s theory was not solely directed at the vindication of 
individual rights. Mill also highlighted the instrumental value of autonomy in suggesting its 
importance in the promotion of human development. For Mill, the normative force of the 
harm principle does not simply rely on the wrongness of interference with the body or in the 
affairs of an individual, but it also suggests that the lack of interference gives the individual 
space to develop their own ideas and preferences and to thereby become a better person. He 
claimed that this was character building and that without the formation of character people 
would be nothing more than machines:399 
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“He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for 
him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He 
who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.”400  
Similarly, Feinberg criticises Kant’s insistence on a rational mode of decision making401 
as a requisite of autonomous decisions and instead promotes a “personal sovereignty”402 (or 
“self-sovereignty”403) model of autonomy, which conforms closely with the rhetorical use of 
the term autonomy found in many cases on consent to treatment (considered in the next 
section). The core idea is that sovereign individuals have dominion over themselves and 
therefore cannot be forced to take action, or have action forced upon them by any external 
party. Feinberg would admit there ought to be certain limits on individual action, which are 
particularly evident through his distinction between ‘self-regarding’ and ‘other-regarding’ 
actions.404 This adds some nuance to Mill’s Harm Principle, by considering situations such 
as the garrison society in which there may be a clearer case for imposing restrictions on 
actions such as recreational drug taking as although they might be primarily directed towards 
the individual, may have significant consequences for the rest of society.405 
Personal sovereignty has much in common with Berlin’s idea of negative liberty, which 
describes an area of liberty carved out by the limitations on the power of others: negative 
liberty may exist in the spaces not subject to the control of others.406 An example of 
autonomy as negative liberty might be seen in Law Commission’s understanding of 
autonomy in terms of the absence of ‘intervention’ in its report on Mental Incapacity407 that 
preceded the Mental Incapacity Bill.408 Berlin contrasted this with an idea of positive liberty, 
which describes the actual ability to pursue and obtain certain goals or being enabled to do 
the same.409 
Plainly then, there are significant differences between Mill’s liberal position (with its 
similarities to Feinberg’s notion of ‘personal sovereignty’ and Berlin’s idea of negative 
liberty410), based on defining the legitimate scope individual action through a principle 
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limiting state action and Kant’s deontological position based on the CI as an a priori 
principle facilitating rational decision-making. Kant conceived of autonomy in terms of a 
duty (Verpflichtung) to make decisions consistent with the CI, whereas Mill imposed 
minimal obligations on the individual in terms of the kinds of decisions that they could make 
(the primary one being that third parties would have an interest in the decision where it is 
one that may cause harm to others). Further, and in more general terms, the political focus of 
Mill’s approach can be contrasted with the more abstract, moral, approach of Kant. These 
important distinctions, among others, suggest that positions of the two philosophers should 
not be quickly conflated. 
 Given their influence in bioethics and law, having an appreciation of the difference in 
approach of these philosophers and the difference in definition that results is therefore 
crucial. Having identified some of these differences, we can now consider how these 
philosophical theories of autonomy map onto the legal recognition of autonomy, particularly 
in respect of medical law.    
AUTONOMY, SELF DETERMINATION AND THE 
CONTEMPORANEOUS REFUSAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Having outlined the concepts of autonomy and self-determination in the previous 
section, we must now consider how those terms have been understood and drawn upon in 
medical law. In particular, the discussion will focus on the implicit and explicit use of the 
concepts of autonomy and self-determination in relation to cases on the refusal of treatment 
and on advance decisions to refuse medical treatment. The reason for this focus is because, 
as discussed above, the law on ADRTs is contingent on the law on contemporary refusals of 
treatment. The case law on contemporary refusals of treatment also offers an important 
insight into the normative basis for the development of the law in this area. Of particular 
note is that respect for personal autonomy has not always been the primary ground for 
requiring consent to be obtained for treatment.  
“It is now well recognised that the interest which the law of negligence 
protects is a person’s interest in their own physical and psychiatric integrity, 
an important feature of which is their autonomy, their freedom to decide 
what shall and shall not be done with their body…”411  
The relationship between the greater prominence of recognition given to autonomy and 
the strengthening of the rights to refuse treatment is complex. We can observe that lawyers, 
and particularly academic lawyers, who position themselves within the medical law or 
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healthcare law traditions, commonly take their understanding of the concept of autonomy 
from bioethics,412 which might be considered the applied field of moral philosophy. 
Testament to the significance of this relationship, many of the leading textbooks on medical 
law contain reference to ‘ethics’ or ‘bioethics’ in their very titles (although arguably these 
terms are under theorised in the medical law literature)413.  
Even those textbooks that do not contain a reference to ‘ethics’ in their titles inevitably 
make reference to ethical principles in the body of the work, because these ethical principles 
are intimately bound up with the legal principles they seek to describe.414 Miola 
characterises this relationship between medical law and medical ethics as ‘symbiotic’.415 The 
two (sub-) disciplines mutually rely upon, reinforce, and perhaps, reproduce each other. The 
law is able to draw upon the philosophical gravitas of ethical argumentation in establishing 
legal principles governing the roles of doctors and patients. While medical ethics can draw 
upon a ready source of ethical dilemmas arising from case law and can then respond to legal 
developments and requirements which shape roles and expectations. In part, this is due to 
the complex interplay between medical law and medical ethics.416  
However, although autonomy may have come to be the most frequently cited and 
dominant principle in bioethics,417 it is a term which has rarely received express recognition, 
much less express discussion, in case law. Hoppe and Miola note that two of the most 
important cases on the law of informed consent (and medical negligence) Blyth v 
Bloomsbury HA and Sidaway are “autonomy-free zones”.418 Neither case employs the term 
autonomy, but despite this, such cases are taken, to be part of the case law that expands 
patients’ rights to respect for their autonomy.  
Where ideas of autonomy and self-determination are directly relied upon by the courts 
they are seldom clearly defined, nor consistently applied.419 In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust a 
number of excepts from precedent case law are provided under the heading “The principle of 
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autonomy”, disappointingly only one of the excerpts actually employs the term “autonomy” 
(from Re T) and it provides no definition, but merely an association of the term with others 
such as bodily integrity, self-determination and choice.420 The case of A local Authority v 
JH421 gives a cogent illustration on the point. There it was suggested that “[the patient] is 
still able to appreciate and express the value of being at liberty and being allowed 
autonomy”422 but footnote at this point states that this meant “[a]utonomy in the practical, 
everyday sense, rather than a strict legal or philosophical sense (i.e., autonomy vs 
heteronomy of the will)”.423  
A much more convincing engagement with the concept of autonomy can be found in 
Chester,424 where the term autonomy was explicitly employed425 and a passage from Ronald 
Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion was quoted.426 In this passage Dworkin suggests that autonomy 
has value because it protects the individual capacity to define her own character.427 
However, this should not immediately be taken as an endorsement of Dworkin’s conception 
of autonomy throughout this body of case law. It is plain that Dworkin’s account of 
autonomy would introduce certain conditions on the recognition of a particular action as 
being autonomous which the law may not accept (e.g. there is no requirement when refusing 
treatment  requiring that refusals accord with the individual’s deeply held values etc).  
In particular, Dworkin argues that a decision is only to be respected as autonomous if it 
reflects the critical interests of the individual.428 By contrast the law would, in theory, be 
bound to respect the decision of individuals who made a decision which did not conform to 
their deeply held values or which was even made for no reason at all.429 
Indeed, when considering the law on the refusal of treatment, much of the focus of the 
case law has not on the patient at all, but on the actions of the doctor. The case of Slater v 
Baker and Stapleton430 is one of the earliest cases in English law to recognise consent as a 
requisite of lawful medical treatment. The case involved a patient who had a cast removed 
from his leg in the absence of his clear consent, causing him pain. His claim against the 
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surgeon upheld in court and he was awarded damages. However, the rationale given for 
requiring patient consent was somewhat different to that which might be proffered today 
(along the lines of a violation of the patient’s right to determine what should be done with 
his body). It was said that “…it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be 
done to him [sic]”.431 This portrays the failing more as one of etiquette than of the violation 
of the physical integrity of the patient, a failure to respect his autonomy, or an interference 
with his right to self-determination.432  
Even as late at the Nineteenth Century, the seeking consent was viewed as a practice 
designed more to improve therapeutic outcomes than protect any supposed patient rights.433 
Taking this view would suggest that there is no necessary link between institution of a body 
of laws which safeguard the right to refuse treatment and autonomy in the sense of patient 
empowerment. 
 The themes of autonomy and self-determination came to greater prominence in this area 
in the Twentieth Century. One of the most important drivers for this change of focus was the 
Second World War and the atrocities uncovered following its conclusion. Although it has 
been reported that informed consent requirements were in existence in Germany at the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century,434 the orthodox medical law narrative holds out the 
discovery of Nazi atrocities during WWII as a watershed moment for the development of 
informed consent and patient rights more generally, following which there was recognition 
that patients required greater protection from the medical profession and medical researchers 
to safeguard them from abuse.435 This resolve that the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi doctors 
should never be repeated was manifested in the Nuremburg Code in 1947, which made the 
voluntary (i.e. uncoerced) consent of human subjects the sine qua non of participation in 
medical research for adults with capacity.436  
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The revelations at Nuremburg did great damage to the trust to which medical 
practitioners were formerly accustomed437 and which is now widely recognised as being so 
important in medical practice.438 Committing to new ethical standards of consent to medical 
treatment and experimentation was therefore vital for the future of medical practice and the 
restoration of trust. Thus, the development of a body of law on consent was also important 
for the protection of the medical profession as well as for patients.  
Although the increased recognition in patient autonomy and self-determination should 
not be construed as being linear and continuous following Nuremburg, as medical doctors 
retained significant control and long afterwards,439 it has been suggested that modern 
“consent-centric” ethical standards have been developed as “a direct consequence of the 
Nazi atrocities”.440 Beauchamp and Childress also point to this episode in history as the basis 
for a much greater level of attention being paid to consent to treatment.441  
The victims of the Nazis were denied their humanity and were treated instrumentally, 
they were experimented upon against their will without any and were thus denied respect for 
their rights to refuse treatment and this was seen as the core of the violation that they 
suffered. The principle of autonomy provided an important philosophical basis for the 
condemnation of atrocities perpetrated during WWII, but so too did the more general idea of 
Human Rights and it was the idea of human rights that provided the practical means for 
offering protection through the development of Human Rights Laws.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) can be seen as attempts to define the minimum acceptable standards 
for the treatment of human beings in law. The rights surrounding medical treatment which 
were developed following Nuremberg were accompanied by, and largely incorporated 
within, a new codified recognition of Human Rights particularly in the ECHR and in the 
UNHR. The rights set out in these Convention documents define certain rights which are 
enforceable against the state. For example, article 2 protects the right to life442; article 3 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union443  prohibits torture, defined as 
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“inhuman and degrading treatment”444. Article 8 guarantees the right to a private and family 
life through the recognition of “personal autonomy and self-determination”.445  This right 
provides similar protection to patients as that which is provided under the common law, 
because it is engaged “even minor interference with the physical integrity of an 
individual”.446 However, this article of the Convention is subject to qualification on various 
grounds including ‘the protection of health’ and ‘public safety’.447 This allows for medical 
treatment to be provided in the absence of consent in certain circumstances. 
While philosophical theories were important in providing a robust and precise basis for 
understanding why the violations that occurred during the war were so heinous, and offered 
a platform for theorising the kinds of rights that ought to be recognised to prevent any 
repetition, it is also important to note the human rights recognised by the ECHR are rights 
held by individuals by virtue of their very human existence. This can be contrasted with 
those theories of autonomy that only recognise certain decisions (rather than persons) as 
being autonomous if they conform to certain criteria. The only criterion for enjoying human 
rights is being human. 
THE POST-WAR RECOGNITION OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN LAW  
One of the most widely cited expositions of the modern rationale for the consent process 
is to be found in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital448 where it was said that:  
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is 
liable in damages.”  
This was followed by the expression of similar sentiment in English law cases such as 
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland:449  
“…the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to 
the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, 
however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life 
would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give 
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effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best 
interests to do so"450  
The employment of this kind of language illustrates a shift in attention towards the 
patient and away from the conduct of the healthcare professional. It represents a shift 
towards patients’ rights and away from the professional standards to which the medical 
practitioner should adhere. 
However, although a change of language in that direction is plainly observable, the 
means by which the law has protected the rights of patients has been through the tort of 
negligence, whose conceptual concern lies with the failure of the medical practitioner, rather 
than the interference with the rights of the patient.451 Despite the conceptual strain necessary 
to protect patient rights through the tort of negligence, the English courts made clear that 
actions against medical practitioners in battery would only be entertained in very limited 
circumstances.452 This provides further indication that many of the cases concerned with the 
development of the law on the refusal of treatment has not been solely motivated by a 
concern to further the cause of patient autonomy, but has in addition been designed to 
protect patients. 
One of the chief ways in which the law has sought to protect patients against the abuses 
of medical power has been by entitling them to information relevant to their treatment.453 
Imposing a duty on medical professionals to provide more information to patients is also 
seen as a method for reducing the “power imbalance” between doctor and patient.454 
Moreover, meaningful decisions about treatment can only be made when they are 
accompanied by certain pieces of information.  
The informational rights of patients have been greatly extended in the post war period 
through the development of the common law: the right to have questions answered 
truthfully,455 the right to be told of the material risks456 involved (not just in the proposed 
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treatment, but also in alternative procedures457 and moving away from the Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee458  test of information disclosure (i.e. disclosing only that 
which a reasonable body of medical men would disclose) towards a standard based on what 
the patient wants to know459 represents a significant stride forward for the patient’s ability to 
control their what kind of medical treatment they receive.  
The courts demonstrated their commitment to upholding the decisions of individuals 
even where the implications of so-doing risked significant harm for the patient or others. 
Particularly fraught decisions were made in favour of the patient even in cases where 
pregnant women risked the loss of their pregnancy.460 One important case in the formation of 
the modern right to refuse treatment was that of Re MB.461 Here it was said that if a pregnant 
woman is competent, she can refuse treatment for any or no reason and can do so even if her 
decision endangers the health of the foetus. Lady Butler-Sloss made the point forcefully:  
“A competent woman, who has the capacity to decide, may, for religious 
reasons, other reasons, for rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at 
all, choose not to have medical intervention, even though the consequence 
may be the death or serious handicap of the child she bears, or her own 
death.”462 
The legal consequences of the failure to respect a refusal of treatment made by a 
competent adult are primarily based around the idea of trespass to the person and medical 
negligence. Although battery may be the best theoretical fit with the modern ideas of self-
determination, the courts have made it clear that they consider the appropriate legal ground 
for the protection to be medical negligence in the majority of cases.  
“…failure to go into risks and implications is negligence not trespass.”463 
Hence although vociferous judicial backing has been given in support of the right to 
refuse treatment,464 it is only where the nature and purpose of the procedure has not been 
explained that the courts will consider actions in battery.465 Consequently, by far the greatest 
amount of legal activity has been in respect of the development of the relevant principles of 
negligence. 
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The establishment of a duty of care between the healthcare professional and the patient 
is straightforward, but the determination of the precise standard of care to be expected is less 
clear. One of the most important cases to establish a test, which turned out to be one which 
was very long-enduring was Bolam. This case established that medical practitioners must 
provide the same standard of care as would be provided by a ‘responsible body of medical 
men’ and thus gave medical practitioners a significant hand in the definition of the standards 
by which they would be judged.    
However, this test was subsequently circumscribed by the decision in Bolitho466 in 
which the court put a gloss on the Bolam method for defining the standard of care by 
expressing a willingness to subject the putative consensus of a reasonable group of medical 
practitioners to scrutiny. If the court did not consider that the standard of care being operated 
by the medical collective was not sufficiently high in some respect, the court would not be 
bound to accept it as the standard of care expected of the reasonable doctor. This principle of 
judicial supervision of medical opinion has also been applied with respect to applications to 
determine the lawfulness of a particular treatment in future in the case of Re T where the 
court preferred the parents’ opinion, that a liver transplant was not in the best interests of 
their child to the opinion of doctors that the transplant should go ahead.467 
A long line of cases have thus come to define the kind and quality of information that 
patients could expect from their medical practitioners. One of the most important recent 
developments on this point came through the decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board.468 Here the supreme court departed from the majority in Sidaway, in respect of their 
view that the test for the disclosure of information to the patient should be based on what the 
reasonable doctor would disclose, adopting instead a test based on the information that a 
reasonable patient would want to receive, while remaining responsive to the informational 
needs of the specific patient whose treatment is under discussion.469   
Aside from the battle for information, patients faced a further hurdle in trying to recover 
damages in negligence actions through the requirement to prove causation. Particularly, the 
medical team might have failed to disclose the right information or explain a procedure to 
the same standard as a reasonable doctor, but nonetheless, if the patient could not establish 
that they would have refused the treatment following a proper explanation and disclosure of 
information, they could not recover damages. However, in the case of Chester even though 
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the claimant could not establish that she would have refused the treatment, had she been 
given the correct information, the view was taken that in order to give effect to Ms Chester’s 
right to self-determination, she would have to be allowed to recover damages.470 Through 
this strained interpretation of causation, the explicit reference to autonomy471 and the explicit 
endorsement of the right to informed consent,472 this case demonstrates a notable shift in 
judicial attitude in favour of patients.  
These developments in medical negligence have had the effect of requiring greater 
levels of information disclosure to patients and can be seen as an ostensible attempt to 
protect patients from the potential abuses of medical power, by making patients party to 
information relevant to their treatment.473 However, the greater extent of these requirements 
of disclosure also puts a greater demand on patients to process this kind of information for 
themselves, which places a commensurately greater degree of responsibility on the patient. 
This case can be seen in the context of political programmes aimed at the empowerment 
of citizens and patients. The state has created requirements and frameworks for the greater 
disclosure of information and the facilitation of decision-making, which open up a greater 
degree of choice and normalise the disclosure of information and of choosing (e.g. star 
ratings from the care quality commission)474. Interaction with this kind of information 
demands individuals with different abilities and different dispositions. In addition to laws 
protecting patient choice, programmes have been designed to encourage patients to be active 
partners in decision-making particularly in medicine. Outside of medicine, consumerism has 
become one of the dominant modes of interaction between individuals and authority. These 
are themes which will be taken up and discussed further in the third part of this thesis. For 
present purposes, it will suffice to say that the development of the rights protecting 
autonomy have themselves been shaped by broader political objectives and by the demands 
of advanced liberal rationalities of government. 
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MAKING SENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDICAL 
LAW AND THE CONCEPT(S) OF AUTONOMY 
“Whatever else people think about individual or personal autonomy, they do 
not equate it with mere choice”475 
Given the foregoing discussion in this chapter, the assertion that there is one unitary and 
universally accepted version of autonomy is immediately contentious and the suggestion that 
there might be “practical, every day sense” of autonomy, while intriguing, remains a bare 
assertion without supporting evidence of its existence, let alone any explanation as to how it 
might be distinguished from other notions of autonomy.476 
Such inconsistency may well suggest that the concept of autonomy is being invoked for 
its conceptual cache and rhetorical value477 as much as for a belief in its worth among other 
normative considerations. The appearance of inconsistency is perhaps an inevitable 
consequence of the attempt to simultaneously satisfy the objectives of patient empowerment 
and conceptual fidelity. The variation seen within the common law when approaching 
matters of autonomy demonstrates limits of purely philosophical or bioethical analysis in 
respect of the law.478 However, considerable criticism has been levelled at the dominant 
form of autonomy that has been developed within bioethics and law and some of these 
criticisms must be highlighted. 
A product of the imprecise and rhetorical usage of the concept of autonomy is the 
apparent willingness to treat it as being interchangeable with the concept of self-
determination.479 Conceptual conflation of this kind suggests the adoption of a ‘thin’ 
approach to the construction of autonomy.480 From this, it is reasonably clear is that the law 
does not strictly adhere to Kant’s concept of autonomy. It is common in bioethics and law 
(should autonomy be explicitly referred to at all) to speak in terms of respecting a person’s 
autonomy.481 However, for Kant it is decisions that may possess the quality of being 
autonomous, not individuals.482  
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By contrast, in English law, it is more common to speak of autonomy as a quality that is 
in the gift of those who of adult years who retain capacity to decide (see e.g. HE). Moreover, 
not all decisions will adhere to Kant’s requirements for autonomous decision-making, 
because for a decision to be truly autonomous it must be one which does not offend the 
Categorical Imperative. Adhering to this requirement means the decision must be 
universalisable (i.e. it must be one which would be just in all circumstances) and that it must 
be one which respects the status of human beings as ends in themselves (and never merely as 
means to ends). These requirements place a significant qualification on the legitimate scope 
of individual choice.  
The Categorical Imperative precludes acceptance of the idea of self-ownership483 as well 
as intentional self-harm (one could not will self-harm as a universal law). Other related 
theories of autonomy would also preclude such action on different grounds. English law is 
somewhat incompatible with this suggestion too. It is certainly not the case that English law 
fully recognises individual self-ownership (one cannot, for instance, sell one’s own 
organs).484 However, the extent to which English law would impose a duty on individuals to 
act in their own interests is limited, because patients are entirely within their rights to refuse 
treatment which will inevitably lead to their death.485 Indeed since the Suicide Act 1961 
English law allows people to commit suicide and this decriminalisation of suicide has been 
held out as an example of the triumph of self-determination over the sanctity of life.486 More 
recently it has been suggested that such a choice can be made autonomously.487 This is a 
position that, as mentioned above, Kant’s theory of autonomy would not admit.488 
In further contradistinction to the Kantian position, under English law individuals are 
entirely free to make decisions which are inconsistent with their past decisions and to make 
decisions which they would not wish to hold out as universalised principles (i.e. to be 
applied in all like cases). A person may refuse treatment arbitrarily489 and then later accept 
the same treatment presented to them at his or her discretion. 
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Mill’s position appears more compatible with English law, because, as discussed, it 
centres not from the question of what kind of decisions are the right decisions to make per 
se, but rather by questioning the legitimacy of interference with individual choice and action. 
It thereby foregrounds the role of the individual in a similar way to general post-war 
approach of the courts in medical cases.490 
However, a closer examination of certain cases suggests that we cannot simply declare 
English Law as being aligned with an idea of Millian autonomy or indeed an idea of self-
determination. Certainly cases like Re T, Re B and Re C can be held out as examples of cases 
in which the patients have defied powerful orthodox medical wisdom in taking decisions, in 
spite of grave consequences, with the backing of the courts, but different cases can just as 
easily be found in which the courts have denied patients’ wishes.491  
The absence of an agreed definition of autonomy means the suggestion that Parliament 
and the courts have not correctly, or fully, produced laws which guarantee respect for 
autonomy an easy, but ultimately inconsequential, argument to make. Quite apart from the 
lack of a clear philosophical pedigree in the definition of autonomy, however, those seeking 
to criticise the law might also point to internal inconsistencies in relation to the law’s 
working definition(s) of autonomy.  
Some have attempted to rationalise the differences in the approaches taken in different 
cases through recourse to new sub-typologies of autonomy.492 Such analysis usefully 
highlights variation in the approach of the courts, but this empirical approach has its 
limitations in that it attempts a categorisation of observed and interpreted body of law, while 
already being well disposed to the idea of autonomy. Although it is not disputed that 
autonomy is an important value, there are competing values (e.g. self, determination, liberty, 
bodily integrity and choice)493 and practical concerns which impinge upon the court’s 
judgment (indeed it has been suggested that the concepts of autonomy and liberty are often 
conflated).494 
The court does not begin with the objective of protecting autonomy, or respecting other 
ethical concepts for that matter, but rather with the commitment to upholding the written 
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law.495 In addition, this kind of analysis, on its own, leaves open the normative question of 
which form of recognition of autonomy is to be preferred and the basis for any such 
preference (and whether these conceptions of autonomy are to be read in a way that is 
peculiar to the law itself)496. Thus, while there is clearly a relationship between the law in 
this area and (certain conceptions of) autonomy, attempting to distil a more precise 
conclusion about the nature of this relationship is a much more complex task and it may, 
ultimately, be one which is unlikely to bear fruit.  
Having this brief overview of the complexity and contentiousness of the definition of 
autonomy, it is now important to consider how this imperfect understanding feeds into 
English law’s understanding of ADRTs. The relationship between autonomy and ADRTs 
will be explored further in the following section. 
ADRTS AUTONOMY AND SELF DETERMINATION 
Having considered the relationship between the law on consent to medical treatment and 
the ideas of autonomy and self-determination, we can now turn to consider the way in which 
the idea of autonomy has been employed as a justificatory platform for the recognition of the 
right to create ADRTs. It has been assumed that the oft-conflated concepts of autonomy and 
self-determination form the basis for legitimising ADRTs, as Mr Justice Munby suggests: 
“An advance directive is, after all, nothing more or less than the embodiment 
of the patient’s autonomy and right of self-determination.”497  
However, when considering ADRTs in English law, we must remember the significance 
of the legal limitations, which mean that ADRTs only take effect once their author has lost 
capacity to make the material decision (i.e. the specific decision about treatment which is 
being posed). This is important, because as was discussed in the first chapter, English law 
does not recognise as binding the contemporaneous decisions of those who lack mental 
capacity.498 Such persons can be provided with whatever treatment is deemed in her or his 
best interests without the need to seek consent.499 This is the sense in which it might be said 
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that the right to create ADRTs enables this right to refuse that treatment in advance and it is 
in that way that it might be considered to extend this right of autonomy:500 
“The patient has a measure of autonomy in choosing between available 
alternatives. Advance decisions are a means by which such autonomy can be 
extended to a situation when the patient has become incompetent, by stating 
in advance the types of treatment which the patient would or would not find 
acceptable in certain circumstances."501 
Though elegant in its simplicity, this seemingly common-sense explanation demands 
some further discussion. It cannot refer to an extension of the willingness to respect patient 
choice in those situations where mental capacity is considered lacking. The legal recognition 
of ADRTs has done nothing to alter the test for capacity. Rather it surely describes the 
willingness to respect the decisions made by the author of the ADRT in respect of what we 
might, as a mere “façon de parler”502 term his or her ‘future self’ (i.e. the person she or he 
will become in future) where that future self is one that has lost mental capacity. As such, 
the ‘extension of autonomy’ could more precisely be said to be a temporal extension of the 
autonomy of the ‘present self’. Through the creation of an ADRT the present self not only 
has legitimacy in contemporary decision-making, but who is also accorded decision-making 
authority over his or her (possible) future self. 
AUTHENTICITY 
Ronald Dworkin, whose conception of autonomy was cited with approval in Chester,503 
has suggested that this ‘extension of autonomy’ is aimed at respecting “precedent 
autonomy”; that is respecting the decision of the last instantiation of the self, capable of 
exercising autonomy.504 He argues that respect for precedent autonomy is preferable to 
alternative ways of making treatment decisions in situations where the patient lacks the 
mental capacity to express a decision contemporaneously:  
“If I decide, when I am competent, that it would be better for me not to 
remain alive in a seriously and permanently demented state, then a fiduciary 
could contradict me only by exercising an unacceptable form of moral 
paternalism”.505  
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Dworkin argues that this would be the case even where the incapacitated person may 
appear relatively contented. In order to advance this argument, he relies on a case study 
based on a patient called Margot:506 a person who had earlier expressed a wish not to be 
given life-sustaining drugs should she ever suffer from dementia, but who she appeared 
relatively happy when she did later develop dementia. The question therefore arose as to 
what should happen in the event that she should require antibiotics to treat an infection. In 
order to answer this question, Dworkin separates out what he sees as her ‘critical’ and 
‘experiential’ interests.507 He suggests that her experiential interests (her state of 
contentedness) must yield to her critical interests (her deeply held values). Thus the ADRT 
should take effect. 
The reason for preferring critical interests over experiential interests is said to be aimed 
at the protection of the ‘authentic self’.508 Clearly the idea of the protection of the authentic 
self is a different goal from the simple protection of individual choice. It is equally plain that 
idea that a decision would have to pass a hurdle of authenticity before being upheld would 
not meet with the concerns of libertarians who believe in unimpeded free choice for the 
individual. Such a requirement would also implicitly rely upon of an external person with 
the authority to determine the question of authenticity. Such an objective would be 
incompatible with the aims of those who seek to draw on autonomy as a means of patient 
empowerment. However, including a requirement of authenticity in the criteria for 
autonomous decision-making may better attend to the concerns over refusing treatment to 
those who appear to undergo significant personal change in the period intervening the 
formation of the ADRT and the point at which it is relied upon.509  
This argument has been taken up by the creators of so-called ‘Ulysses contracts’ in the 
United States. These are similar to ADRTs, in that they concern decisions made in advance 
of the question of treatment arising, but crucially these decisions may take effect while the 
patient retains capacity. As they are often drafted in relation to addiction services, a common 
trigger is the relapse into addictive behaviour, but the precise trigger can be chosen by the 
creator of the decision. Such arrangements are similar to the way that ADRTs might be 
recognised if England and Wales were to become compliant with the UN convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities (“CRPD”), because in such as case ADRTs could not be 
triggered by the loss of mental capacity (because mental capacity cannot be used as a means 
                                                     
506 AD Firlik, ‘Margo’s Logo’ (1991) 265 Journal of the American Medical Association 201 
507 R Dworkin (n 426) 201-208 
508 see also R Dworkin (n 426) 32-39 
509 see Chapter Four 
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of determining a person’s legal rights or ‘legal capacity’ article 12) and therefore the trigger 
for the ADRT would have to be specified by the creator of the instrument.   
Ulysses contracts would therefore not respect autonomy in the broad manner recognised 
by English law; rather the proponents of such agreements they say they respect a form of 
autonomy grounded in “authenticity”.510 They construct a notion of the authentic self whose 
views should be prioritised over the present-self, or any other kind of self. This means that 
the power to legislate is not presumed to reside in the voice of the individual, but in some 
notion of her or his authentic essence.  
This position surely begs the questions: how is authentic self is to be determined and 
who can legitimately make such a determination. To be of any differential consequence, the 
authentic self must be determined by some form of other (if it could be determined by the 
patient themselves in their current state, they would naturally claim that their current self 
was their authentic self, in order that their current wishes be accorded legal force!) And, as 
there is no truly objective way in which authenticity can be determined whichever person is 
granted the power to make the determination is invited to make a choice about what qualities 
of the patient and their decisions are deserving of respect. Thus, the person who determines 
authenticity will introduce their own values, or those of the group to which they 
contemporaneously identify, into the decision-making process and simultaneously relegate 
the importance of the patient’s values. Any such move is therefore to be considered 
regressive. 
  
                                                     
510 T van Willigenburg and PJJ Delaere, 'Protecting Autonomy as Authenticity Using Ulysses 
Contracts' (n 26) 396–397 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the importance of certain factors to the 
emergence of ADRTs. It was suggested that one of the only reasons ADRTs have 
arisen was because of the advancements in medical science which have enabled life 
to be sustained in conditions of low mental and bodily functionality without an 
envisioned prospect of recovery. These advances have been coupled with a shift in 
the nature of the relationship between patient doctor, and expert authority more 
generally. Resultantly there is no obvious source of direction for the decisions about 
when life support should cease. This vacuum of direction can be filled by ADRTs 
wherein the patient provides their own decision in respect of their own treatment. 
The most heavily relied upon normative argument for the recognition of ADRTs in 
the courts and the legislative process is the characterisation of ADRTs as a mere 
extension of the legal right to refuse treatment.511 This is a right whose modern 
interpretation rests on the ideas of self-determination and autonomy. Hence it is 
argued that ADRTs extend of autonomy. 
The main part of this chapter was taken up with a discussion of the meaning of 
autonomy. Philosophers have differing definitions of autonomy and that the law has 
not selected any of the various definitions on offer, but has adopted a rather looser 
understanding of the term which has fluctuated over time and between cases. This 
means that the suggestion that ADRTs are based on an extension of autonomy offers 
a weakly-specified normative basis for their definition in law.  
In order to better appreciate the values that the law is trying to protect therefore we 
must give thought to the question of why the value of autonomy has risen to such 
prominence in Western society. Doing so will enable us to consider the purposes for 
which autonomy is put to work and this will enable a better understanding of the aim 
of the invocation of autonomy.  
However, as we have also seen, the law does tacitly accept a form of personhood that 
provides the opportunity to produce binding ADRTs and this may demonstrate a 
preference for patient choice over a fidelity to a philosophically coherent 
                                                     
511 HE v Hospital NHS Trust (n 66) (Fam) [37] (Munby J) 
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understanding of personhood. These critiques based around personhood offer some 
of the most compelling arguments against the recognition of binding ADRTs, but 
acceptance of them would entail far-reaching and fundamental changes to the other 
areas of law. It is unclear whether the proponents of these arguments in respect of 
ADRTs would wish to see them accepted beyond the realm of ADRTs in a logical 
manner. If not then the deployment of the personhood argument might be seen as a 
sophisticated way of stymying the law on ADRTs rather than promoting a genuine 
concern for a philosophically rigorous conceptualisation of personhood in law.  
In the next part of this thesis it will be suggested that a different basis for the critique 
of ADRTs might be found in Foucault’s work on governmentality. It will be argued 
that Foucault’s work will allow a richer understanding of both the development and 
operation of ADRTs than can be attained through an analysis based on more abstract 
philosophical approaches. It will demand a focus on the historical conditions which 
have made the acceptance of ADRTs possible, particularly surrounding the use of 
autonomy as an organising principle in society, and this will provide a stronger basis 
for understanding the seemingly inconsistent way in which ADRTs are recognised in 
practice. Furthermore this analysis will allow us to step back from an analysis of 
ADRTs based on their benefits for individuals and consider what benefits society 
might derive from a system of ADRTs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CRITIQUES OF MODERN CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF 
AUTONOMY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two it was suggested that in spite of the frequency with which autonomy is 
drawn upon in support of the law on the refusal of treatment and ADRTs, it remains a 
concept unfurnished with a clear and settled meaning in law, or indeed in philosophy. This 
has meant that appeals to autonomy might be made for developing the law in different 
directions and that the concept of autonomy can only claim partial responsibility for the 
current shape of the law.  
Regardless, it seems, the law has implicitly and explicitly placed reliance upon the 
concepts of autonomy and self-determination (seldom, if ever, making a clear distinction 
between them)512 in developing the law on the right to refuse medical treatment. Autonomy 
(and self-determination) is used as the primary explanatory concept for narrating the 
development of the law.513 Consequently, one of the most well-worn tropes of healthcare law 
is to question whether the law provides adequate protection for patient autonomy.  
Yet, given the uncertainty over the meaning of autonomy,514 and the purposes for which 
it is put to work (e.g. the protection of human rights, or the empowerment of citizens) 
evaluating the extent to which the law protects autonomy is far from straightforward. Indeed 
without agreeing on a definition it is impossible to do so precisely. For instance, for some, 
autonomy may be increased by increasing the levels of information available for individuals, 
while for others the acceptance of mere choice without reflection cannot be described as 
increasing autonomy.515   
The discussion in this chapter will explore some of the reasons why the development of 
laws based around autonomy has not been universally welcomed. A selection of critical 
perspectives on the development of autonomy will be considered by way of illustration. 
                                                     
512 e.g. Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) (n 69) (Fam) 41 (Hughes J) 
513 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health (n 161) [68] (Kerr and Reed LLJ); Birch (n 457) [72] (Cranston 
J) 
514 G Dworkin (n 371) 6 
515 O O'Neill (n 372) 37, 47-48 
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These critiques can be juxtaposed with the critique that will be developed in the next part of 
this thesis, based upon Foucault’s work on governmentality.  
The present chapter (and the one that follows) will afford the opportunity to situate the 
governmentality perspective in relation to a body of critical literature. The critical literature 
discussed in this chapter will relate to modern conceptualisations of autonomy in a general 
way, which may apply to all forms of consent to treatment but one which might also apply to 
ADRTs. Chapter Five will relate to critical perspectives on ADRTs specifically. It will be 
argued that governmentality offers a distinctive way to understand the development and 
operation of the law on ADRTs. Unlike the critiques presented here, the critique grounded in 
governmentality does not rest upon the adoption of any particular substantive normative 
commitment (e.g. to Human Rights, to community or individualism). Rather it suggests that 
the law has evolved in order to address crises of government and the ADRT has been 
developed in order to address a crisis in the government at the end of life.  
AUTONOMY IN LAW MEDICAL LAW 
In spite of the fact that no precise definition of autonomy has been ventured explicitly by 
parliament or the courts, many commentators have suggested that the way in which 
autonomy is commonly invoked in modern times does point towards a range of definition 
which has been adopted for practical purposes. Many commentators have been critical of 
both the assumed meaning of this value and its pre-eminence among other values and 
considerations.516 This chapter will offer a discussion of these critical perspectives on 
modern conceptualisations of autonomy as the basis for the right to refuse treatment and the 
right to create ADRTs.   
Critics have suggested that a ‘thin’, individualistic version of autonomy has been 
promoted in law and more generally in society. In contrast to some philosophical 
conceptualisations of autonomy (discussed in the second chapter) which put certain 
constraints on the exercise of autonomy, many commentators have suggested that there is a 
tendency to adopt an understanding of autonomy that is merely synonymous with individual 
choice:517 e.g. “autonomy – freedom of choice as an end in itself”.518 
                                                     
516 eg M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm - Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?’ (n 353) 398-401 
517 O O'Neill (n 372) 47 
518 GR Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and the Constraining of Choice: The Cases of Death and Serious Bodily 
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This kind of understanding of autonomy complements ideas of negative liberty519 and 
empowerment,520 but arguably it is not consistent with criteria of universalisation, personal 
development and authenticity (see previous chapter). This is because patients might make 
impulsive decisions which are out of keeping with an observable pattern of their decision-
making and if choice alone is sufficient for autonomy, the decision must be respected. 
The move towards recognising greater patient rights can be viewed, in general terms, as 
one from paternalism to individualism, from medical control to patient choice.521 Positive 
though that may sound, it is a trajectory that has not passed without criticism. It has already 
been noted that autonomy is a broad term, with a number of divergent and in some cases 
contradictory definitions posited from various quarters, but uniting the goals of recognising 
autonomy and empowering patients through choice has led to the adoption of a ‘thin’ 
version of autonomy, which is unedifying for some.  
For instance, Onora O’Neill has argued that the legal recognition of autonomy has 
become synonymous with ‘self-determination’, because the mere choice of an individual has 
become more than simply a necessary condition of ethical action and has moved to become 
“sufficient” for the purposes of respecting the decision.522 This is a common line of critique 
against a ‘thin’ version of autonomy, which suggests that “personal autonomy is more than 
uncoerced choice”.523 That is to say that the mere fact that a choice has been made by an 
individual is taken as being sufficient ethical justification for the decision in and of itself.524 
It has therefore been alleged that autonomy is invoked merely as “a right to what ‘I want’”525 
however unreflectively or inconsiderately that decision is arrived at.  
A related source of criticism has been the alleged one-sided nature of autonomy’s 
development. It is often noted that patients have accrued many rights during the post war 
period, but have inherited few duties in return (although this was the goal of the project of 
patient empowerment526). Maclean has advocated greater obligations for patients.527 
                                                     
519  I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (n 370) 169-178 
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523 M Holstein, JA Parks and MH Waymack (n 480) 21 
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525 M Brazier and Cave E (n 34) para 3.7 
526 K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (n 8) 62 
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University Press 2009) 250 
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These misgivings might also be levelled at ADRTs. In theory there is no questioning of 
the reasoning behind the patient’s ADRT as long as it is in compliance with the formalities 
laid down by the MCA, although Maclean has suggested that, in practice, the reasoning used 
in an ADRT might be used by an assessor in determining whether the ADRT was made with 
capacity.528 Moreover there appears to be no obligation on patients to make particular kinds 
of decision, or to consult any third party about their decision (e.g. a medical practitioner or a 
family member). 
However, those who advocate an idea of autonomy that is empowering of patients have 
sought to criticise the implementation of laws designed to protect autonomy on the grounds 
that they do not function as they should in offering individuals enough freedom and choice. 
FUNCTIONALIST CRITIQUE 
The efficacy of the law has been challenged by ‘functionalist’ critiques, which have 
highlighted the gap between the promise of the law and what its capacity to deliver practical 
change. Underpinning the functionalist critique of individualistic version of autonomy is the 
contention that the law fails to offer a sufficient level of genuine choice to patients making 
medical decisions. The blame for this state of affairs might be channelled in different 
directions.  
One reason might be the under-provision of information to patients. Certain studies have 
suggested that patients would like to be provided with more information in certain 
circumstances.529 Along these lines, battles have been fought to increase the quantum of 
information that must be provided and professional codes have been developed that require 
that information is provided in such a way that it can be understood easily by the recipient.530 
Such moves have been reinforced by legal developments such as Sidaway,531 Pearce532 and 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire533 in which patient rights to information were protected and 
extended. 
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However, concerns have been raised that simply increasing the quantum of 
informational disclosure, could ultimately be counterproductive in removing the limiting the 
opportunities for medics to employ their conscience in decision-making534 and from the 
patient’s perspective because as it can hinder understanding and complicate decision-
making. Schwartz535 claims that the proliferation of choice in many areas has gone past the 
point at which it is of benefit to us and that, far from empowering people, the level of choice 
in modern life now constitutes a burden for many.536 Along similar lines it has been argued 
that the range of choice in informed consent situations should be limited.537 
Criticism has not only been made of the law for failing to require the disclosure of a 
sufficient quantum of information, but also for requiring an inadequate quality of 
information in the consent process has also been criticised. Especially following Sidaway,538 
it has been suggested that the law privileges information on risk over other kinds of 
information that patients may also be important for some patients.539 Taking the view that 
risk is central to the decision-making process also tacitly endorses a rationalist model of 
decision-making behaviour,540 which may not accord with the way that some people wish to 
make decisions.  
In terms of ADRTs, the fact authors are not obliged to seek medical or legal advice 
before making an ADRT has been a source of criticism for some.541 However, implementing 
such a requirement would have the potential to impede the independence the decision-
making of the authors of ADRTs and would lengthen the process of creating an ADRT 
which in turn disincentivise the creation of ADRTs.  
FEMINIST CRITIQUES AND RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
Some feminists have argued that the modern form of autonomy is entirely geared 
towards a male way of thinking and does not take account of the practical and socially 
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situated way in which women reason and make decisions.542 Thus, the idea of a person 
weighing medical decisions with cold rationality, in the way that some modern conceptions 
of autonomy may demand, has been portrayed as an androcentric caricature,543 objectionable 
on functionalist grounds (because it might not be possible to make medical decisions in that 
way in reality), but which may also contribute to the subjugation of women in a more 
general sense.  
Feminist bioethics has been built up from the views that the field of bioethics is 
inherently gendered, privileging a male perspective and subjugating a female perspective.544 
It has been suggested that Kantian autonomy structured around a quintessential "young, 
white, bourgeois male who stands before endless possibilities"545  and ideas of autonomy 
ought to conform to the “actual experiences and capacities” of those who are asked to make 
decisions.546 Along these lines, Fineman argues that people are not truly autonomous, in the 
sense of being independent, because they always rely on the support of others to make 
decisions and that rather than being given more space in which to make their own decisions, 
they should therefore be provided with greater rights to care and support in order for them to 
make decisions.547 Gilbar suggests that this does not happen sufficiently in English law, 
claiming that patients’ families tend to be treated with suspicion and hostility and that the 
involvement of the family should be embraced as part of the consent process.548 Veatch goes 
further in suggesting that the idea of informed consent should be abandoned and replaced 
with a desire to arrive at ‘deep values’ together through a pairing of doctor and patient.549 
The feminist scholarship in this area has been constructed in part through the 
experiences of women. It has been observed that women are “disproportionally represented 
among patients” “are more likely to be employed in health services as carers”.550 Women 
are overrepresented as applicants in cases involving decisions to withdraw treatment at the 
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end of life.551 Furthermore, many of the important pre-MCA cases in which the person 
seeking recognition for an ADRT was female resulted in the ADRT not being upheld.552 
However, by contrast, cases involving male patients tended to result in the ADRT being 
successfully upheld.553 Of course, the number of reported decisions is relatively small, too 
small to make a claim to representativeness, and the broader reality may well have been 
different. However, early indications in the post-MCA case law have not shown a 
continuation in this trend.554  
CULTURAL CRITIQUES 
One suggested remedy to the complaint that the current prevailing definitions and 
practices of autonomy are too individualistic in character has been advanced by the 
advocates of ‘relational autonomy’.555 Drawing inspiration from certain branches of feminist 
critique, (in particular, the work of Carol Gilligan)556 relational autonomy promotes the 
empirical claim that people tend to make decisions collectively rather than as atomised 
individuals and the normative claim that more communal or collective models of decision-
making should be supported and promoted. This is not only said to be true for patients, but 
also for doctors and medical teams, who are encouraged to work in a collaborative way.557 
This form of autonomy is a close cousin of the ‘ethic of care’558 and some commentators are 
proponents of both relational autonomy and of the ethic of care.559  
While relational conceptualisations of autonomy suggests that more attention should be 
paid to the collective nature of decision-making, the ethic of care invites the paying of 
greater attention to the role and function of the carer. Its advocates argue that the carer is 
often forgotten in bioethical discourse that is overly focussed on narrow decision-making 
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scenarios which invite abstract thinking rather than an appreciation of the realities of living 
with illness and of caring for patients.560 It has been argued that such a conceptualisation of 
autonomy is simply too far removed from the realities of the experience of being a patient to 
be meaningful.561 Therefore it is said that patients want and need care as much as the bare 
right to choose between alternative forms of treatment.562  
One of the great difficulties for the proponents of anything other than a liberal system of 
consent to treatment occurs where the will of the patient is at variance to the will of the 
family or society etc. Herring even suggests, on an ethic of care approach, that such is the 
importance of community in decision-making, people who want to refuse treatment could be 
given treatment against their will, if their refusal would cause significant hardship or burden 
to their carers.563 Such an outcome would be radically different under the current law and it 
will be argued in Part III of this thesis that the concept of autonomy, in the imprecise terms 
in which it has been developed in the law, is broadly reflective and supportive the advanced 
liberal system of government in which it operates. A push to recognise forms of autonomy 
that are not obviously compatible with that rationality of government will be unlikely to be 
adopted.  
Adopting Herring’s position in respect of ADRTs, could mean subjecting all decisions 
to an additional test of whether they would cause an unacceptable level of burden to others. 
Such a test would not only have to be satisfied at the moment of the creation of the ADRT, 
but also at its point of application. As a result it would be impossible know in advance 
whether an ADRT would be binding in future, because the future circumstances of the 
author’s dependents could not be known in advance. ADRTs would therefore be no better 
than ACPs.  
LACK OF CHOICE 
To the contrary, however, some have criticised the development of autonomy in law for 
failing to offer enough choice to the individual. One of the chief grounds for this criticism is 
that patients have no right to compel treatment to be given to them, but can merely refuse 
treatment they do not wish to receive.564 Therefore the law establishing the right to refuse 
treatment can claim a very limited role in the empowerment of the individual and the 
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promotion of choice.565 Those elect to have surgery or procedures (e.g. cosmetic surgery or 
fertility treatment) remain at the mercy of medical opinion and the law as regards whether 
the particular treatment is appropriate for them to receive.566 Such medical decisions about 
whether to provide treatment will be guided by codes of ethics,567 but these ethical codes 
may still afford considerable discretion to the medical practitioners who have responsibility 
for their interpretation in the first instance. This problem is most starkly illustrated by cases 
such as Pretty568 and Nicklinson569 in which patients who may have wished to end their own 
lives but who lacked the physical capacity to do so were denied their request for assistance 
or any assurance that any person who were to assist in accelerating their death might be 
prosecuted as a result.  
Furthermore, as the right to refuse treatment is couched exclusively in negative terms, it 
will often entail negative health consequences for the patient where it is exercised. Thus, 
even where the right can be exercised, patients may be reluctant to use it for fear of 
damaging their own health. Limitations of this variety, which pertain to the conditions in 
which choices are made and the power relations with which they are permeated,570 are 
masked by the law’s recognition of and reliance upon the idea of autonomy.571 
There is an odd parallel with between this line of critique that patients are insufficiently 
empowered to make healthcare decisions and the Marxian critique that the choices offered 
within liberal systems of government are often illusory, because liberal systems fail to 
guarantee the conditions in which choices can be freely made.572 As Marxists view 
liberalism as an ideological form of governance designed to maintain a system of capital 
which exists for furtherance of the interests of the ruling class and the oppression and 
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subjugation of the working class,573 the increase in informational rights that has been 
described above would do little to quell this concern.     
Further to this critique, Marx drew a distinction between ‘formal freedom’ and ‘real 
freedom’.574 The right to refuse medical treatment could be used as an example. This right is 
often proclaimed with hyperbole but when we examine more closely the circumstances in 
which it can be exercised as well as the kind of person who may be empowered to use this 
right, it may appear less egalitarian its practical effects. Those with greater access to 
information and who are better educated will be in a better position to resist the medical 
authority through which the treatment is offered. They will likely have a better awareness of 
the legal right of refusal and they might be more inclined to enter into a dialogue with the 
medical team about which kind of treatment they should be given. Those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds who may be less likely to be aware of their rights, or of the 
possibility of receiving alternative forms of treatment, would be less likely to actually 
exercise their rights as they would be impeded by their structurally determined ignorance. In 
that sense, the legal right, which, on the face of it, applies equally to all adult citizens can 
only be exercised by a certain section of society a few in an empowered way. It is thus, 
according to the Marxist argument, a right which is illusory for a great number of people.575  
Even if rights to information are seen as being inherently valuable, they are rights which 
may be more readily utilised by certain people than by others. The passing of decision 
making responsibility on to those who lack the ability to make a good decision for 
themselves can make the process of consent seem daunting and bamboozling at the best of 
times,576 but for those with a limited capacity for comprehending such information it could 
be even more problematic. For those who lack some capacity or who are in a somewhat 
vulnerable position, the rights that have been accrued through cases such as Pearce577 
(which demands truthful information to be given in response to patients questions) are of 
very limited utility. In order to take full advantage of the protection the law offers, patients 
must actively become proficient at using risk-based information to in order to make 
decisions. Additionally, they must learn to ask questions in order to get the kind of 
information that is important to them. Faden Beauchamp and King suggest that 
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“Professionals [should]… establish a climate that encourages the patient or subject [sic] to 
ask questions.”578 
Admittedly, there is an obligation to make an effort to present information in terms that 
the patient can understand and to as part of the consent process under the MCA and the 
MCA Code of Practice, and practitioners must have regard to this code.579 Of course the law 
does make some provision for those whose vulnerability manifests itself as a lack of 
capacity. This is also underpinned by the decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire which 
suggests a shift in the legal approach towards information disclosure as the court made clear 
that the consent process (and the process of information disclosure) should operate as a 
“dialogue” which has patient understanding as its aim.580  
Those who do lack capacity receive additional support and are not expected to make 
decisions for themselves (although they are expected to be included in the decision-making 
process), but even here some claim that the ‘best interests’ standard contained in the MCA 
causes medical practitioners to focus too heavily on what the patients desires in that situation 
without regard to what is wanted by the family.581 In addition, there may be people who 
satisfy the test for capacity by a small margin, or those who for some other reason we may 
consider vulnerable who might pass through the protective framework of the MCA.  
However, even for those without cognitive impairments, it might be said that most 
people might struggle to interrogate the treatment information when they are in ill health and 
need of treatment. Decisions to consent to medical treatment might be taken while under the 
influence of drugs, or following the receipt of a life changing diagnosis. Such factors may, 
of course vitiate capacity582, but often this will not be the case (especially given that there is 
a presumption of capacity under the MCA). 
As this brief overview of critical perspectives illustrates, the conceptualisation of 
autonomy as a basis for the law and its development is a matter of frequent contention. It is 
therefore unsurprising then that the implementation of laws based on such a contentious 
concept has been the subject of much critical attention. Many of these critical perspectives 
suggest that some individualistic interpretations of autonomy, which some suggest have 
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prevailed in general terms,583 fail in practice. Patients may feel overwhelmed and unable to 
take in, remember and process the risk based information they are given. At a more 
fundamental level, some argue that individualistic models of autonomy fail to take adequate 
account of the social conditions in which autonomy is practiced. For example, they fail to 
take account of the oppression that is generated from the ruling classes, or the patriarchy, or 
the simple fact that people tend to make their decisions within social networks rather than 
entirely alone. This tends to normalise and reproduce problematic social relations in this 
field. 
What can be taken from each of these perspectives collectively is that abstract notions of 
autonomy, devoid sensitivity for the social context in which they are designed to operate, are 
problematic. Such accounts may fail to adequately appertain to the reality of every-day 
decision-making and may therefore be descriptively deficient. But in addition, although the 
normative claims of abstract philosophical reasoning which supports autonomy 
demonstrably lacks persuasive force for many commentators. For these reasons, appeals for 
laws to be brought into line with particular versions of totalising philosophical concepts 
ought to be treated with caution.  
In addition, the suggestion that the particular way in which the concept of autonomy has 
been developed philosophical development of autonomy can explain the emergence of 
ADRTs cannot be considered more than a partial success at best. With due acknowledgment 
to the importance of the philosophical analysis of autonomy, it is argued here that the law on 
ADRTs has not been developed in a vacuum as the result of a process of metaphysical 
argumentation, but rather through a complex interplay of values and objectives, together 
with social and technological conditions. In order to attain a fuller understanding of the law 
on ADRTs we therefore need to look beyond the traditional confines of analytic moral 
philosophy and bioethics. This is a task that will be undertaken in the second part of this 
thesis using Foucault’s theory of governmentality. 
Part of the argument will be to retract from abstract normative pronouncements about 
the kind of system that best protects values and rights which are held out as being important. 
Rather the concern is more pragmatic: medical technology has advanced to the point that it 
can routinely sustain life at very low levels of functionality for prolonged periods and there 
is a lack of clear authority for determining when treatment should be withdrawn in such 
situations in the context of an advanced liberal society. It is argued here that ADRTs have 
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emerged more as a response to a crisis of government than as a product of the elaboration of 
a normative position. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a discussion of some of the most prominent criticisms of 
modern recognitions of autonomy, which are taken underpin the recognition of the right to 
refuse treatment and ADRTs. The critical perspectives discussed in this chapter illustrate 
that in so far as it is true that the law has developed along the lines of a particular conception 
of autonomy, it has not been universally greeted as a positive development. To the contrary, 
many have found the organisation of the law around this conception of autonomy to be 
problematic. 
With so many criticisms of the kind of autonomy which has allegedly been relied upon, 
the question arises as to why such a version of autonomy has been adopted at all in law. 
Some feminist and Marxist scholars suggest that it is part of a wider societal project of 
female subjugation and/or class oppression. These perspectives are valuable in highlighting 
the potential for ideas such as autonomy to structure social relations. In this thesis it will be 
suggested that the development of ADRTs is indeed part of a broader project, but rather than 
one of domination, it is a project aimed at the government of society. Moreover, the 
structural considerations merely make up a part of the story, because ADRTs have important 
implications for the way in which people relate to and govern themselves (a point which will 
be considered in detail in Chapter Six). 
A common source of criticism is the individualistic spin put on the concept of 
autonomy, resulting in what some describe as being a ‘thin’ version of autonomy,584 lacking 
in moral depth. The individualised conception of autonomy has also been the subject of 
criticism from feminists and cultural theorists who dispute the descriptive and normative 
validity of a system that suggests people make decisions as individuals and that they should 
make decisions as individuals rather than in their family. Relational autonomy has been 
advanced by some as a more acceptable alternative to individualistic conceptions of 
autonomy. However, acceptance of such a form of autonomy would entail significant change 
in the law on the refusal of treatment, allowing refusals of treatment to be overridden where 
they would cause a significant burden to others. Adopting this model of autonomy in 
medical law would render all refusals of treatment subject to a ‘burdensomeness test’ and 
ADRTs no better than ACPs. It would not be impossible for the law to embrace relational 
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autonomy in this way, but to do so may not accord with the broader objectives and purposes 
for which autonomy is put to work that were discussed in the previous chapter. Particularly, 
placing an additional criterion to be met before a decision will be respected would conflict 
with the goals of empowerment and the protection of patient choice, which have come to 
prominence in recent times. Thus the greatest problem for those advocating alternative 
versions of autonomy on which to base the law is that those they are not aligned with the 
prevailing model of decision-making upon which advanced liberalism depends. This is the 
most important reason why these kinds of criticism have not translated into a radically 
different legal approach. 
Criticisms of the individualistic conceptualisation of autonomy and its legal 
implementation notwithstanding, autonomy has been relied upon as the fundamental ethical 
principle justifying the development of the law on ADRTs. Thus the orthodox understanding 
of ADRTs as instruments which merely ‘extend autonomy’ appears to rest on a broad-based, 
perhaps rhetorical, version of autonomy. The simplicity of this orthodox narrative can be 
contrasted with the many challenges and objections made to the legal recognition of ADRTs 
in the MCA, described as the most contentious part of the bill,585 as the law went through 
parliament. Some of these are set out in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SPECIFIC CRITIQUES OF MODERN 
CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF AUTONOMY IN RELATION 
TO ADRTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of critiques of modern conceptions of autonomy and their incorporation 
into healthcare law were set out in the previous chapter. These arguments clearly speak 
to ADRTs, as the notion of autonomy forms the principle normative basis for their 
recognition,586 but these arguments were not specifically directed towards ADRTs per 
se. The purpose of this chapter will be to consider how concerns surrounding the 
construction of the principle of autonomy have been specifically raised against the kind 
of autonomy that underpins the recognition of ADRTs.  
These concerns, many of which were aired in the pre-Legislative Scrutiny 
Committee on the Mental Incapacity Bill,587 will be set out and considered in this 
chapter. Attention will first turn to these concerns and then attention will turn to a 
different line of critique based on the idea of personhood. The latter is one of the most 
interesting and important challenges to the operation of ADRTs, because it does not 
ostensibly take issue with the current interpretations of autonomy, but rather with the 
question of whether autonomy can operate as the moral foundation of ADRTs if the 
creator of the ADRT is deemed to be a different agent from the one to whom the ADRT 
later purports to apply. This is significant because it was claimed in the previous chapter 
that the critiques which cut across some of the fundamental assumptions of the broader 
political rationality in which the law operates would struggle to gain traction and effect 
change. The personhood critique cuts into the very foundations of the legal framework 
on ADRTs and does so ‘along the grain’ i.e. accepting the assumptions of the advanced 
liberal rationality in which the law operates. 
However, before turning to the critiques grounded in ideas of personhood, some of 
the objections raised to the enactment provisions that make ADRTs possible will be 
discussed. A number of these were considered in the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny 
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Committee for the legislation that was eventually enacted as the MCA and these will be 
considered in the next section.  
THE MCA PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY COMMITTEE 
The 1995 Law Commission Report, “Mental Incapacity” made a series of 
recommendations that paved the way for the Mental Incapacity Bill (my emphasis), 
which was later to be enacted as the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Law Commission’s 
central aim was “that [the] new legislation should provide a unified and comprehensive 
scheme within which people can make decisions on behalf of, and in the best interests 
of, people who lack capacity to make decisions for themselves”.588 
Many of the principles that were ultimately written into the MCA were principles 
that had already received recognition in the common law. Perhaps the most important 
among these was the principle that everyone has capacity, unless the contrary is 
proven.589 This principle is reflected in the functional approach to mental capacity, 
which the Law Commission favoured590 and which, as they noted, was already being 
used in many areas of law at the time.591 A similar principle has long been recognised in 
the criminal law in relation to the so-called M’Naghten rules,592 which governs the 
defence of insanity: everyone is presumed sane (and therefore capable of having 
criminal responsibility) unless the contrary is proven.593 Similarly, the principle that a 
person must not be treated as lacking in capacity merely on the grounds that they have 
made an “unwise decision” was enshrined in section 1(4), but was already clearly 
established in cases such as Re T.594  
The theme of a continuity, or extension, of existing legal principles is one of the 
most prominent in the reasoning which has led to the recognition of ADRTs.595 As the 
right to make anticipatory refusals of treatment had already received recognition at 
common law, as an extension of an existing and well-established right,596 prior to the 
enactment of the MCA, it was not seen as a legal development that required novel 
justificatory argumentation.  
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During the legislative process, however, it was argued that the law should not 
permit ADRTs that “effectively shorten life”.597 This line of argument contests the idea 
that respect for autonomy entails respecting all decisions of the patient. Further to this, 
Age Concern argued that ‘‘the concept of advance directives is morally wrong because 
in no circumstances has any person the right to refuse measures which will prolong 
life’’.598 This claim was put in stronger rhetorical terms by those who claimed that the 
provisions on ADRTs would lead to “euthanasia by the backdoor”.599  
There was also concern that failure to provide Clinician Assisted Nutrition and 
Hydration (“CANH”) may cause suffering and a loss of dignity at the end of life.600 
However, the idea of limiting the individual power to refuse treatment based on a 
conception of dignity demands a robust definition of dignity and a serious commitment 
to the protection of dignity through the limitation of choice would have to apply to 
choices beyond those made at the end of life. Moreover justifying such limits on choice 
would be challenging in advanced liberal democracy, which relies on individuals who 
can exercise free choice.601  
These objections appear difficult to sustain in light of the fact that no more can be 
achieved through an advance decision than can be achieved through contemporaneous 
refusals of treatment.602 Logically, if there were an objection to people making 
anticipatory decisions which would abbreviate the lifespan of their author (should they 
ever be relied upon) the same objection should apply to contemporaneous refusals of 
treatment which abbreviate lifespan. Of course, some would argue that the special value 
of life means that it should never be intentionally shortened by act or the omission of 
‘ordinary’ or ‘proportionate’ treatment (i.e. that which is not considered ‘futile’ or 
burdensome)603 but this argument is not one that is accepted in English law, where 
sanctity of life concerns yield to those of self-determination.604 As there was no 
argument to change the existing law on this point, it appears that the principle pleaded in 
support of this argument (i.e. that there should be no hastening of death by withdrawing 
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life-saving or life sustaining treatment) is not one that has been advanced consistently. 
However, this line of argument is to be commended for its bold honesty in that it makes 
no secret of its aspiration to limit the level of choice that individuals may exercise over 
their medical treatment.  
A slightly different concern was raised by some medical groups, who argued 
against the right to be allowed to make ADRTs, because they claimed that people cannot 
foresee what their treatment preferences might be following the loss of capacity.605 This 
problem is peculiar to ADRTs, because in cases of contemporaneous refusals of 
treatment, knowledge of the circumstances of the decision can readily be imputed to the 
decision-maker. However, with anticipatory decisions there is a possibility that new 
forms of treatment could emerge in the time intervening the making of the decision and 
the time when the decision is called upon. These considerations were certainly 
important, but further to the recommendations of the Scrutiny Committee606 safeguards 
were written in to the MCA designed to allay some fears of this kind: ADRTs will not be 
applicable where there has been a change in the circumstances of the patient607 and this 
provision cannot be avoided even where the author of the ADRT expressly states that 
they do not wish to be bound by its terms.608 The requirement to specify the 
circumstances in which the ADRT will apply has also led to the avoidance of a prima 
facie ADRT in W v M609 on the grounds that the patient had specified what should 
happen if she were to receive a particular diagnosis (viz a Vegetative State (“VS”)) but 
in the event, she was diagnosed with a condition of a similar kind that was almost 
unknown to medical science at the time she expressed her wishes).610 Cases such as 
these illustrate the considerable level of discretion that is available to the healthcare 
professionals and the courts when adjudicating the applicability of ADRTs.611 The 
existence of this discretion, which has been retained in the MCA, weakens the argument 
that ADRTs are too rigid and lock their authors in to decisions regardless of changes in 
future circumstances. 
Similarly, some opined that it would be improper for a person to make a decision 
about the refusal of treatment in the absence of professional advice.612 Imposing such a 
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requirement would demand an additional service from healthcare professionals and 
would place additional costs on the health service. Great controversy followed the 
decision in the United States to use state funding (through Medicare) to pay for 
professionals discuss advance care planning with individuals.613 Moreover, a 
requirement to consult a medical professional would extinguish one of the only genuine 
claims that ADRTs can make to empowerment of patients. By affording medical 
professionals the possibility of persuading the other party (the ‘proto-patient’) to making 
certain decisions (although Maclean believes that medical professionals should be under 
a duty to persuade their patients)614, citizens would lose the power of pre-emption. 
A further concern was that some may be placed under undue influence to create an 
ADRT.615 This kind of concern is partially addressed by the inclusion of formality 
requirements, which require ADRTs which purport to refuse life sustaining treatment to 
be witnessed.616 If the witness suspected that the person was being forced to make the 
ADRT, they could refuse to sign the document. Requiring creators of ADRTs to consult 
with medical practitioners would not eliminate this kind of concern, because medical 
professionals could equally apply persuasive pressure on people making important 
decisions,617 indeed some think that they should be under an obligation to do so.618  
These concerns and objections are worthy of serious consideration, but as 
discussed, many of them represent objections not only to an extension of the law into 
ADRTs, but also to the very foundation of ADRTs in the ‘individualistic’ conception of 
personal autonomy, which allows individuals to refuse any treatment that they do not 
wish to receive. Moreover, by the time that Parliament was legislating for the MCA it 
was already apparent that ADRTs had received legal recognition through the common 
law619 and, in consequence, the MCA did nothing radical in providing for the creation of 
ADRTs. It was also apparent that the courts had considered some of the potential 
problems associated with the recognition of anticipatory decision-making of this kind 
and had considered the imposition of certain safeguards to guard against abuse. 
However, one line of criticism that was not considered by the courts in the pre-MCA 
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case law, at least directly, but which has subsequently come to prominence is the 
personhood argument. This will be considered in the next section. 
THE PERSONHOOD CRITIQUE620 
Many criticisms of autonomy considered thus far might apply equally to 
contemporary refusals of treatment as they apply to ADRTs. However, what I will refer 
to as “the personhood argument” that will be discussed in this section is one that applies 
to ADRTs specifically. Mclean has neatly summarised the major premise of what I will 
refer to as the personhood problem in the following way:  
“If advance directives are predicated on the basis of personal autonomy 
then… their authority only applies to an individual if he or she is the same 
moral entity that created the directive.”621 
A significant problem would thus occur were the author of the ADRT to be treated 
as a different ‘moral entity’ if his or her ADRT were to be relied upon. A problem of this 
order goes directly to the moral legitimacy of the ADRT,622 because if the author has 
become a different moral entity, she or he would lack the moral legitimacy to bind her or 
his future self.623 On that basis, the present self would purport to bind a different person. 
As the personhood argument is one that goes to the moral core of advance decision 
making, it demands serious attention. However, even if it is accepted that this kind of 
change is possible, the moral legitimacy ADRTs is only threatened if such a change has 
actually occurred (i.e. whether the author has actually become a different moral entity). 
Therefore the ability to identify when such a change might happen is crucial for the 
strength of this critique. 
Different approaches have been suggested for the identification of change in ‘moral 
entities’ and many of these theories revolve around the concept of personhood. Legal 
personhood can be taken to mean the recognition of a person before the law.624 Other 
aspects of personhood may include moral personhood and it is this aspect of 
personhood, which refers to the moral status of a person. Fluctuations in moral 
personhood may not automatically affect legal personhood, but it could be argued that 
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there should be a moral basis for the law’s recognition of personhood and any 
fluctuations thereto.  
Invoking the concept of personhood makes it possible to divide aspects of existence 
between the biological and the political, what the ancient Greeks termed bios and a zoē 
respectively.625 Since then, various theories of personhood have emerged in moral 
philosophy,626 which suggest different criteria for the recognition of personhood and for 
identifying material changes in personhood. These theories can be divided between the 
animalist, and the psychological.  
Animalist theories of personhood refer heavily to the biological makeup of the 
person. On this view, if a person remains biologically the same, then they should be 
recognised as the same moral entity.627  An immediate difficulty arises from the idea of 
an entity remaining the same and how much change might be admissible before the 
organism might be considered to have changed.628 If a broad view of biological makeup 
is taken (i.e. if we do attach moral significance to changes at the cellular level, or even to 
larger scale changes such as organ transplantation or limb amputation) then such 
theories may suggest a high degree of continuity of personhood especially in relation to 
adults who may create ADRTs. Animalistic theories could found a basis for challenging 
the arbitrary restriction on the ability to create an ADRT at the age of 18 and why legal 
personhood might be affected by a loss of mental capacity. 
Accepting such an animalist theory as a universal principle of law would have far-
reaching consequences. For instance, the recently deceased might have biological or 
genetic identity with the person they were when they were alive. The law would not 
recognise this: one cannot murder a corpse in the same way that one can murder a living 
human person.629  
Locke argued against animalist conceptions of personhood by drawing attention to 
the absurdity of treating someone as a new person if his or her hand were to be cut off.630 
He developed a theory of personhood grounded in psychological persistence.631 He 
argued that “whatever has the consciousness of the present and past actions, is the same 
person to whom they both belong”.632  On this basis the continuation of personhood 
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requires that one must be able to remember one’s previous states of consciousness. 
Therefore, according to Locke, if a person has memory problems, perhaps owing to a 
condition such as dementia, and cannot remember an earlier state of mind, they must be 
treated as a distinct moral entity from that forgotten person.633 
There are obvious objections to Locke’s theory of the continuity of personhood. For 
instance, the defendant who committed prima facie offences whilst intoxicated, but who 
later became sober and could not remember her actions would be able to argue that they 
should not be held liable for her intoxicated actions. Taking a broader appreciation of the 
arguments which cast doubt on the right of the present self to make decisions for the 
future self (where the future self lacks capacity), we might ask why such arguments 
cannot apply equally to other areas of the law? The pragmatic answer is that acceptance 
of such an argument would have radical implications for the entire legal system.  
Accepting these arguments would potentially allow the debtor to claim no longer to 
be the same person as she who incurred the debt and on that basis ought no longer to 
have a duty to account for that debt; the convicted criminal might argue that they are not 
the same person as the one who was convicted and therefore they ought not to suffer the 
penalties of the conviction; and the husband might argue that he is not the same person 
as he was at the time of his marriage and that consequently he ought not to be bound by 
his marital vows. According to Locke, all that such people would have to demonstrate 
(or prevent the other side from demonstrating, depending on the burden of proof) in 
order to achieve this would be to say that they could not remember their state of 
consciousness at the time of making the agreement or committing the crime.634 This 
would have radical implications for the entire legal system and it is unclear that such 
changes would be compatible with the prevailing advanced liberal mode of government, 
which relies on individual choice, the persistence of legal relations and of individual 
responsibility. 
A more sustained and nuanced theory of personhood was devised by Parfit. He 
grounded his argument for the superiority of psychological criteria for identifying 
personhood in a series of thought experiments involving cerebral transplantation and 
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cloning.635 The conclusion of these experiments was that the changes in the bodily make 
up of a person would not be sufficient per se to give rise to a change in personhood. 
Furthermore, he argued that the most important factor, in terms of decision-making 
legitimacy, is not whether the person remains identical to the former self, because all 
people are subject to continual experiences which may adjust their psychological make-
up in small ways, but rather whether a sufficient psychological connection between the 
two selves (or the self at both point in time) remains. 636 On this basis, he suggested that 
although people may undergo change over time, the present-self has a legitimate claim 
in making decisions for the future-self, where a psychological link with the future-self is 
retained.637 Parfit claims that a persistent psychological connection between the present 
and the future self is “as good as personal identity”.638 It is this psychological 
connectedness639 that forms the basis for legitimate self-regarding decision-making.640  
The idea of a sufficient degree of connectedness invites the question as to what that 
might mean in more precise terms. Parfit uses the character “R” to represent a sufficient 
degree of connectedness.641 This degree of connectedness can be measured by counting 
the ‘quasi-memories’642 shared between the two incarnations of the self (i.e. the past and 
the present self). This criterion places a great deal of weight on task of interpreting these 
quasi-memories and according weight to them. This would render R highly debatable in 
respect of any past and present self pairing. For the purposes of creating ADRTs, this 
would add a great deal of complexity to the question of whether the ADRT should be 
applied or not. In order to use Parfit’s theory for this purpose we would require “far 
richer data than we ordinarily have or could acquire, even with great cost and effort”643 
before deciding whether an ADRT was created by a sufficiently connected former self as 
to bind the present self. Specifically, making an assessment as to whether we can 
identify R would require the gathering of data at two points in time: the point at which 
the ADRT is written and the point at which the treatment it specifies becomes indicated, 
the circumstances it details obtain and the person lacks the capacity to make a 
contemporaneous decision. The complexity and indeterminate nature of such a criterion 
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would render it extremely difficult to reconcile with the legal goal of a clear demarcation 
between those ADRTs which are binding and those which are not. 
As discussed, the way in which personhood is recognised in law has serious 
implications for the operation of ADRTs. As a consequence, a number of authors have 
considered the implications of this personhood critique specifically for advance care 
planning and advance decision making.644 Maclean is one author who has considered 
how these arguments may affect English law and the MCA specifically. In so doing, he 
has lent his support to Parfit’s theory of personhood.645 On this basis, he suggests that 
there will be many occasions the author of an ADRT will lack a sufficiently strong 
psychological connection with the person to whom the ADRT may apply (i.e. the person 
who lacks capacity when the specified treatment is indicated and the specified 
circumstances obtain). As a result, Maclean argues that it would be inappropriate accord 
the ADRT full binding force against the future self.  
In such circumstances in which there is a low degree of a psychological 
connectedness, Maclean analogises the relationship between the author of the ADRT 
and future self as on akin to that of a parent and child.646 As discussed in Chapter One, 
the law allows parents to make medical decisions on behalf of their children, but those 
decisions will only be binding on the in so far as they are within the best interests of the 
child.647 Consequently, Maclean argues that where there is an insufficient psychological 
connection between the author and the person to whom the ADRT purports to apply, 
then the decision contained in the ADRT will only be valid in as far as it accords with 
the best interests of the patient at the time. 
Such a position would clearly be at odds with the current ethos of respect for 
autonomy as patient choice and its corollary that an unwise or irrational decision is not 
destructive of its validity.648 It would also mean that there would be little difference in 
outcome between those who had made an ADRT and those who had not (and instead 
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relied on the doctrine of best interests under the MCA) as both decisions would have to 
be made in accordance with the best interests doctrine.649 
However, if Maclean’s position were to be accepted and implemented into law here 
it would render ADRTs near-redundant. As has been explained in the first chapter, 
ADRTs are concerned exclusively with the refusal of treatment projected into the future 
and that in the absence of an ADRT a person can be provided with medical treatment in 
accordance with her best interests. In legal terms, the only reason for which a person 
should make an ADRT, therefore, is if they anticipate that they might be provided with 
treatment in their best interests that they would not wish to receive. If they are happy 
with the treatment that they may be given in their best interests, they have no reason to 
create an ADRT. If the operation of ADRTs were restrained on the grounds of 
personhood, in the way that Maclean advocates, ADRTs would hold no advantage over 
simple statement of wishes to be taken into account as part of the best interests 
assessment (see Chapter One).  
However, even if we accept the premise that the ADRT is made by someone of 
different personhood (S1 – the current-self) to the person to whom it applies (S2 – the 
future-self), the person who has developed into S2 has always had the opportunity in the 
intervening period to revoke or otherwise alter their ADRT. Implicitly this indicates that 
there is a strong psychological connection, and little difference between S2 and S2-δ.650 
Ethically therefore, there is a strong case that her or his decision contained in the ADRT 
is the decision that they want to be made at S2.  
Dworkin’s position on this point is similar, but does not rely on an acceptance of 
the argument of substantive metaphysical change; his position is that the decision at S1 
should be accepted because it is the last autonomous decision made by that agent.651 On 
either approach there is no genuine difficulty with accepting the decision of S1 as being 
straightforwardly applicable to S2.652  
In addition, we might analogise the ADRT with testamentary devices in order to 
show that there is no barrier in general terms to according legal force the wishes of the 
present-self over the future-self. Maclean claims that such an analogy fails as it would 
amount to “commodify[ing] the present-self”653 and goes on to allude to examples in 
bioethics where other forms of commodification are deemed to be unacceptable. 
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However, his argument is undermined by the fact that the purpose of a testamentary 
device is not limited to the disposal of property: provisions can also be made for the 
guardianship of the testator/testatrix’s children for instance.654 The analogy does not rest 
on the subject matter of the testamentary disposition, so much as its ability to give legal 
force to the wishes of a person who is no longer able to express those wishes 
autonomously for themselves. As such it holds true.655 
In highlighting these objections to Maclean’s argument it is not to suggest that the 
law cannot admit the possibility that individuals change their minds over the course of 
time. It is important to acknowledge the safeguards that already subsist in the MCA. One 
of the most important is that ADRTs can be revoked without formality.656 If the author 
changes their mind, perhaps because they consider themselves to have undergone a 
significant personal change, they can revoke or modify their ADRT through words alone 
(although it would certainly be prudent to do so in writing). Reliance on the author of the 
ADRT to revoke the ADRT in these circumstances avoids the difficulty of a third party 
having to determine when an individual has undergone sufficient personal change to 
warrant ignoring their ADRT.  
Of course this argument may be subject to the objection that it is based on the 
fiction that anyone that creates an ADRT has a permanent awareness of her decision and 
keeps that decision under constant review. Such an expectation is patently unrealistic, 
but it might be retorted that even if the creator of the ADRT does not keep her decision 
at the front of her mind, they do have the opportunity to reconsider their decision and 
while they retain capacity. Moreover, there is an argument that anyone who elects to 
make an ADRT must take with it the responsibility for reviewing and amending that 
decision in future should they no longer wish that decision to apply. The law even offers 
additional protection for those who fail to revoke or modify their decisions as perhaps 
they should and these provisions may address some of the personhood concerns.  
For instance, ADRTs will not be applicable where the author of the ADRT has 
done anything that is deemed inconsistent with his or her decision.657 Behaviour that is 
inconsistent with the decision may be indicative of a change in personhood and even if 
the creator of the ADRT does not take action to revoke or amend his or her decision, it 
may not be upheld on these grounds.  
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Additionally, the provisions relating to the interpretation of an ADRT could be used 
to avoid applying the terms of the decision in circumstances where it is thought that 
there has been a significant change in personhood. As Michalowski and Maclean point 
out,658 those who are faced with the interpretation of ADRTs need only an honest belief 
that an ADRT lacks applicability or validity659 to avoid being bound by its terms, 
whereas if they wish to rely on the terms of the ADRT they must have a reasonable 
belief in the applicability and validity of ADRT.660 Thus, if a healthcare practitioner 
believed that there had been a significant change in personhood which cast doubt on the 
applicability or validity of the decision661 they would have to satisfy a lower burden of 
proof, should they decide to provide treatment against the terms of the ADRT than if 
they were to accept its validity and applicability.   
Although it may be argued that the manner of autonomy that has received 
recognition in law has been overly individualistic in general terms and that such a 
conceptualisation may be damaging to certain groups.662 In view of these provisions in 
the MCA and in view of the way the ADRTs have been interpreted in the case law,663 it 
would seem that the argument that the individual has received too much power to bind 
his or her future self through ADRTs is greatly weakened.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to offer a critical discussion on the relationship 
between the principal normative concept relied upon in the recognition of ADRTs and 
the legal recognition of ADRTs. It was argued that, at least rhetorically, autonomy plays 
a central justificatory role for ADRTs (as it now does for contemporaneous refusals of 
treatment that were considered in the previous chapter).  However, the ill-defined and 
contentious nature of autonomy in law means that appeals to autonomy cannot be 
precisely mapped on to a legal framework, and even were they to do so, that framework 
would be unlikely to receive universal support. Indeed, on a given set of facts it is 
possible to envisage autonomy being pleaded in aid for those advocating the withdrawal 
of treatment (e.g. on a strict individualist reading of autonomy for instance) as well as 
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those advocating the continuation of treatment (e.g. on the basis that the person who 
made the refusal was inadequately informed of the consequences of his or her refusal). 
This contentiousness is visible in the objections raised to the development of the 
law on ADRTs in the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Committee664 prior to the enactment of 
the MCA. Prominent among these objections was the fear that the development of the 
law was really a furtive first step towards the legalisation of euthanasia. The strength of 
such claims appears greatly limited by the fact that the MCA did not provide any new 
rights for patients, but rather made possible the extension of existing rights into the 
future. The concern that people should not be entitled to make binding ADRTs on the 
basis that they could not know the future state of medical science at the time of creating 
an ADRT must be read in the light of the provisions of the MCA itself.  
The law does not simply respect a purported patient choice in the form of an ADRT 
without further question and it never has done so.665 We have seen that ADRTs must be 
expressed in clear terms, must apply to the treatment which becomes clinically indicated 
and in the circumstances envisioned by the author, before they will be treated as 
binding.666 If there is a suggestion that the decision has not adhered to the formalities of 
the MCA,667 or if the author has done anything inconsistent with the decision in the 
ADRT,668 the decision can be avoided. In this respect, the charge that the law has moved 
too far in the direction of accepting a thinly veiled version of self-determination through 
its recognition of ADRTs appears weak. 
However, one very important line of criticism was not explicitly highlighted in the 
Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Committee. This was the ‘personhood argument’ that was 
discussed in the second part of this chapter. It is powerful and novel line of critique, 
because it does not contest the extant conceptualisation of personal autonomy on which 
ADRTs have been developed, as most other critiques do in some way, but rather 
contests the notion that there is moral continuity between the individual who makes an 
ADRT and the person to whom it may eventually apply. On that basis, autonomy would 
not provide an adequate justification for the recognition of ADRTs.       
A line of critique that addresses ADRTs on their own terms is deserving of serious 
attention. However, its success as a line of critique may be limited for two important 
reasons. Firstly, the MCA does tacitly accept, and attempts to offer safeguards against 
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the kinds of concerns raised by the personhood argument. ADRTs are revocable without 
formality, will lack applicability if there is a material change in circumstances and are 
subject to an interpretative bias which makes it less onerous to avoid an ADRT than to 
apply it. Secondly, if the personhood argument were accepted here then it ought to be 
accepted mutadis mutandis to other areas of law and to do so would render many areas 
of law, such as criminal law and contract law, unrecognisable. These are areas of law 
which are essential to the functioning of advanced liberal programmes of government 
which rest on the ability of individuals to take choices and take responsibility for those 
choices.   
These critiques based around personhood offer some of the most compelling 
arguments against the recognition of ADRTs, but acceptance of them would entail far-
reaching and fundamental changes to the other areas of law. It is unclear whether the 
proponents of these arguments in respect of ADRTs would wish to see them accepted 
beyond the realm of ADRTs in a logical manner. If not then the deployment of the 
personhood argument might be seen as a sophisticated way of stymying the law on 
ADRTs rather than promoting a genuine concern for a more philosophically rigorous 
conceptualisation of personhood in law. 
Through the analysis and discussion in the first part of this thesis it has been argued 
that the assertion that ADRTs have been developed pursuant to an extension of 
autonomy belies a number of contentious and complex factors. The question of whether 
to continue medical treatment at the end of life has only arisen since there has been the 
possibility of significantly prolonging life. Moreover, the kind of autonomy being 
developed has arguably been invoked as a strategy for empowering patients and 
disempowering doctors in the context of a pluralistic world advanced liberal society in 
which the authority of the expert must itself become subject to market forces.669 
Advanced liberal democracy demands, and depends upon, the existence of individuals 
who can make decisions for themselves and who can take responsibility for their own 
futures and ADRTs are one way of fostering this kind of attitude. Individual choice has 
become an organising principle in advanced liberal western society and having a 
situation in which individuals decisions about the end of life must be made on behalf of 
others is highly problematic a system of government organised along these lines. 
It is argued here that some of these complexities can be best brought out through 
their consideration in relation to Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality. This 
theory will be set out in the next chapter and will be related back to ADRTs in the two 
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chapters that follow. This theoretical perspective will allow for a richer understanding of 
both the development and the operation of ADRTs than one which could be attained 
through an analysis based on abstract philosophy alone. In a similar way to some of the 
Marxist and feminist critiques of autonomy that were outlined in the previous chapter, 
governmentality demands an appreciation of the broad social changes and forces which 
have helped to shape the context in which ADRTs have emerged. Concurrently, 
however, it demands attention on the microplays of power and particularly on the way in 
which the individual becomes a subject attuned to the exercise of power over 
themselves. This is a theme that will be taken up in Chapter Seven. The way in which 
the law has developed and the fact that ADRTs are recognised by the law will neither be 
proclaimed as a victory or a defeat, but rather as an instantiation of a modern mode of 
government. 
Moreover, governmentality can speak to some of the concerns raised in respect of 
the development of forms of autonomy that support the right to refuse treatment and 
ADRTs, which have been explored in both this and the previous chapter. However, 
unlike some of the critical positions considered in this part of the thesis it will also allow 
for an appreciation of the productive aspects of the development of the law.  
Viewing ADRTs as part of the technologies of government and the technologies of 
the self suggests that ADRTs should bear certain properties in order that citizens can be 
subjectivised as active, responsible, healthcare consumers who bear responsibility for 
their future treatment. ADRTs have arisen in the context of the possibility of prolonging 
life through modern medical apparatus and the lack of a clear source of authority for 
determining when that extension of life should cease. 
The employment of governmentality in the next part of this thesis will demand a 
focus on the historical conditions which have made the acceptance of ADRTs possible, 
particularly surrounding the use of autonomy as an organising principle in society, and 
this will provide a stronger basis for understanding the seemingly inconsistent way in 
which ADRTs are recognised in practice. Furthermore this analysis will allow us to step 
back from an analysis of ADRTs based on their benefits for individuals and consider 
what benefits society might derive from a system of ADRTs. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
The previous part of this thesis provided a detailed discussion of the normative 
arguments relied upon for the justification and critique of ADRTs commonly inovked in 
bioethical and healthcare law analyses. It was suggested that the principle justification drawn 
upon in recognition of ADRTs is based on the supposed role of ADRTs in extending 
personal autonomy. However, doubt was cast upon the extent to which the extension of 
autonomy argument holds true and the extent to which it is a useful claim to make. 
This part of the thesis will offer a novel basis for the critique of the law on ADRTs using 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality. The theory of governmentality will be set out in 
Chapter Five and its application in respect of ADRTs will be considered in Chapters Six and 
Seven, where the operation of ADRTs as part of the technologies of the self and the 
technologies of government will be discussed respectively. Autonomy remains a central 
theme in this part of the work, but by using governmentality as a theoretical platform a 
different conceptual and operative understanding can be obtained. Here the focus shall be on 
the practices which autonomy elicits and its role in government. This approach makes 
possible the consideration of the practices which are bound up with the production and the 
operation of ADRTs in respect of the individual (as is the traditional point of focus) and in 
respect of the seldom considered aspect of ADRTs in the population. 
  
 128 
 
CHATPER FIVE 
THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENTALITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The second part of this thesis examined some of the most important precursors to the 
recognition of ADRTs. Although there are a number of possible contributory factors, it was 
suggested that the factor given most theoretical attention for the development of ADRTs lies 
in the idea of autonomy. Much simplified, those advocating the recognition of ADRTs 
suggested that they are nothing more than extensions of the right of patients to refuse 
medical treatment, a well-established (if under theorised)670 principle in both bioethics and 
law, into the future. It was suggested that the ideas of autonomy and, perhaps to a lesser 
extent, self-determination, which provide the normative grounding for this legal 
development are capable of bearing a number of different meanings, not all of which would 
accord with the legal framework of the MCA (e.g. requiring that decisions must be 
considered in keeping with a person’s authentic self before they can be considered 
autonomous). Notwithstanding degree to which the definitions of these keystone concepts 
are unclear and have been contested, many consider that an individualistic variant of 
autonomy has won out over all others.671 This individualised nature of the concept of 
autonomy has attracted criticism for Marxists and some feminists alike. In respect of 
ADRTs, some argued that ceding this level of choice to the individual leaves open the 
undesirable possibility that people will make ADRTs when ill-informed of the kinds of 
treatment they are refusing and may leave them open to coercion. It was also suggested that 
this kind of advanced refusal of treatment might be considered tantamount to a request for 
euthanasia. These points were discussed in the previous chapter. 
Another important line of critique that was considered in the previous chapter did not 
challenge the way in which the concept of autonomy has been construed and constructed, 
but rather suggests that even on its own terms, autonomy cannot provide for a simply right to 
make decisions about possible future events, because it should not be presumed that the 
person who makes the decision would share a relationship of sufficient moral proximity with 
the person to whom the decision may eventually apply.  
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Many accounts of the development of the idea of personal autonomy and the right to 
refuse medical treatment in bioethics and law posit the Nuremburg trials as a fundamental 
turning point.672 As such, there is a degree of recognition of the historical contingency of the 
development of the constitutive values of medical law. However, as important as the 
Nuremburg trials undoubtedly were in the development of the values relied on today in the 
recognition of the right to refuse treatment, the idea that there is a simple and direct 
relationship between these trials and the way the law is recognised today is highly 
contestable. As exemplified by cases like Bolam, the law continued to provide medics with a 
great deal of deference and cover long after the Nuremburg trials and by the same token 
gave a far more limited recognition to the idea of patient autonomy than that which pertains 
today. In addition to the graduated change that has taken place following Nuremburg, 
important developments also took place in the centuries prior. These developments may not 
appear to be immediately important to the concerns of bioethics, but in terms of the 
development of the idea of individual autonomy on which ADRTs rest, they are of critical 
importance. Part III of this thesis builds on the position that it is important to interpret key 
concepts in light of the historical conditions of their emergence using Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality, which adopts a genealogical method concerned with writing a history of 
the present.673 
This chapter will provide a detailed exposition of Foucault’s theory of governmentality. 
Foucault develops this theory with respect to changes in the practices of government which 
took place prior to Nuremburg, primarily between the Sixteenth and Twentieth centuries 
(although, Foucault does admit that he “skips two centuries” i.e. he jumps from the 
Eighteenth to the Twentieth).674 The idea of governmentality is developed with reference to 
various moments throughout govern this period at which the prevailing circumstances gave 
rise to questions over how to because old systems of government broke down, or were 
unable to cope with the new conditions which faced them.675 These moments led to 
innovation in the practices of government, as government itself developed into an art.676 
Perhaps the most important moment in this development of the practices of government 
came in the Eighteenth Century, when size and complexity of society led to the population 
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being considered to have taken on its own ontological status rather than being merely 
considered the collective term for a multitude of bodies. This change prompted a new mode 
of government that was reflective of, and orientated towards, the body of the population. It 
was also at this time that the rationality of liberalism was developed in response to the 
totalising rationality of the police state.  
This development of the liberal practices of government, which has since further 
transformed into advanced liberalism, has played a crucial role in the development of 
autonomy. Indeed autonomy and liberalism can be viewed as mutually constitutive,677 which 
provides some indication as to why these terms are so often conflated in law.678 As such, it is 
argued here that ethical and political developments should not be held separate679 and that a 
great deal can be learned about autonomy, as a moral principle, from examining the 
development of political rationalities, which took place during a quiet period for bioethics.680 
Many forms critique grounded in particular branches of ethics and metaphysics tend to 
neglect an important factor in the political significance of the development of a form of 
consent which prioritises individual choice and consequently responsibilises the individual 
(which takes place in conjunction with their individualisation)681 for the purposes of 
governmental expediency.682 It is argued here that this kind of responsibilisation has 
developed over time and as a strategy of government in that the apportionment of 
responsibility has varied over time, but at the current point in history more and more 
responsibility is being shifted onto individuals.683 Thus, the central objective of this chapter 
is to explain some of the ‘problematics of government’684 that have led to the conclusion that 
‘individual autonomy’, broadly conceived, is a necessary component of modern forms of 
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government and that the individualistic form of autonomy that is espoused by the courts 
owes much to the prevailing, advanced liberal, historical context of our times. 
Chapters Six and Seven take the idea of the operation of governmentality through the 
technologies of the self and the technologies of government and apply those approaches to 
government to the operation of ADRTs. In this way it will be seen that we can view ADRT 
can be viewed through the kinds of practices they elicit and require in respect of the 
government of the self and the government of others.       
THE GOVERNMENTALISATION OF THE STATE685 
In order to have a sound appreciation of the prevailing rationalities of government, 
which approximate to forms of liberalism and neoliberalism (or ‘advanced liberalism’)686 in 
Western society, we must look at how these rationalities of government came to prevail (for 
they, as other political rationalities are historically situated). Through tracing the 
developments of rationalities of government in this way we can better understand the kinds 
of problems that the contemporary forms of government in the West have been created to 
work around. The central argument of this thesis is that the development of ADRTs can be 
viewed as a response to a problem of government at the end of life. This area has become 
problematic as the result of the combination of a number of factors: the medical technology 
that now enables life to be sustained in circumstances of low functionality (e.g. Persistent 
Vegetative States (“PVS”s) and Minimally Conscious States (“MCS”s)); the aging 
population; the financial crisis and the pressure it has placed on the provision of healthcare; 
and the development of an idea of autonomy that serves advanced liberal rationalities of 
government.  
By adopting this focus it is hoped that it will be possible to avoid getting bogged down 
in debates concerning the ‘true’ meaning of autonomy687 and instead gain an understanding 
of the role that individual autonomy plays within the legal system and society. The concern 
is with how the idea of personal autonomy and by extension, the idea of ADRTs, has been 
used as part of the practices of government.  
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From this it will be seen that, far from regarding the establishment of ADRTs as a 
victory for the advocates of individual autonomy arising from a stronger ethical argument, 
we can see the triumph of individual autonomy as a result of its necessity to advanced liberal 
society.688 Moreover, it will be argued that this kind of bioethical rationality is itself bound 
up with the practices of the liberal state in supporting and reproducing liberal modes of 
government, defined as ‘conducting the conduct’ of the self and of others.689 As will be 
discussed, this liberal strategy of government implies the calculated direction of free 
subjects, capable of some resistance,690 rather than their domination. It is hoped that this 
critical methodology will offer an improved way of understanding the current state of the 
law. 
The first part of this chapter will therefore examine at the development of early forms of 
government and some of the reasons for the development of a liberal art of government. This 
transition has been made possible by the rise of a new form of power in governmental 
practices themselves, which came to stand alongside, if not ahead of, sovereign power in 
import. The discussion will then move to focus on liberalism and neo-liberalism (or 
advanced liberalism as it is termed by Rose)691 and the various techniques and technologies 
which have grown up around it, with a particular focus on the technologies that promote and 
aim to secure autonomy. This discussion should not be seen as a way of merely categorising 
different historical epochs together with their historical practices. The idea is rather that 
through looking at practices of government and their development, we can make visible 
some of the complex factors that combined to make an imperative of change: the 
‘problematics of government’.692 It will be argued that it is through considering these 
problematics and technologies of government within the (neo)liberal political rationalities 
that we can explain the progression in medical law from paternalism to the individualism693 
that dominates modern medico-legal discourse and expresses itself most clearly in the legal 
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construction of the consent process and even more strongly when it comes to advance 
decision making. 
 EARLY FORMS OF GOVERNMENT  
SOVEREIGNTY 
Throughout the Middle Ages sovereignty could be understood as a form of transcendent 
and absolute power within the bounds of a territory.694 Sovereign power was of a deductive 
nature whose power was chiefly exercised through their commands assured by their ability 
to effect death as a penalty for disobedience:695 the power “to kill and let live”.696 This power 
was personally embodied by, and resided in, the autocratic figure of the sovereign.697 It was 
for the sovereign alone to decide on the exercise of the power of exile or death. However, 
this power was intimately linked to, and limited by, the extent of the sovereign territory as 
the sovereign could only exercise power within their realm. Hence great stock was placed on 
the expansion and securing of the realm as a means of increasing and consolidating power. 
As such sovereign, or ‘juridicial’, power698 operated through a direct relationship between 
the sovereign and their subject.699 As a form of power, it was a potent and direct means of 
giving effect to the sovereign will, by controlling individuals and maintaining a necessary 
link of authority between sovereign and subject. The will of the subject would always be 
bounded and shaped by the will of the sovereign and there would be little guarantee of how 
the sovereign might use their power. Similarly therefore, there would be little guarantee of 
the occasions on which the sovereign might override the subject’s own autonomy. 
This, together with the appearance of a concentration of power such as this in one person 
as absolute sovereign, became problematic in the Sixteenth Century when questions of 
legitimacy began to arise700  together with many normative questions, such as: how to 
govern oneself, how to be governed and how to govern others.701 There is an “immense, as 
well as monotonous literature”702 on this subject through which Foucault offers a selective 
overview passing from the Machiavellian rationalities of government as a set of tactics for 
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enabling the prince to retain control of their kingdom, through to the anti-Machiavellian 
literature, which sought to distinguish government from being a mere tactics of self-
preservation and towards an art.703   
The immediate solution for keeping hold of such a potent power was to develop a way 
of legitimising sovereign power and domination704  through what Foucault terms the “theory 
of right”.705 This involved the establishment of certain limitations on the occasions upon 
which sovereign prerogatives could be properly exercised, such that they could not be seen 
as arbitrary deployments of force. For example, one of the most potent sovereign powers, the 
right to kill, could only be legitimately called upon in response to a direct threat to the 
sovereign themselves706  which ensured its object was therefore solely self-preservational.707 
this remained true in later centuries even though there was a creeping of additional requisites 
and restrictions placed on the use of sovereign sanctions, particularly in that they should 
only be used to preserve the common good708, but in actual fact, this may have amounted to 
little more than an tautologous imperative to be obedient to the sovereign law.709 
RAISON D’ÉTAT 
A similar imperative towards self-preservation can be found in the abiding feature of 
Machiavelli’s advice to the prince: how to retain his hold on power. Machiavelli’s work was 
subject to a great deal of attention around the time of its publication and during a revival of 
it in the Nineteenth Century.710 In response to Machiavelli’s treatise, thinkers began to 
explore what should be compromised in the art of government.711 François de la Mothe le 
Vayer was one such thinker who drew distinction between three layers of government that of 
the self (morality), the family (economy) and the state (politics).712 He asserted the existence 
of “an upward continuity”713 of government, such that in order to be able to govern a family 
one first had to be able to govern oneself and before governing a state, a family and by 
implication oneself;714 an idea later adopted and continued by Rousseau and Quesnay.715 
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This brought the question of government away from the individualised focus of 
Machiavelli’s treatise and put conditions and measures on government outside of mere 
continuation.  
However, one of the immediate developments of the government away from the focus 
on an autocratic prince as the leader of the state was in the re-focussing of attention on the 
state itself.716 Self-preservationism at the level of state was the core part of raison d’état the 
doctrine by which the state sought to maximise itself through its own rationality.717 This 
rationality of raison d’état gave rise to a need on the part of the state for knowledge about its 
own strength in the form of a “political arithmetic”718 and it also meant the worth of 
individual citizens consisted only in their capacity to assist the state in consolidating or 
increasing its power.719  
POPULATION 
One of the major indicators of the strength of the state was to be found in the health of 
its population. Prior to the Eighteenth Century, Foucault claims that this concern was 
essentially couched in negative terms and arose particularly at times of epidemics such as 
the plague in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries).720 However, Foucault describes the 
recording of birth and mortality in England from around the sixteenth century onwards as an 
early indication state concern with the population.721 This concern with the population 
continued into later centuries when ensuring that the population was healthy (particularly 
with respect to members of the armed forces)722 became aligned with the objective of 
strengthening the state.  
As a result, the population became a problematic of government: something to which the 
state government needed to turn its attention if it was to secure state prosperity along the 
lines of raison d’état. The political rationality of the mercantilists was to maximise the 
population in order to maximise economic output723 and consequently new ways were 
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sought to the increase of the population and the safeguard its wellbeing. During the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, this task fell to the “great technological assemblage” 
of the police.724 This ‘assemblage’ was developed in Germany following the treaty of 
Westphalia in which a disparate group of smaller states were united into a federation, with a 
new federal administration.725 This new administration developed a new disciplinary 
science, Polizeiwissenschaft (which was fostered by university system).726 At this time, the 
meaning of the word ‘police’ took on a meaning close to the English word, ‘policy’727 which 
entailed the establishment of techniques and agents of the state with an interest in 
“increasing the state’s forces… while preserving the state in good order”.728 It also entailed a 
duty on the part of patients to look after their own health.729 
The remit of the police traversed the entirety of the functions of government, but was 
particularly influential in education and the generation of hierarchies and professions.730 
Their generalized function was ensuring that the activity of individuals was aligned with the 
goal of increasing the state’s forces731 and according to their theoretical outlook, the state 
would be strongest when it had the largest possible population which can be supported by 
the means that are necessary to support them in good health who can work efficiently, travel 
freely and trade effectively.732 Thus, it was for the police to intervene to ensure each of these 
objectives; to ensure, what might be more broadly termed ‘wellbeing’ (and everything which 
gives rise to that state of being)733, and thereby could increase the state’s forces by having a 
healthy and contented populous. This at once linked “the state’s strength and individual 
felicity” which makes “men’s [sic] happiness the very strength of the state”.734 
Healthcare provision was no longer an activity aimed primarily at individuals, because 
when the focus of government turned towards the population, the health of the body of the 
population came to be just as important.735 Moreover, the concern with the health of the 
population was not only to be considered in negative terms in the sense of reacting to 
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outbreaks of ill health and at times of epidemic,736 but rather it was to become positive such 
that the concern was “how to raise the level of health of the social body as a whole”737 in 
order to improve productivity and utility in a broader sense. It was therefore not a solely 
reactive and restorative pursuit, but it was to incorporate strategies of prevention and 
surveillance. In an attempt to achieve this, special attention was paid to the family and the 
cultivation of obligations for them as in respect of the rearing of children in order to ensure 
the reliable resupply of the workforce with healthy, educated and self-disciplined 
individuals.738 Within the field of medicine, hygienists took on the role of disseminating 
public health messages and collecting populational medical data as a form of social 
control.739 Their work was particularly important in the new urban environments being 
created through the increasing population and changes in the modes of production.740 The 
surveillance of society, and the information derived from it, allowed for detailed 
categorisations to be made of the ill and those otherwise unfit to work.741 The family also 
played a significant role in acting as a conduit between the public and individual health 
concerns,742 as it could operate with a far more consistent presence than the clinic could.743  
Importantly, the objective of the police in improving the conditions and wellbeing of the 
population was not motivated out of benevolence for the population, or to increase the 
personal power of the sovereign, but rather out of concern for the state itself. However, this 
objective shifted again in the Eighteenth Century, when a rapid expansion in the population 
gave rise to new problematics of government. At this time the physiocrats and economists 
began to view the population less as a ‘multiplicity’744 of individuals and more as a kind of 
natural phenomenon, incapable of direct control through sovereign orders or regulations,745 
which constituted a body in itself. Rather, a series of techniques were developed to shape the 
conditions under which the population exists.746  
Foucault accords great significance the recognition of the population at this point in 
Eighteenth Century, because its recognition prompted a change in the art of government 
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based on outdated models of sovereignty and the family.747 Sovereignty alone was simply 
too inefficient a means of governing a political body undergoing “a demographic explosion 
and industrialization”748 and it was also too blunt and unwieldy to micromanage “the fine 
grain of individual behaviours”749 this could be achieved through using other forms of power 
and different technologies of government. Therefore in response, new and more expedient 
ways of governing and propagating power were sought.  
The population took on a separate existence from its constituent “man-as-body” 
subjects, to become collectively embodied as “man-as-species”.750 This recognition co-
emerged, in the latter part of the Eighteenth Century, with a form of power that Foucault 
termed biopolitcs: “the science and technologies pertaining to the management of the 
population”.751 In this new world, it became clear that “government is basically much more 
than sovereignty... [it is] absolutely linked to the population”752 and to an extent the role of 
individual subordinated and instrumental towards the needs of the state in securitising the 
population.753 
Thus the modern practices of governmental power which focus on the population, can be 
contrasted with the mode of governing exercised through the power of sovereignty alone.754 
As discussed, sovereignty can be thought of as a deductive form of power755 which has its 
mode of operation in taking.756 By contrast, the new governmental rationalities have as their 
goal the fostering of the society that they govern, through inter alia increasing wealth, health 
and welfare.757 This governmentality aimed to promote a greater level of production and to 
“increase the happiness and prosperity of all [of society’s] inhabitants and to multiply their 
numbers”.758 Therefore these new governmental rationalities have a productive disposition759 
and are concerned not so much with the extent of the sovereign territory and the expansion 
of the realm as with those that inhabited it.760 This move is explained by Foucault with the 
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assistance of the Christian shepherd metaphor, in which it is the security of the flock which 
is to be held above all else by the authority of the sovereign who pays attention to the flock 
as a whole as well as to each individual.761 Adopting a simultaneous concern for the 
individual and the collective concern marks another point of distinction between sovereignty 
and the new rationalities of government. In addition, these different approaches to 
government have different claims to legitimacy. While sovereignty drew its authority from 
the assertion of a transcendent right to rule, often pronounced in western monarchies as a 
right bestowed on them by god,762 the new rationalities of government are immanent to their 
objects.763 That is to say that the new rationalities of government are dependent upon their 
relationship to the population. 
Pastoral power is similar to the power exercised through sovereignty in that ought to be 
put to use for the good of the society as a whole,764 but it differs from sovereignty because it 
is not bounded by territory, but rather the ‘multiplicity’765  and “[i]t is therefore a power with 
a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit 
like… [a] sovereign”.766 The purpose of these forms of government therefore is of the 
protection of the population that it governs. It is important to note, however, that although 
new forms of governmentality became necessary in order to govern the population, these 
new practices of government did not expunge the old power of sovereignty as an active form 
of power.767 Rather it sovereignty was translocated it into a triangular array with discipline 
(which took on a new importance when it came to managing the population)768 and 
“governmental management”.769 Governmentality can thus be understood as the result of this 
need for change prompted by the recognition of the population as a body per se and the 
acknowledgement that the power of sovereignty alone was insufficient to guide and manage 
this complex body.  
                                                     
761 S Prozorov, ‘The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the Refusal of Care’ 
[2007] Foucault Studies 53, 54 
762 see King James I, Basilikon Doron or His Majesties Instrvctions To His Dearest Sonne, Henry the 
Prince (Reprinted from the Edition of 1616, Harvard University Press 1918)  
763 M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (n 6) 125; M Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule 
in Modern Society (Sage 2010) 254 
764 M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (n 6) 128 
765 ibid  129 
766 ibid 129; but see Prozorov S, ‘The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the 
Refusal of Care’ [2007] Foucault Studies 53, 54 
767 M Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ (n 698) 101-102; see J Přibáň, ‘Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe’s 
Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 41 
768 M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (n 6) 107 
769 ibid 107 
 140 
 
The recognition of the population led to the development of a whole host of techniques 
and processes designed for interaction with it. From the Sixteenth Century, statistics had 
gained increasing importance in managing the population.770 But one of the most ingenious 
diversifications of governmental practice that emerged at around this time was the ability to 
govern through autonomy.771 This idea, which will be further discussed below, marks one of 
the central pillars of this new ‘liberal’ art of government.  
LIBERAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 
Colbert (a finance minister): “What can I do for you?” 
Le Gendre (a merchant): “What can you do for us? Leave us alone (Laissez-
nous faire)”772 
THE CRITIQUE OF STATE INTERVENTIONISM 
As discussed in the previous section, the move towards a liberal political rationality 
came about through the recognition of the population as a body in itself, the central object 
and as being immanent to the new governmental rationality.773 Some put this mode of 
government in direct opposition to the Polizeistaat that has just been considered,774 but 
perhaps the better view is to see it as part of a continuum particularly with respect to some of 
the disciplinary practices that were used Europe throughout many centuries.775 Through the 
challenges posed by the expanding population, there eventually came a recognition that the 
state and its reliance on sovereign power or totalising police power was inept to “undertake 
the infinite task of superintending the totality of the economic processes”776 taking place 
within its territory. Since the role of government is to maximise the population, this could 
only be achieved if government conducted itself in an efficient way. This theme of 
efficiency was taken up by the économistes who launched a strong criticism of the 
regulatory Polizeistaat model which had taken hold in a number of European countries in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. 
The économistes claimed that the police disposition towards creating an abundance of 
cheap food so that workers could survive on low wages ignored the concerns of the 
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agricultural producers who needed the possibility of making a profit so that they could 
reinvest in their land.777 The removal of police price controls on grain was also contended to 
impede the market from arriving at “just price”.778 Their concern was that it manipulated the 
market based price discovery mechanism. Placing arbitrary and extraneous regulation on the 
market was unnecessary, because the market would arrive at this price on its own. Moreover, 
forcing producers to sell produce, for which there was a low supply and high demand, at a 
lower price would encourage hoarding and ultimately would militate against the goal 
sought.779  
The économistes further extended the principle of the market onto the population, in 
opposition to the thesis espoused by the police mentality, such that did not hold the 
maximization in the numbers of the population to be a good in itself, but rather that the 
material conditions necessary to sustain a population would generate a populous of optimum 
size.780 They further asserted that it should be for the market to determine trade with foreign 
markets in opposition to the mercantilist policy of trying to sell as much as possible abroad, 
in order to accumulate the maximum gold at home.781  
However, it was not only argued that the interventionist state was ineffectual in a 
pragmatic sense; strong normative arguments were also made to the effect that it was not 
right for the state to intervene in the affairs of private citizens.782 These arguments can be 
traced back to the liberal turn during the Eighteenth Century, when increased pressure was 
put onto the state to withdraw from overseeing and providing of health services directly to 
allow different social organisations and charities to perform these functions.783   
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND RAISON D’ÉTAT 
The liberal rationality which sprang forth as a response to the problematisation of 
interventionism and comprehensive regulation sought the reduction in the influence of the 
state and the minimization of state intervention.784 Its chief point of emphasis is on the 
‘natural processes’ in society, which are to be given the privileged status as being beyond 
the proper remit of government intervention. It maintains the économistes’ prohibition on the 
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interference with natural processes, relating to the population785  and it also disqualifies 
raison d’état, in the sense “in which a sovereign exercised his totalising will across a 
national space”,786 however their reasoning did admit a kind of raison d’état in which the 
goal was to increase the forces of the state.787 In a subtle but important departure from the 
reasoning of the mercantilists (who sought to maximise the population), the concern of the 
new liberal forms of government moved towards the maintenance and management of civil 
society, to promote scientific knowledge, administer a population of interests and to frame 
natural processes through securitisation and the injunction against transgressing onto the 
space of individual freedom788  all of which may run counter to the to the ability of the state 
to grow unrelentingly.789 
NATURAL PROCESSES 
One of the central justifications for limiting the power of government was in order to 
protect the so-called “natural processes”.790 These are processes, such as the birth rate, which 
cannot be controlled by sovereign command alone.791 Foremost among these was the 
economy, as a natural process that is intimately bound up with liberal thought. The idea of 
economy has more than one sense. In a literal, sense, it describes the operation of 
productive, consumptive and trading activities in the market, but there is also a sense of the 
word, which is broadly analogous to ‘efficiency’ and it is this sense of the word which is 
active in the phrase “political economy”.792 This idea described the liberal imperative for 
“cheap government”793 involving the “self-limitation of governmental reason”794 which acts 
as an internal limitation on the practices of government.795 Consequently the limitation on 
action is not based on economic science as an external factor, which dictates governmental 
intervention; rather economic science is a mere supplement to governmental reason.796    
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The crucial facet of the “modern governmental reason”797 lies in a continual state of self-
questioning and self-limitation.798 This norm of self-monitoring becomes just as important 
for the individual in liberal society as well as for political governments in a way reminiscent 
of de la Mothe le Vayer’s idea of ‘upward continuity’ and the need for one that holds 
themselves out as being a governor of others to first be able to govern themselves.799 One of 
the most important applications of self-monitoring for the purposes of this thesis is the self-
monitoring of one’s own health (which will be explored in greater detail at a later point in 
the thesis).  
In terms of the ‘market sense’ of the economy, there were competing views on how the 
sovereign could observe its processes: Quesnay and the physiocrats800  thought that the 
sovereign could divide up different economic processes into a table over which the 
sovereign could have knowledge and retain control, but Foucault read Adam Smith’s theory 
as a critique of this position suggesting that “the sovereign is, can, and must be ignorant”801 
such that the totality of economic processes are not capable of being known by the 
sovereign802  or indeed by any individual within the market.803 Government, therefore, must 
address a “realm of processes” that it cannot govern through sovereignty alone, because the 
sovereign “lacks the requisite knowledge and capacities” to do so.804 This realisation 
heralded the end of the dream of the sovereign totalisation of raison d’état and Polizei. 
However, the possibility that more attention could be paid to the interests of subjects and 
that in turn, those interests could be governed in certain ways, meant that the reach of 
government could extend out even further than it could within the Polizeistaats of 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe.  
This powerful liberal idea of the futility of the quest for total knowledge about a 
population might also be seen as the first sign of the retreat of the totalising authority of 
moral authorities. If the interests of individuals within the population are, to an extent, 
unknowable, then perhaps so too are the moral principles on which they are to operate. This 
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moment might be seen as the origins of liberal secularism and the ‘value pluralism’805 which 
has it made possible.    
Adding to this injunction against excessive state intervention, arising for the desire for 
an efficient market based system of governance and a normative disposition towards a small 
state that has been under consideration here, Rose identifies three further features inherent in 
liberal government: the use of knowledge as a form of authority, the fostering and 
instrumentalisation of expertise, and the cooption of individuals as agents directed towards 
their own government.806 These will be explored in turn beginning with the governmental 
imperative to know. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AUTHORITY 
From the previous discussion it can be understood that the place of an all-powerful 
sovereign stood in opposition to the liberal ideology of the économistes and their 
problematisation of the economy that was emerging around the middle of the Eighteenth 
Century.807 Foucault articulates their conclusion in an uncharacteristically pithy form, 
“[t]here is no sovereign in economics”.808 The économistes argued for a laissez-faire 
approach towards governance and economic regulation, which was thought to increase the 
overall wealth of the state through increasing economic prosperity.809 They saw 
government’s role as being in the fostering of a civil society and in order to do this 
effectively,810 it was necessary to foster technologies that allowed the state to acquire 
knowledge about the processes that affected the population because “[t]he finitude of the 
state’s power to act is an immediate consequence of the limitation of its power to know”811 
even though it was acknowledged that the state could not have a comprehensive knowledge 
in this regard. Hence a determined effort was made towards the gathering, collating and 
processing of information relevant to the population.  
Much of this was achieved through the development of scientific practice, which became 
imperative for the sovereign and for the functions of good government and political 
rationalisation812  through the enlightenment. One particularly notable example of this is the 
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science of statistics813 whose importance had been recognised for centuries, but in which 
even greater governmental stock was placed from the beginning of the Seventeenth century. 
However, on its own, this information (including statistical information) was mere data. 
It was only once the information had been analysed and interpreted that it could be put to 
use. Those who could develop and harness this kind of information in this way became 
experts; symbiotic coemergents of fields of knowledge; who could assist with the use of 
their knowledge for the effective securitisation of the population. Their accrued knowledge-
power814  and epistemic authority could in turn be drawn upon for the purposes of 
government.815 Thus this expertise could be used to the benefit of government programmes 
by encouraging experts to develop their knowledge to address aspects of life that have been 
problematised by government (particularly those problems which related to the processes of 
the population). Disciplinary power became more important as a means of governing 
individuals as the population grew larger816  and gave rise to techniques, technologies and 
experts who could help to govern the population through generating discourse and 
knowledge particularly in quantifiable terms.817 Public health experts of various kinds were 
used to “make subjects more governable”.818 Some of these techniques (particularly those 
pertaining to health and autonomy) will be discussed in the next chapter. 
EXPERTISE  
Expertise also played a vital role in the new governmental strategy of ‘governing at 
distance’,819 which was a strategy strongly endorsed by Adam Smith’s metaphor of the 
invisible hand.820 This feature of liberal forms of government can again be contrasted with 
the very direct way in which the sovereign would exercise their power vis-à-vis their 
subjects. Distancing the site of the propagation of government power from its site of 
application was achieved because the ‘regimes of truth’821  developed and communicated by 
these experts, (which, in turn, begat social norms) were not the direct product of the state.822  
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For example, in the Nineteenth Century expertise was used in the shaping of the family 
and through the incorporation of expert advice into the family itself the composition and 
behaviour of members of the family could be modified at a stage removed from the state 
itself.823 Therefore the link between experts and government was at least more opaque than 
the relationship between the state and those agents who served it directly (in the manner of 
the police). Adherence to a norm would not therefore be seen as an act of loyalty towards a 
sovereign, so much as an act of fidelity to society.  
In terms of the consent process and medical decision-making, the doctor (and their 
public health counterpart, the hygienist) played important roles as experts who could forge a 
link between observable trends in the human body and extrapolate that knowledge in order 
to achieve a stronger understanding of the population in general. One side effect of this was 
that doctors became much better aware of how diseases were spread824  and the 
acknowledged cost of widespread disease and epidemic to society and to the economy. 
Large scale outbreaks of disease and epidemics, and the threat of them, made those with this 
kind of expertise very important.825 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND AUTONOMY 
“Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 
“free”.”826  
Liberalism and its propensity to ‘govern at a distance’ further entailed a strong 
recognition of individual rights and freedoms. This protection of rights and the movement 
away from the centralised, totalising, power of the sovereign is routinely lauded as a move 
away from domination and towards freedom, but we should not automatically see this as the 
case,827 as it is entirely possible for forms of domination and ‘illiberality’ to continue in 
liberal forms of government.828 Equally it would be simplistic, even meaningless, to attempt 
to analyse the relative freedoms of those who lived under a sovereign in the Sixteenth or 
Seventeenth Centuries and those who lived under the liberal regimes of the late Eighteenth 
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and Nineteenth Centuries829  because freedom, for Foucault, is not an ahistorical constant 
concept, but rather one which is historically conditioned.830 
A strong sense of the historically particular kind of freedom that emerged and was 
promoted during the period of classical liberalism can be obtained from the writings of John 
Stewart Mill, and in particular his exegesis of the harm principle (for which he is best 
known) from his canonical and influential work, ‘On Liberty’.831 This work (which was 
referred to in Chapter Two) provides an explanation which is perfectly in keeping with this 
liberal rationality for the way that these natural rights were framed. The individual was to be 
accorded rights and liberties, the corollaries of which were state duties and injunctions from 
interference in so far as their acts or omissions did not cause harm to others. Importantly, 
Mill’s thesis is not contingent on a transcendental notion of values, but is deeply rooted in 
liberal pragmatism and a concern for the effects of actions rather than their inherent 
morality.  
This sentiment is echoed by Adam Smith who advocated the recognition of individual 
rights through reference to the economic markets: "[e]very man, as long as he does not 
violate the laws of justice, must be able to pursue his interest and bring his capital where he 
pleases”.832 The principle underlying the work of both Locke and smith in this respect is that 
the state ought to limit the scope of its own legislative intervention in the lives of its citizens 
in a manner paradigmatic of liberal government. In so doing, the continued struggle with the 
question of the legitimacy of intervention must be weighed against encroachment on 
individual autonomy and other natural processes.833  
The novelty in Smith’s reasoning came with its tacit recognition of homo œconomicus 
(the ‘subject of interest’) was that the sovereign had to refrain from interfering, not because 
there was a law prohibiting their interference, but because the sovereign was necessarily 
ignorant  of the full extent of individual interests.834 In addition, these rights and liberties 
formed out of the injunctions on state intervention, were instrumental to the formation of a 
civil society, a key reference point of liberal government,835 and it is where civil society was 
brought together with the imperative for economic maximisation embodied in homo 
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œconomicus that allows for a form of liberal government which sovereignty alone could not 
achieve.836  
An important challenge for liberal government, however, was in how to direct the free 
choosing, autonomous subject behave in a manner that was in alignment with the overall 
objectives of particular government programmes.837 One way of achieving this was through 
the codes of civility that were developed by civil society, which helped to keep order at both 
a private and a public level.838 As rose claims, the practice of carving out freedom from the 
state “…goes hand in hand with the emergence of a range of novel practices which seek to 
shape and regulate individuality in particular ways”.839 some of these processes will be 
looked at in greater detail in chapter seven, however by way of example, hospitals, schools 
and prisons all set about ways to encourage the formation of the free individual who did not 
require the direct oversight of the state, but who could be relied upon to have such concern 
for their own state of being that they would actively seek their own betterment and 
maximisation.840  
However, this classical liberal approach also came up against problems as a result of its 
stand-offish approach to regulation and business practice. It gave scant incentive for 
employers to offer their employees anything in the way of benefits, protection or other social 
assistance. Insofar as this led to social problems, which affected contentment and 
productivity and harmed the population in other ways, remedial strategies were sought. And 
the response to this problematic of ill health and joblessness was a greater level of state 
intervention in the form of welfarism.  
WELFARISM 
“The people of England appeared for the first time to acquire a sense of sight 
and smell and realise that they were living on a dungheap”841  
The perceived deficiencies of laissez-faire capitalism were problematised and led, in 
some places, to a new era of Welfarism.842  The failure was diagnosed through the 
appearance of social problems that arose at the time which included crime, ill health and 
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unemployment. These phenomena were all perceived as threats to the security of the 
population and society. In response, it was argued that the state should step in by finding 
new ways to bring collections of liberal individuals together and to endear a sense of 
collectivity between them to secure the population. And it was this process of the state (or at 
least the collective, or the social) stepping in, taking a greater level of responsibility for 
various aspects of social life including employment, health, housing etc and additionally 
administering social benefits that characterises Welfarism843 in very broad terms.  
Orthodox wisdom suggests that the dawn of this rationality, in the UK at least, was 
announced by William Beveridge’s 1942 report identified five great evils of society: squalor, 
ignorance, want, idleness and disease, which government should be disposed to guard 
against.844 In order to address these problems there were drives to improve housing 
conditions, to guarantee every citizen a basic level of education and right to healthcare 
services through the establishment of the NHS.  However, it should be borne in mind that 
this welfarist approach was not a binary dialectical response to laissez-faire capitalism 
(Beveridge himself was of “liberal origins”)845 but it was rather a limited form of 
intervention designed to help those most in need.846 
Many of these technical projects of intervention may be thought of as constituent aspects 
of what is commonly called the “welfare state”; a phrase which Briggs claimed was coined 
in the UK in 1945.847 However, both the timing and location of its inception are much 
disputed.848 What might be said however, is that there was no single moment of collective 
demand for an end to the laissez-faire capitalism, which flourished under liberal 
government, and a new era of welfarism, but rather a gradual change punctuated with a 
series of problematisations centred on the population. Indeed, one of the strongest critics of 
this project, Hayek, saw the welfare state a threat to liberty that was more difficult to counter 
than it was the arguments of socialism, precisely because welfarism lacked a strong 
definition.849  
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Some view the roots of this idea of the welfare state in the interwar period around the 
time of the Wall Street Crash and the resulting Great Depression850 which prompted the 
establishment of regulatory mechanisms and bodies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).851 It also led to nations being forced into co-operation and to experiment 
with the adoption of Keynesian policies internationally in an attempt to revive the 
economy.852 However, it has been argued that increased government spending is not the sole 
indicator of whether a nation is truly a ‘welfare state’. According to Esping-Anderson this 
can be better measured by taking account of the extent to which “social rights” were 
increased labour power was “decommodified” and attempted to quantify this.853  
In any case, one of the social rights most pertinent to this thesis which underwent a 
significant development at this time was the ‘right to healthcare’.854 The goal of improving 
the health of the population was to be assured not with a return to a medischinische Polizei, 
but through collective insurance schemes, which meant that the risks associated with ill 
health could be spread across the population rather than being born by the individual and the 
family.855 Such schemes operated by encouraging or requiring payment into a collective 
scheme which would pay out according to the needs of any of its members. Insurance of this 
kind had a rectificatory effect on the risks and hardships of life which created the conditions 
for social problems.  
However, these insurance schemes also prompted a greater need for knowledge and 
information concerning relationships and processes that one may have been considered 
private, such as eating habits or family relationships. This kind of information was needed so 
that the insurer could calculate the likelihood that workers would fall ill (or outside of the 
medical sphere that harvests would fail or workers would be laid off). Once those 
calculations are made, it is possible to work out the annualised cost of guarding against such 
events on a per member basis. Where the insurance scheme is run by the state of insurance 
in which the state itself adopts the role of insurer, it becomes directly in the government 
interest to reduce these risks. 
This gave rise to a proliferation in state agencies whose aim it was to eliminate or at 
least mitigate the risks inherent in everyday life at this time was testament to the state’s 
                                                     
850 M Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State (n 841) ch 6 
851 MH Nadesan (n 751) 69-70 
852 ibid 69-72 
853 D Wincott (n 847) 351 
854 See T Osborne T, ‘Of Health and Statecraft’ (n 727) 179 
855 NS Rose, ‘Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism’ (n 669) 293 
 151 
 
adoption of responsibility for these risks and its putative interest in their reduction. 
Legislation from the Nineteenth Century had already introduced environmental and public 
health regulations which sought to protect the health of the population and its productive 
capacities.856This was further extended during the Twentieth Century most notably with 
legislation in the UK to guarantee the provision of healthcare to all of its citizens regardless 
of their ability to pay through the establishment of the National Health Service (“NHS”). 
Environmental legislation also became more stringent with the accession of the UK to the 
European Union (“EU”) in 1975.    
However, the point of the UK’s accession to membership of the EU coincided with the 
beginning of a broader decline in welfare state provisions and by the time Margaret Thatcher 
became Prime Minister, the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of the welfare state was at an end.857 The 
political rhetoric of the time asserted that the state had become too large, and that its citizens 
had become too dependent.858 Thatcher and her US counterpart Ronald Regan were the 
paragons of the next political rationality that came to dominate US and UK politics in 
response to a populous perceived as being too comfortable, neoliberalism. This thinking was 
influential in the development of the individual autonomy.859 The next section will provide a 
discussion on the meaning of neoliberalism and its significance in the development of our 
current conceptions of individual autonomy. 
NEOLIBERALISM 
“Government can give people the information, legislate and regulate to 
encourage sustainable living, help business to function in a more 
environmentally responsible way: work with other nations to develop the 
right international framework. But it can't 'do it' by itself. 'Doing it' will 
depend on the decisions and choices of millions of individuals and 
companies. Our task is to empower them to make the right ones.”860  
Neoliberalism as a term is still all too frequently used to describe a particular kind of 
political rationality, but it should be remembered, particularly when we are using the term in 
the context of Foucault’s lectures on governmentality, that neoliberalism is not a 
                                                     
856 T Osborne, ‘Security and Vitality: Drains Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth Century’ (n 
722) 99 
857 but c.f. D Wincott (n 847) 356 
858 see G Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self’ (1993) 22 Economy and Society 
267, 274 
859 See D Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (n 9) 120-129 
 
860 ‘Tony Blair’s speech on healthy living’, July 26, 2006. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/jul/26/health.politics [accessed 11/4/2012] 
 152 
 
homogenous, ahistorical rationality, but rather that it can exist in different forms.861  In 
general terms however, there was a resurgence in the ideas of classical liberalism from the 
1970s onwards.862  
Foucault identified this reemergence of liberalism in a new form following periods of 
increased state intervention in economic processes at different places and times (namely 
Freiburg following the demise of the Weimar republic and, in one instance, and the USA in 
the 1960s in the other), which were considered to have failed. Both kinds of intervention 
were born of a concern that this kind of government interference would lead to a growth in 
an expensive and rigid new state bureaucracy which would harm productivity and create 
‘distortions’ which would necessitate yet more government involvement to rectify.863 
However, differences emerged in respect of the correct response to these failures.  
The German Ordoliberals considered that state intervention was warranted to the extent 
of fostering competitive mechanisms864  especially as regards facilitating the German 
“individual social security” in designed to encourage the individual to take more 
responsibility for themselves by making sure that they had made sufficient contributions to 
ensure that they would be insured against life’s dangers.865  Whereas the American brand of 
neoliberalism sought to attain the same goals through extending market principles beyond 
the areas in which it traditionally operated, with more limited state intervention, to generate 
competition in the same way.866 While these neoliberal movements did retain the core 
concerns of classical liberalism in maintaining the importance of the economy, both in terms 
of the capital market and in terms of limiting government activity.  
Though there are clearly distinctions between the German approach, the US approach, 
the French approach (and perhaps between the British approach too) towards what might be 
broadly classed as neoliberalism,867 the reason they can all be considered as forms of 
neoliberalism is precisely because they share certain common features. Harvey describes the 
common ground as being centred on the idea that “human well-being can be best advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms”,868 which compliments Foucault’s 
analysis. Governments employing a neoliberal strategy would seek to nurture the population 
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through the expansion of the role of markets. Where markets already exist, the government 
is forbidden from interfering with them (as was the case in classical liberalism) but where 
markets do not exist, they are to be created by the state.  
As discussed, the liberal rationality of government which construed the market as a 
quasi-sacred natural occurrence can be contrasted with that of the pre-war German Ordo-
Liberalism and the Chicago school who did not see the free market economy as a kind of 
natural phenomenon which the state should refrain from interfering with, but rather 
something which could only arise the right conditions for its emergence were set.869 Under 
these rationalities the responsibility for setting the conditions of the market fell to 
government. One of the most significant requirements of a free market along with goods and 
means of exchange, is individuals who are free to go to the market and to interact with it. 
Thus, it became imperative for government to accord certain rights to individuals (the right 
to own property and the right to their own physical integrity) to subjectivise them as part of 
their creation of a functioning free market. 
An example of the extension of market principles in healthcare can be seen in the 
creation of “star ratings”870 in hospitals in the England stands out as a cogent example of the 
expansion of market principles into areas that were traditionally not in operation. The 
problem which gave rise to this star ratings initiative was the variation in performance in 
hospitals as well as the need, along economic lines, to secure better value for the public 
money spent in hospitals. Previous governments had imposed targets upon the NHS in order 
that they should meet certain expectations (eg in respect of waiting times) however the 
current initiative based on star ratings871 ensures that it is not the state that acts as the 
enforcer of standards, but rather the individual ‘health consumer’872 (formerly known as the 
patient) acting in accordance with market principles.  
This also means that the state shirks from providing substantive definitions of the good, 
in that it is for the patient to choose their own course of action and this leads to the prospect 
of the development of the good itself within the regulated freedom of the market. The 
absence of clear direction in respect of medical choices arguably creates a vacuum of ‘under-
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determination’ from which individual freedom is generated873 and enables a plurality of 
values to be drawn upon in society. Under advanced liberal regimes of government there is 
no single source of moral authority, but rather a constellation of expertise available to guide 
the consumer. 
EXPERTISE UNDER NEO-LIBERALISM 
The advanced liberal conception of expertise differs slightly from its liberal forebear, in 
that expert knowledge was not allowed to exist free from contestation. Rather expertise was 
to be subject to market forces, such that the regimes of truth874  developed and presided over 
by experts could be challenged if consumers did not buy in to their discourse, thus opening 
up a market in expertise itself. Techniques such as auditing aided this scrutiny of 
expertise.875  
This marketisation was further prosecuted through subjecting experts to financial 
scrutiny through the ‘grey sciences’ of accounting practices, audits and enumeration.876 
Thus, with the use of those techniques, expertise could become measurable in order that 
consumers could make choices about the worth of the knowledge derived from that 
expertise. These steps are imperative for the establishment of functioning markets in 
expertise and in healthcare that ensure patients can seek out the best doctors and the best 
healthcare facilities.877 
Pressure could also be brought to bear upon expertise from capital interests in the form 
of lobby groups that suppress or aim to discredit information derived from scientific 
discourse, thus opening a market in expertise. However, political forces could also use 
expertise and scientific knowledge to their own ends, particularly in supporting government 
strategies. In this sense knowledge and expert authority entered the market and became 
commodified. 
Expertise in respect of healthcare no longer resides with the doctor, nor even within a 
broader range of medical opinion. Techniques such as audit were developed and other 
methods accountability were produced which limit the control of the medical profession and 
increase patient choice. 878A whole range of specialists, coaches and gurus have emerged to 
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produce different kinds of knowledge aimed to assist consumers in making choices. This 
kind of freedom of choice could be seen as empowering, but it can also create situations of 
unresolvable uncertainty. In particular, the problem of when to switch off the life support 
machine is a question that cannot be determined solely with reference to expert medical 
opinion. 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND NEOLIBERAL ENTREPRENEURIALISM  
The rights conferred on individuals included the promotion of individual freedom and 
simultaneously encouraged the exercise of that freedom in a particular way that is deemed 
responsible.879 This was in contrast to the welfarist government programmes in which it was 
the state that assumed responsibility for aspects of individual lives such as healthcare and 
social security. The public health movement began to change at around the same time as 
advanced liberalism began to take hold in the UK to focus on the effect of lifestyle choices 
on public health.880 This brought the seemingly mundane choices under the expert gaze and 
further offloaded the responsibility for wellbeing onto individuals and further introduced the 
concept of risk into lifestyle choices. The neoliberal calculation being that “choice-makers 
can be assumed to make rational decisions that accord with the aims of government, 
providing they are given ‘accurate’ information and the skills required to make choices… 
the role of government is to provide access to the necessary skills and information”881 and 
therefore that people should be given the (qualified) freedom to enter the market and to 
actively pursue their own interests. 
Before the individual enters the marketplaces established through government, they are 
to be actively subjectivised or ‘made up’, in Hacking’s terms, in order to be prudent, 
responsible and active in their own lives.882 This involves a process of discipline and 
responsibilisation of the individual so that they adhere to the norms promoted in society.883  
Health is one norm that has been promoted consistently for millennia, but in a neoliberal 
framework the individual must become a consumer of health. Citizens in neoliberal regimes 
of government are to take an active role in self-monitoring and the monitoring of possible 
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treatments.884 In some cases this may go as far as to view their own bodies as commodities 
(e.g. Organ sales (although this is prohibited by law),885 sale of ova (which remains illegal in 
the UK subject to the possibility of reimbursement for expenses, but in it is legal some states 
in the USA),886 the employment of surrogate mothers). This represents a distinct change in 
expectation which calls for closer examination in the next chapter.  
As well as the ways in which individuals per se were made up, there were also 
techniques for making up collective groups of individuals. Social enterprises were 
decentralized or destatised at this time (particularly in the UK through ‘quangoisation’)887 
where certain groups and communities were given responsibility for themselves, but were 
also governed and brought into alignment with the political programmes through techniques 
such as targets and performance indicators etc.888 The state could dictate the objects of 
measurement and incentivise the expert actors to work towards certain objectives aligned 
with the objectives of government in its fostering of the population.  
CONCLUSION 
Although Foucault’s development of the theory of governmentality in his lecture series 
‘Security, Territory Population’ centres on the way in which the government of the state 
changed and became more de-centralised and complex as a result of various factors, the 
most important theme underlying this discussion of that theory in this chapter has been the 
development of autonomy.  
This part of the thesis presents the theory of governmentality as a critical approach that 
differs significantly from those approaches explored in the second part of this thesis. 
Governmentality, as we have seen, concerns the changes in the practices of government that 
took place over the centuries in response to various challenges and variations in material 
conditions, whereas moral philosophy is concerned with the elaboration and refinement of 
moral principles using philosophical argumentation. The theory of governmentality suggests 
that the development of autonomy cannot be explained as the result of the simple refinement 
and elaboration of posited moral principles. Rather personal autonomy emerges both as a 
product and as a necessary component of modern practices of government. Thus, the kind of 
autonomy that has come to be recognised in law and society is an eminently functional form 
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of autonomy that can be seen as the product of the limitations that state government has 
come to impose upon itself in recognition of its inevitable ignorance of the interests of 
individuals, but it can also be seen as a phenomenon that has aided the development of 
certain forms of government. The market can only function with the existence of active 
consumers, capable of assessing their own interests, following advice that best accords with 
those interests and taking responsibility for their own decisions. 
The functional dependence on the kind of individual with these kinds of capacities 
means that those individuals who are incapable of making choices (paradigmatically through 
a lack of mental capacity) present a challenge to modern modes of government. This 
challenge is compounded by the emergence of medical technology that enables life to be 
sustained for long periods at the end of life and the lack of a clear and legitimate authority 
who can direct the continuation or the cessation of treatment in the absence of an 
autonomous decision from the individual receiving treatment. These challenges are made 
more pressing in the context of an aging population and a recent economic crisis that has 
resulted in pressure being put on the provision of healthcare services. 
The central argument made in this work is that it is the combination of all these factors 
has resulted in a crisis of government, the response to which has been the institution of 
ADRTs. A case might be made for ADRTs being the logical extension of an underlying 
philosophical principle of autonomy, but this factor alone cannot explain the development of 
ADRTs in their current form. It is the crisis in government as a result of a number of factors 
that has led to the need to recognise ADRTs.   
In the remainder of this part of the thesis some of the technologies and techniques that 
government can use in the pursuit of its objectives will be considered. The next chapter will 
consider the operation of ADRTs as part of the technologies of the self. In broad terms, this 
will involve an exploration of the way that ADRTs can be put to use for the generation of 
the kind of prudent, responsible and autonomous individuals that advanced liberal society 
requires in order to function.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ADRTS AS A TECHNOLOGY OF THE SELF 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The second part of this thesis was devoted to a discussion of the normative precursors of 
ADRTs. There it was suggested that the primary normative basis for extending the law to 
enable individuals to do this was to protect the right to personal autonomy. However, 
autonomy is a term capable of bearing a multitude of meanings and the law has not 
consistently favoured any particular definition. Consequently, the law may frequently face 
the charge of lacking sufficient adherence to the principle of autonomy, but the strength of 
this argument entirely depends upon the definition of autonomy used as a referant.  
It is in this respect that we confront something of an evaluative bind; there is no ‘true’ 
notion of autonomy. Its interpretation within law and indeed by members of the bioethical 
and medico-legal community is read through and interpreted by reference to different 
ideological commitments, aspirations and contexts which shape its meaning and indeed, its 
critical reception. When translated as part of a project of the self, which I suggest has been a 
dominant approach in bioethical-legal thinking, the concept of autonomy as it arises within 
statute and in judgment invites a very particular critique. Although a specific definition of 
autonomy may not have been clearly articulated in law, many have suggested that the law 
has tended to respect a constellation of individualistic, narrow or ‘thin’ versions of 
autonomy. This tendency has been the source of much criticism. Some concern was 
expressed that with such an interpretation of autonomy individuals would too easily be able 
to make decisions by which they would be bound in future and that the law would not take 
into account changes in the personhood of the author of the ADRT over time. In the previous 
chapter it was argued that the particular conceptual direction that autonomy has taken must 
be viewed in the context of developments in governmental rationalities. The advanced 
liberalism which has emerged has meant that, aside from the establishment of markets, 
government has limited its interventions and the individual citizen has been charged with a 
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more active, consumerist role.889 In order to encourage individuals to adopt such a role, 
various programmes of government have sought to ‘empower’ individuals.890 ADRTs might 
be considered within such a project in that they purport to allow individuals to control their 
future treatment following a loss of capacity. However, while ADRTs do have the potential 
to offer an extension of autonomy in the ‘thin’ sense of empowerment in offering the right to 
make pre-emptive choices about future healthcare choice to patients, it is arguable that 
ADRTs fail to reliably facilitate the ultimate recognition of these choices in practice.  
Significantly, this failure puts into question the true extent to which the putative liberal 
form of autonomy has empowered patients in practice.891 In the first part of this chapter, 
then, critical consideration will be given to the extent to which ADRTs can truly provide 
people with a greater degree of control over their medical treatment at the end of their lives. 
The limitations of ADRTs will be highlighted through the examination of two prominent 
cases. No claim is made that these cases are representative of the law in this area, but these 
cases do helpfully illustrate some of the operational challenges of the creation and 
recognition of ADRTs. These cases concern individuals who express wishes to refuse 
treatment in the event of losing capacity, but in both the court failed to recognise a valid 
ADRT. On an orthodox bioethical analysis might conclude that the failure to recognise these 
wishes as ADRTs is demonstrative of a failure to accord sufficient respect to patient 
autonomy.892 It might even be argued that the extent to which ADRTs permit individuals to 
exercise practical control over their end of life treatment, in a meaningful way, is greatly 
limited (which is not a novel position)893 and therefore that ADRTs are legal instruments 
without purpose, hollow, or perhaps ideological, instruments of advanced liberalism. That 
will not be the conclusion of this chapter. Rather, these cases will be drawn upon to 
exemplify how the law on ADRTs relies upon and facilitates certain practices of the self, 
which can be considered as part of the ‘technologies of the self’, which makes possible the 
formation of ‘ethical subjects’.894  
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This mode of analysis shifts the focus away from the kinds of results that ADRTs are 
able to produce (i.e. whether or not they are respected by medical professionals and prevent 
treatment from being provided)895 and instead homes in on the practices that are instituted, 
required and fostered by ADRTs. Regardless of whether an ADRT is to succeed or not (in 
the sense of the outcome according with the stated wishes), the very creation of an ADRT 
demands certain practices on the part of the individual acting on themselves. Establishing a 
legal framework that provides for the possibility of creating ADRTs constitutes a strategy 
for governing others and represents an attempt to address what has been characterised in this 
thesis as a ‘crisis of government’896 at the end of life. In this sense ADRTs are not without 
purpose, however infrequently they may be upheld. Indeed, and to the contrary, the 
operation of ADRTs appears well aligned with the (advanced) liberal imperatives of active 
decision-making897 and self-authorship.898 
TWO RECENT CASES ON ADVANCE DECISIONS 
The cases of W v M899 and Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1)900 highlight some 
of the difficulties to be faced when creating an ADRT, which are resultantly recognised as 
legally binding refusals of treatment upon the loss of mental capacity. In both cases, the 
women who had expressed their wishes not to receive treatment in the future found that the 
courts were not prepared to accord their decisions binding force and instead permitted their 
medical teams to provide treatment deemed to be in their respective best interests. 
These cases illustrate some deficiencies with the arguments that ADRTs are 
empowering and the more general claim that the idea of individual autonomy has become 
overly individualised. One of the first problems to be encountered by would-be advance 
decision makers is the problem of specificity. This is a problem that was introduced in 
Chapter One, but the case of W v M offers one of its starkest illustrations. 
M, fell into a coma after a sudden and unexpected illness. She was later diagnosed as 
suffering from a disorder of consciousness known as a Vegetative State (“VS”).901 However, 
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when later reassessed by a different consultant neurologist, she was given a new diagnosis of 
being in a Minimally Conscious State (“MCS”). The diagnosis of VS can only be made after 
six months and a diagnosis of MCS requires 3-5 years.902 MCS was a newly defined 
neurological condition (only recognised by specialists in 2002)903, which describes those 
whose brain activity reaches slightly greater level than that which is attained by PVS 
patients. Crucially, patients who are diagnosed as being in a MCS are able to respond to 
stimuli on some occasions, as was M.  
Nonetheless M’s family applied for a court order for the cessation of life support, 
grounded in the belief that M would not have wished to have been kept alive in such a state. 
This belief was supported by the fact that in 2003 M had stated that she would not wish to be 
kept alive with clinically-assisted artificial nutrition and hydration (“CANH”) if she ever 
found herself in a state of existence analogous with that Anthony Bland or persistent 
vegetative state (“PVS”) or a state similar to that in which some of her family members had 
found themselves.904 
It will be remembered from Chapter One that ADRTs must be composed in such a way 
as to specify the kind of treatment to be refused and the kind of circumstances in which that 
treatment is to be refused.905 In order to meet this requirement it might be thought that the 
author ought to provide a high degree of specification in order that there could be no doubt 
over when treatment should not be provided following the loss of capacity. Perversely 
however, drafting ADRTs with a high degree of specificity risks reducing the kind of 
treatment to which the ADRT may apply, because if a very detailed specification of 
treatment or circumstances has been provided a person interpreting the ADRT might take 
this to mean that the author of the ADRT would not have wanted it to apply in similar, but 
not identical, circumstances to those that obtain.  This could result in the provision of 
treatment of a similar kind or in a similar set of circumstances to those in which the author 
wished to refuse. Much therefore rests upon the way ADRTs are interpreted in practice.  
However, in M’s case, the application for the cessation of treatment was refused on the 
grounds that firstly there was no “formal” advance decision to refuse treatment (the meaning 
of which is unclear), which was applicable to her state of health at the date of the hearing. M 
had failed to specify that her refusal of treatment should apply in the event that she should 
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fall into an MCS. However, in order to have done this, M would have required ‘almost 
clairvoyant’906 powers, because the MCS diagnosis was not widely known or employed at 
the time she made her wishes known about her future care. The denial of M’s purported 
ADRT meant that the medical team were entitled to provide treatment in M’s best interests. 
It was further held in court that continued CANH was in M’s best interests as M continued 
to experience some positive experiences. And although her prior-stated wishes were taken 
into account as part of the ‘balance sheet’ approach to the assessment of her best interests 
under s.4 MCA, as she had not anticipated falling in to an MCS specifically, the scales 
tipped in favour of continuing with life support and CANH.  
A complicating factor in M’s case was that although her case was reported in 2011, she 
had made the relevant statements about her future treatment wishes prior to the publication 
of the MCA 2005 and its coming into force in 2007 and had suffered the disorder of 
consciousness (PVS/MCS) which caused the loss of her mental capacity before this date too. 
Parliament had made provision for such an eventuality through a Transitional Order which 
made clear that those who had expressed their wishes to refuse future treatment prior to 1st 
October 2007 and who had lost capacity prior to that date would not be bound by the 
formality requirements of the MCA.907 Thus, in these circumstances any claim as to the 
existence of an advance decision should be judged in accordance with the common law as it 
stood prior to the MCA.908 However, the Transitional Order also stipulates that in such 
circumstances purported ADRTs must be made in writing.909 And although the pre-MCA 
common law did set out some principles for the recognition of advance decisions to refuse 
treatment, there was never a requirement that the decision should be made in writing. On this 
basis it appears that the Transitional Order demands adherence to formalities imposed in 
retrospect. If so, it is arguable that this requirement is incompatible with Art 7 ECHR which 
prohibits retroactive legislation.  
Today, anyone who wishes to create an ADRT must comply with the formalities of 
sections 24-26 MCA. As discussed in chapter one, these stipulate that advance decisions to 
refuse life-saving treatment must be made in writing, as well as being signed and witnessed. 
The MCA further requires that the provisions must be applicable to the circumstances that 
emerge before they can have binding force (a fact well illustrated by W v M).910 Another 
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requisite is that anyone who wishes to create an ADRT must be over 18 years of age and 
must have the capacity to make the decision.911  
A further potential pitfall for would-be creators of ADRTs can be found in the 
requirements on capacity and its assessment in the MCA and the way in which these 
requirements have been interpreted. The MCA enshrines a number of principles relating to 
mental capacity and its assessment. The most pertinent of these principles for would-be 
creators of advance decisions are the legal principle that everyone is presumed to have 
capacity unless the contrary is proven912; that capacity is to be assessed in accordance with 
particular decisions being taken at the particular time it is being taken913 (and should not be 
assumed to be lacking without assessment914); and that a person with capacity should be free 
to withdraw their consent at any point in future while they retain capacity. The latter point is 
implied by section 25(3), which states that an advance decision only takes effect where the 
person in question lacks capacity to make the decision and by section 24(3) which states that 
the advance decision can be varied or withdrawn until the point at which capacity is lost. 
The operation of capacity as a requisite for the creation of advance decisions is well 
illustrated in the case of Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1).915 The central question 
to arise was whether the advance decisions that E had made to refuse medical treatment 
(especially being given artificial nutrition) were valid. At the date of the application it was 
agreed that E lacked capacity to refuse nutrition and therefore E could be treated in 
accordance with her best interests in spite of her protests unless she had a valid advance 
decision refusing any such treatment. Ultimately both of E’s purported ADRTs were found 
to lack validity for want of capacity at the time of their creation. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the MCA test for mental capacity asks whether the 
assessed person has “an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or 
brain”916 and if so, whether that person is able to understand, retain, and ‘weigh information 
in the balance’ to make a decision, as well as whether they can communicate their 
decision.917 If a person cannot pass one of these tests, then they lack capacity for the 
decision. Thus the test does not depend on evidence of a mental disorder, nor can such 
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evidence per se found a conclusion that capacity is lacking.918 That being said, it is entirely 
possible that mental disorders may produce effects which preclude decision-making capacity 
and to that extent the background is of some relevance.  
E was 32 by the time of the local authority’s emergency application to court and had 
been suffering from eating disorders for around 20 years. There was a strong suggestion that 
this problem had been triggered by a number of years of sexual abuse as a child which also 
led to alcoholism and as a result of being entered onto a palliative care pathway in hospital 
she had become dependent on diamorphine too.919 E had been admitted to hospital on 
numerous occasions because of her eating disorders, but owing to the financial pressures on 
the hospital trust there was no long term place for E in hospital or in residential 
accommodation. This meant that the care she received between 2010 and 2012 was 
primarily in her own flat and its insufficiency was marked by the “‘revolving door’ series of 
emergency admissions for medical and psychiatric care”920 she experienced during this time. 
E made two attempts at creating advance decisions to refuse resuscitation and artificial 
feeding. One in July 2011 and the other in October 2011. E had been assessed as having 
capacity in a general sense the day prior to writing the July decision by a doctor, but no 
formal assessment had been completed.921 The latter of these was made “using a standard 
form” with the help of “her mother and mental capacity advocate”922 as well as E’s solicitor 
and was witnessed by a mental health professional. In October the “general medical view” 
was that E had capacity, but yet again, there had been no formal capacity assessment. The 
lack of formal capacity assessments, coupled with E’s ongoing medical and mental health 
problems gave Mr Justice Peter Jackson enough cause to doubt that on either occasion, E 
had sufficient capacity to make that decision.   
There are, of course, many critical observations that could be made about the assessment 
of mental capacity in English law923 (at both theoretical and practical levels), but when 
thinking about advance decisions it is notable that we are doubly reliant on the test for 
capacity, because it is the sole means of determining the moment at which an advance 
decision becomes binding and, as E’s case illustrates, it is determinative of whether an 
advance decision is valid at its very inception. E went to great lengths to make her 
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opposition CANH clear and seemed to take all reasonable steps in attempting to conform to 
the legal requirements of the MCA. In spite of both this, and the fact that E had not failed a 
contemporary assessment of capacity, her purported ADRTs were not recognised as such. 
Moreover, it was decided that CANH coupled with a complete care programme was in her 
best interests on balance even considering her consistent and strong opposition to it.  
If it is possible to take the kinds of steps that E took and still end up with an ineffectual 
ADRT, it must be asked whether ADRTs really do fulfil their apparent promise of 
empowerment and extending autonomy. This concern is highly pertinent to the discussion in 
the second part of this thesis, given that the inclusion of provisions on ADRTs in the MCA 
were made on the understanding that they would extend individual self-determination and 
autonomy.924   
However, such an analysis leads us back to the problematic nature of the definitions of 
autonomy and self-determination. The second part of this thesis provided evidence of a great 
deal of disagreement over the definition of these concepts in philosophical and bioethical 
circles, as well as a considerable level of ambiguity over the definitions of autonomy and 
self-determination that are relied upon in this area of law. Therefore, an analysis that 
suggests that ADRTs provide inadequate recognition of personal autonomy is eminently 
contestable on fundamental, definitional grounds. And while it may be useful to highlight 
inconsistencies in the approach of the law,925 with this approach the normative question 
remains as to which conception of autonomy should be selected.  
This part of the thesis adopts a different kind of analysis based on a conception of 
ADRTs as a governmental response to a crisis in end of life treatment. This analytical 
strategy is based on Foucault’s work on governmentality as detailed in the previous chapter 
and particularly an assessment of whether ADRTs can be seen as a kind of technology of the 
self.  
The previous chapter explained how advanced liberal rationalities of government have 
been shaped by historical factors, but in the next section a brief overview will be provided of 
the operational aspects of modern governmentality. Particular focus will be given to the idea 
of the practices of government operating through the technologies of government and the 
technologies of the self. As the focus of this chapter is on how ADRTs operate as part of the 
technologies of the self and given the importance of the idea of autonomy to ADRTs, the 
                                                     
924 W v M (n 11) [226] (Baker J) 
925 see e.g. J Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law’ (n 419) 
 166 
 
goal will be to explain how a liberal version of autonomy expects and facilitates certain 
practices of the self.  
GOVERNMENTALITY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault’s lectures in the Collège de France 
developed an idea that he defined with the ‘ugly word’, ‘governmentality’.926 Unfortunately 
Foucault did not bestow this term with a consistent meaning.927 But we can take an 
understanding of modern forms of governmentality as the product of various 
problematisations of government which arose at various points in history. These 
problematisations ultimately led to the emergence of a liberal art of government during the 
Eighteenth Century, which was characterised by a commitment to self-limitation through the 
idea of ‘political economy’. This advent of liberal governmentality arrived at time when the 
population was in the process of rapid expansion and came to be recognised as a body in 
itself, rather simply a multiplicity of individuals. The importance of the population was such 
that it became the primary referent of government, or as it is sometimes put, a body that was 
‘immanent to government’.928  
During this time, the practices of government were transformed. The traditional 
conception of an activity predominated by the sovereign will, backed up by the right to “kill 
and let live”,929 inherent to the transcendent sovereign right to office, and morphed into an 
art with diverse and decentralised sites of propagation. This art of government operated 
through practices of normation and normalisation930  rather than commanded imperatives931  
and was geared towards the securitisation of the population as a new and discrete body 
immanent to government.932 As such, the modern powers of government which emerged 
from the process of governmentality remained purposeful,933 but their purpose resided not in 
the preservation of the leader (as with Machiavellianism)934 or the state (as with raison 
d’état)935 but rather with the population. This change, described as ‘the governmentalisation 
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of the state’936  resulted in sovereignty becoming merely one form of power among others, 
incident to the processes of government.937  
Thus, government is not to be equated with the idea of state government, but is a far 
broader phenomenon pertaining simply to the “conduct of conducts”.938 Foucault employs 
the word government in a sense which is not restricted to decisions made by officials or 
other  arms of the state,939 but instead is concerned with the processes by which conduct is 
conducted940 or ways to ‘structure possible fields of action’.941 It is also certainly not to be 
construed as an act of domination, oppression or as ‘antithetical’ to freedom942 a fact which 
should be apparent from Foucault’s particular way of conceiving of power.943 Indeed, 
Foucault sees the practices of good government as being contingent upon a certain kind of 
freedom.944 This means that government is something that can emanate from others directing 
individual conduct, but it can also involve the individual governing themselves.945 This is the 
process by which individuals constitute themselves as ethical subjects.946 The development 
of responsible individuals with the powers of self-scrutiny and self-government acquired 
through the technologies of the self are essential to the functioning of liberal government.947  
Foucault described modern forms of governmentality as operating at the intersection of 
the ‘technologies of the self’ and the ‘technologies of government’.948 This conceptualisation 
of governmentality can be applied to the law on ADRTs in order to demonstrate how 
ADRTs accord with, and support, modern practices of government. To this end the next part 
of this chapter will provide an explanation of the meaning of the term technology in this 
context and will then proceed to focus on the technologies of government and how ADRTs 
facilitate and require certain practices of the self. 
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TECHNOLOGIES 
Modern governmentality can be said to operate through the interplay between the 
technologies of the self and the technologies of government949 (also referred to as the 
‘technologies domination’). Technologies, in this sense of the word, are “for the shaping of 
conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired 
events”950 through the “regular application of… knowledge… to the pragmatic problems of 
the exercise of authority”.951 Consequently, technologies can become part of the technēs (i.e. 
practical knowledge, or ‘practical reason’952) of government when they involve using 
“systematized knowledge” to address the “pragmatic problems of the exercise of 
authority”.953  
As such technologies have an instrumental value in the practical assistance they are able 
to render government for the advancement of governmental programmes. That is not to say 
that technologies are to be viewed solely as instrumental devices; they are also 
“assemblage[s] of different techniques of government, technical objects, actors, financial 
and other resources and ‘sociotechnical’ forces”.954 Thus, technologies help forge new and 
productive relationships between all of those components and actors which therefore result 
in much more than the attainment of a specified goal. 
The conceptualisation of technologies as networks draws on the work of Bruno Latour 
who studied the effects of power as resulting from the interaction between different actors955 
and the role of technical objects, “inscription devices” and “forms of architecture” in 
regulating conduct.956 The particular importance of the concept of a network is that it can 
demonstrate how non-human technical objects can modify human behaviour and thus can 
rebuff the “neo-Kantian” “ontological separation”957 between the human and the 
technological. In other words, the technological domain becomes visible as a result of the 
interplays and reflexive modulations between technical means and human interactions (both 
personal and interpersonal), which has the ultimate result of affecting conduct (e.g. the 
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mechanical and organisational processes which inter alia combined to make Taylorism 
possible).958  
Technologies thus pertain to complex interactions between programmes, persons and 
machinery and are not to be simply construed as direct mappings of commands and 
programmes of government onto reality.959 Instead, they seek to “structure the field of 
possible actions”960 and thereby exert control, but not direct determination, through 
delimitation. The technologies of government comprise of the practical techniques through 
which government is mapped onto and shapes the real961  together with the assemblages of 
connections of agencies and persons that make this possible. taking the technologies of 
government as an example, it is plain that they do not offer governing powers perfect, or 
precise, control in attaining their objectives within the practices and conduct of those they 
govern; their operation and effect is far messier, “more Heath Robinson than Audi”962 with 
multiple sites of propagation and relational influence. Hence technologies really can make 
no bolder causative claim than to affect the mere tendency to influence decision making and 
conduct.963 This is particularly true of the technologies used in modern, liberal, styles of 
government and their affinity for self-limitation964  through ‘political economy’965  and 
‘action at a distance’966 rather than direct and overt intervention. 
These ideas can be readily related to the law on ADRTs. It will be remembered from the 
previous chapter that it was argued that the emergence of ADRTs can be considered a 
product of an emerging ‘crisis of government’967 as much as a rationalisation of autonomy as 
their supposed underlying norm. As such, introducing a framework for the creation of 
ADRTs appears as a technical attempt to address the crisis i.e. an intervention aimed at 
producing a certain practical outcome. This is because ADRTs promise to provide a 
practical means of addressing the problem of individuals who are at end of life and lack the 
mental capacity to decide whether to continue treatment. They operate on the basis of 
voluntary consent and there is no direct requirement for citizens to create ADRTs at all. 
Thus the aspiration of ADRTs is accords closely to the precepts and injunctions of 
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liberalism. They provide the medical team with the requisite cover of legitimisation that they 
require. Moreover, as ADRTs are accessible to those the strategy of governing through 
ADRTs can be seen as part of a (neo)liberal968 approach towards government in instituting 
certain conditions under which it is possible for the responsible, entrepreneurial citizen969 to 
make provision for themselves, to develop and take care of their own preferences. 
This can be seen in the way that it has created a framework within which ADRTs can be 
made, specifying when such decisions take effect (i.e. only following the loss of mental 
capacity in respect of the specific decision) and what such decisions may consist in (i.e. only 
the refusal of treatment), but importantly making this a mere possibility rather than a 
requirement for citizens. Simultaneously ADRTs establish the conditions that actualise 
health concerns in the minds of citizens in such a way that they are more likely to understand 
that they have a responsibility for both their current and future health.970 
Furthermore, the assemblage-like nature of ADRTs can be appreciated through 
considering the interaction of people and institutions who may become involved in the 
formation of the ADRT. The nature of these assemblages will vary, but it is likely that the 
author of the ADRT would first need to be informed of their legal right to make an advance 
decision. The most likely source of this information would be a member of the medical 
profession that the person might come into contact with such as their general practitioner 
(“GP”). Naturally there will be some discretion and variation regarding when, how and 
indeed whether patients are informed of this right by their GPs, but the policy for GPs to 
make this information available (primarily to certain patient groups) is formulated the 
medical regulatory bodies which derive their authority from the state. In addition, the kinds 
of published guidance on the formation of a legally binding ADRT and template forms 
(inscription devices)971 might be considered technical means for the completion of ADRTs. 
It is possible to view all of these elements as part of an assemblage of ADRTs.  
In the case of Re E, the idea of creating an ADRT was said to have been the product of 
E’s own research, but her research was prompted by her regular contact with psychiatric 
services and the attendant threat of compulsory treatment and force-feeding. In addition, E 
had a medical background and sought assistance in an attempt to make her wishes take a 
legally binding form in an ADRT. Contact with IMCAs, or legal representatives, is another 
possible route to the creation of ADRTs. aside from situations such as e’s, the consultation 
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with solicitors in contemplation of making a will might be a more common opportunity to be 
told of the right to make an ADRT. As part of the will drafting service, attention may be 
drawn to the possibility of creating an ADRT (perhaps in addition to giving advice on 
creating lasting powers of attorney).972  
The third most likely way in which a person might be informed of their right to make 
such a decision is indirectly, through media articles or through friends or family who may 
have had learned of this right. social networks are also likely to be important for the creators 
of ADRTs who may wish to discuss the creation of the decision (and the reasoning behind 
it), perhaps for reassurance, advice, or simply to inform another person of the decision so 
that they might be able to draw the medical team’s attention to the existence of an ADRT in 
the right circumstances. This is similar to what happened in W v M where M’s mind was 
directed to the question of her future treatment upon learning of the plight of Anthony 
Bland.  
CONTRASTING TECHNOLOGIES  
The technological assemblages discussed thus far have been based on the formation of 
groups that are external to the individual themselves and, in terms of an analysis grounded in 
governmentality, are concerned with the ways in which they come to shape the conduct of 
individuals. Foucault makes the distinction between these kinds of technologies and those 
which are employed by the self to be exercised upon the self, namely the ‘technologies of 
the self’. This thesis argues that the operation of the law on ADRTs involves both practices 
of self-government and practices of the government of others. In this chapter the focus is on 
the government of the self and in the following chapter greater attention will be given as to 
how ADRTs can function in relation to the government of others.  
Although both the technologies of the self and the technologies of government are both 
aimed at the regulation and direction of conduct, they can be distinguished by the fact that 
the practices of government involve the way in which government attempts to regulate the 
body of the population, whereas the ‘practices of the self’ concern the ways in which people 
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are enjoined to regulate their own bodies and conduct973  and to speak ‘the truth’ about 
themselves.974  
The techniques (technēs), or practices, used in these self-oriented technologies of the 
self can be put to work to by “individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or 
transform it in terms of a certain number of ends”.975 In that respect, the kinds of practices 
which are fostered by ADRTs qua technologies of the self can also be channelled towards 
certain ends, such as self-responsibilisation especially concerning healthcare. 
THE TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 
In simple terms, the technologies of the self are groupings of techniques, which can be 
used by the individual to “affect their body, thoughts and behaviors (sic)”.976 Dean uses the 
term ‘self-directed’ technologies and ‘other regarding’ technologies to emphasise the fact 
that these are techniques which are applied by the self and to the self.977 Thus, an analysis of 
the operation of ADRTs, as part of the technologies of the self, demands an examination of 
those techniques that the individual practices upon themselves which are elicited through the 
creation of ADRTs. In other words, ‘how to ADRTs facilitate self-directed techniques’? 
For analytical purposes, aspects of the technologies of the self can be broken down into 
four fundamental facets, which Dean rearticulates as: “the governed ethical substance”, the 
“governing or ethical work”, the “governable subject” and the “telos of governmental or 
ethical practices”.978 Examining these components in further detail in respect ADRTs will 
aid the illustration of the distinction between the practices of the self and the practices of 
government. The aim is to explain how this particular kind of advance decision-making can 
be regarded as a technology of the self.979 
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WHAT IS TO BE GOVERNED? 
The first characteristic of the technologies of the self is that they must specify the aspect 
of the self which is to be governed (e.g. the soul, or the flesh).980 For example, in his work 
on the History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that Christianity aimed to govern the flesh 
through an examination of the development of ethical practices around the ‘pleasures of the 
flesh’.981 In respect of his work on prisons, the subject of government was the very soul of 
the prisoner who was to be governed.982 
At first sight, ADRTs appear to straightforwardly pertain to the existence of the ‘future 
self’ (the way in which the body of the future self is to be treated and indeed the conditions 
under which its existence may be ended). Therefore it might be concluded that the ‘future 
self’ is the substance which is to be affected, or acted upon, by the (present) self.983 
However, further consideration of what is entailed by the formation of ADRTs through the 
present-day individual making decisions on behalf of their future-self, the ethical substance 
being governed might be better regarded as the ‘existential disposition’ of the individual (not 
simply the future state of existence itself). The creation of an ADRT is to indicate the value 
its creator places on certain states of existence. 
Both E and M had clearly contemplated the possibility of entering into a state of 
existence that they would have found unacceptable and on that basis made statements about 
their continued existence in those states. Both E and M specified states of existence under 
which they would wish to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining treatment. Arriving at a 
decision to refuse medical treatment in future will necessarily involve some engagement 
with profound philosophical questions concerning the value of existence in conceivable 
circumstances. Such exercises pertain to the question of how the existential disposition is to 
be governed.  
HOW SHOULD THE OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT BE GOVERNED? 
Having identified the ethical substance to be governed as the existential disposition of 
the subject, the question then arises as to how this is to be governed. This question invites 
consideration of the technical means through which the individual can govern their 
existential disposition. 
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The good functioning of modern day health promotion rests on individuals playing an 
active role in their own treatment.984 In order to garner the cooperation of people to “invite 
or incite [people] to recognise their moral obligations”,985 policy makers have made efforts 
to encourage individuals to make choices which align with their values and goals. 
Consequently, those who do not take good care of themselves and who fail to exercise their 
responsibility in accordance with the advice of experts may be subject to social 
stigmatisation,986 in some cases, failure to take responsibility for one’s health can even result 
in the denial of healthcare services.987 Hence, individuals find themselves under a duty to 
safeguard their own health and, given the way that health is defined as an optimal state, to be 
health-aware and to take active steps in educating and informing themselves about their own 
medico-existential condition.988  
A long-running and potent method of inciting individuals to acknowledge and regulate 
their own behaviour was the inculcation of moral principles into everyday life through 
religious discourse. Foucault argues that the central moral imperative of Ancient Greece 
“take care of yourself” (“epimeleislhai sautou”)989 had been forgotten (or at least 
underplayed) in the Twentieth Century, whereas the other related maxim of the Delphics, 
“know yourself” (“gnōthi seauton”990) has been held in constant high regard since the 
enlightenment. This is due, in part, to the influence of Christian moral values and their 
persisting echoes in the contemporary world. In particular, the need to renounce oneself in 
order to achieve salvation appeared to preclude ‘taking care of oneself’.991 In the ancient 
world the ‘care of the self’ was acknowledged as having an instrumental value in being not 
merely a self-directed practice, as it emanated from the will to govern others, because in 
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order to be able to govern others effectively one first had to become aware of how to govern 
oneself.992 
The Christian influence on the practices of the self was linked to the goal of self-
knowledge and involved self-renunciation, which was considered a necessary means towards 
the salvation of the soul.993 However, the changes that took place in the Eighteenth Century 
brought with them a move away from these Christian techniques, which concerned 
renunciation of the self and towards techniques that focused on cultivation. This ‘cultivation 
of the self’ was achieved through the technologies of the self and, in particular, the ways that 
people are enjoined to form themselves through self-writing and verbalisation.994  
 “By the Hellenistic age, though, writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed 
to correspondence. Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing 
activity.”995  
“One of the tasks that defines the care of the self is that of taking-notes on 
oneself to be reread, writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and 
keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one 
needed.”996  
The practice of writing for oneself, whether in correspondence, or in notes which are not 
shared with others has a long history.997 The modern ways in which people can engage in 
self-writing and self-narrative discourse are manifold. This can be seen as a response to the 
“crisis of subjectivation” where the need to find a way to allow the subject to submit to 
themselves so that they can follow rules which would give their lives meaning.998 Foucault 
examined the patterns of self-writing that took place in ancient Greece and Rome, which 
included writing about oneself in correspondences with others. Letter writing of this kind 
may have subsided, but the spirit of the activity has shown a great resurgence with those 
who use social media. For example, the once burgeoning, now positively ballooning 
popularity Facebook (which had “21 million users” in 2008999 and “an audience of over 606 
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million” in 20111000 and in October 2012 the number of users reached one billion1001), 
affords its users the ability to create their own interactive timeline and to share with 
‘friends’. Through all these seemingly trivial acts of self-expression it is possible to build up 
a persona and to thereby engage in a process of continual entrepreneurial self-renewal.  
ADRTs can be seen as a more formal and solemn opportunity for individuals to self-
author in such a way as to constitute themselves as subjects. Any person who specifies the 
circumstances under which they would not wish to continue living necessarily makes a 
profound statement about the value they ascribe to their own existence. As the formation of 
an ADRT is a voluntary undertaking it will involve its creator engaging in various thought 
processes. They must contemplate different possible future states of existence and must 
evaluate those against their own individual system of values. This was evident in both E and 
M’s cases where both had considered the possibility of a certain state of existence and had 
rejected it. Following this, they must commit their decision to writing because, as discussed 
in chapter one, any person who wishes to make a decision to refuse life-saving treatment 
must acknowledge this in writing.1002  
This demand for written documentation acts as an imperative towards both an 
inscription and transcription, or subjectivation, of the self. It enjoins individuals to adopt an 
entrepreneurial approach towards their own healthcare and to consider confronting ‘ethical’ 
questions in practical, medico-legal terms, through the objectification of the future self as an 
external entity to be governed.1003 This is a practice the E engaged in, but M did not 
(although it is questionable whether the law required writing at the time M expressed her 
wishes). 
The act of writing an ADRT, in addition to being an exercise of self-elected self-
expression, involves entering into a medico-legal discourse and consequently submitting its 
limits and structure. The expression must meet certain criteria and must acknowledge the 
risk of death. As the purpose of an ADRT is to refuse treatment and therefore the author 
must envision the circumstances under which they would wish for that to happen (and must 
educate themselves as to when the law says their decision can take effect). They must also 
confront their own mortality in this exercise and in this respect a parallel might be drawn 
                                                     
1000 Ryan T and Xenos S, ‘Who Uses Facebook? An Investigation into the Relationship between the 
Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and Facebook Usage’ (2011) 27 Computers in Human 
Behavior 1658, 1658 
1001 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/10468914 [accessed 16/10/2012] 
1002 MCA, ss 25(5)-(6)  
1003 M Foucault, Discipline and punish (n 673) 170 
 177 
 
with the practice of praemeditatio futorum malorum,1004 in which an individual engages in a 
meditative thought exercise concerning their own future misfortunes in order that they might 
to prepare themselves for the worst to happen.  
This kind of contemplation ‘seals off’ future possibilities and fixes on one kind of 
eventuality, which in the case of ADRTs is that capacity will be lost and in circumstances 
where the medical team may wish to continue treatment.1005 Related to this is the meletē 
thanatou1006 as it requires the author to ‘actualise’ their death and to think closely about 
when they would want to be allowed to die.1007 ADRTs can only be created following an 
engagement with these processes and through such engagement; a more responsibilised 
subject can be formed. The contemplation of one’s own mortality and making decisions 
about what kind of treatment one would wish to receive at the end of life indicates not just a 
concern for the so-called ‘future self’, but a concern for the present self. 
CREATING GOVERNABLE SUBJECTS “MODE D’ASSUJETTISSEMENT”1008 
“To live as an autonomous individual is to have learned these knowledgeable 
techniques for understanding and practising upon yourself. Hence the norm 
of autonomy produces an intense and continuous self-scrutiny, self-
dissatisfaction and self evaluation in terms of the vocabularies and 
explanations of expertise.”1009 
The third element of the technologies of the self is that they must specify the kind of 
governable subjects that are to be produced by the practices of the self. A functioning and 
relevant system of ADRTs requires people who are concerned for their own health to have 
an appreciation of the risks to their future health, especially the potential infirmities they will 
encounter in old age, and people who can have a sense of what kind of circumstances of life 
they would be prepared to tolerate (i.e. people with a considered ‘existential disposition’). 
Health is paradigmatic as one such normative end which is strongly linked to the practices of 
the self and is increasingly defined, as well as promoted, by experts.1010 The World Health 
Organisation allows this concept of health to bear a very broad contemporary definition as: 
“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
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disease or infirmity”.1011 This definition highlights the nature of health as an optimal state, 
which therefore gives weight to the notion that health is to be thought of as a continual 
project of surveillance, precaution and work, rather than as a static outcome.1012  
This definition also entails a responsibility to be vigilant and guard against what Rose 
calls 'protodiseases'1013 i.e. those lifestyle factors and choices inimical to the optimisation of 
health. Health-messages are frequently propagated by a wide range of medical and non-
medical institutions, and experts who promote “the primacy of health”.1014 Often these 
messages come in the form of a highlighting of the risk of future ill health, which increases 
the purview of medicine from the actual to the potential.1015 ADRTs are plainly concerned 
with bringing forward concern for future health (and indeed future states of existence) to the 
present. 
Individual autonomy plays a critical role in the establishment of responsibility of this 
kind. As a value that has come to constitute a fundamental pillar of modern modes of 
government, it has been explicitly, albeit imprecisely, incorporated, protected and defended 
in law as a right for patients.1016 At the same time, it has become a value which patients are 
functionally expected to embrace.1017 The corollary of this valorisation of ‘choice-making 
autonomy’ is that the onus of decision-making responsibility is transferred from the state and 
the clinical team onto the individual.1018 Thus, the pursuit of good health has become 
normalised as an individual responsibility1019 and has been increasingly recognised as 
such.1020  
Individuals must understand that they can take active control of their future through the 
creation of an ADRT and do not need to adopt a passive-responsive stance towards their 
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medical care. As discussed, the creation of an ADRT calls for a level of responsibilised, self-
directed thought, which can be developed through self-reflection, narrative, prediction and 
analogy to the circumstances of others. 
Causing people to actively consider the creation of their own ADRT can be achieved 
through a number of techniques to enhance and facilitate a perceived sense of individual 
responsibility and choice making obligations. These reflexive thought processes are likely to 
heighten the sense of individual mortality and generalised health-awareness.  
TELOS OF GOVERNMENT 
“[T]here is no power that is exercised without a series of aims or 
objectives”1021  
“[A] sick man lives more carelessly when he is under medical observation 
than when he attends to his own health.”1022  
Finally, there must be a telos of governance (a point which the technologies of the self 
shares with the technologies of government).1023 This idea of the ultimate purpose of this 
mode of self-government raises the question of the kind of society and the kind of 
subjectivities that these practices of the self attempt to lead us towards or the kind of world 
these practices seek to produce.1024 
One aspect of this telos might be seen in the resurgence of the care of the self. This has 
not taken the form of a revalorisation of the pleasures of the self per se, but in making self-
care a priority for all. But, rather than merely promoting the practices of self-control (or 
enkrateia) that allows one to avoid becoming a slave to one’s own desires and urges in order 
to become a ‘wise moderate’ instead (sōphrosynē),1025 the modern imperative to care for the 
self is directed towards self-optimisation.1026 As discussed, under advanced liberal modes of 
government, one is to make a continual project of oneself: analysing, testing and comparing 
oneself to certain norms.1027 Thus, modern practices of the self are also to be distinguished 
from the practices of the self which were induced by Christian discourse in two important 
respects. Firstly because it does not require the destruction of the self, prior to the attainment 
of a new subjectivity (as Christian discourse does), but rather seeks to shape subjectivity in a 
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positive way, based on a “permanent anthropologism of Western thought”.1028 Secondly, 
modern practices of the self are such that it is now no longer sufficient to be without sin (as 
was the promise of leading a good life according to Christian mores), we must all aspire 
towards ‘sainthood’ i.e. the optimal. This is not something that Christian discourse would 
expect for all. Indeed, in this respect, an analogy with the ethical codes of ancient Greece 
and particularly the “mode d’assujettissement”1029 is perhaps therefore stronger than the 
Christian analogy to the modern practices of the self. This entails that the self must labour 
under continual self-reflection in order to work on and improve itself in pursuance of the 
elusive (and unreachable) optimum. 
The telos of this process would most obviously be to ensure that individuals make 
medical decisions about their own lives, ultimately about when they find it acceptable to end 
their own lives by the refusal of life-sustaining or prolonging medical treatment. This result 
would lead to the great advantage of reducing the incidence of the governmental crisis of 
individuals whose lives can technically be sustained, but who cannot make a decision for 
themselves as to whether to refuse such treatment. Even where the decision of the individual 
is not ultimately accepted in practice, as was the case in W v M and Re E, the encouragement 
of individuals to undertake the kinds of processes which prepare them for these kinds of 
possibilities at the end of life is ultimately beneficial to state government, because it 
provides a more legitimate basis on which end-of-life decisions can be made.  
However, it has been argued here that the purpose is broader than this. As the level of 
control ceded to individuals by ADRTs is of a precarious and contingent nature, they can be 
viewed as having a broader purpose in fostering a general acceptance that individuals have 
an obligation to safeguard their own health and healthcare preferences, not only in the 
present but also in respect of future contingencies,1030 through the practices of ‘autonomous’ 
decision-making and accepts that the right to self-determination should be lost in the absence 
of capacity. This promotion of individual autonomy and choice, which underpins ADRTs, 
allows the state to extricate itself from making moral decisions on controversial subjects in 
which the state lacks the necessary knowledge and authority. 
As discussed earlier, the neoliberal turn has engendered a marketisation of knowledge 
and expertise itself. As such, there is no inherent authority in expert knowledge without 
consumer validation and similarly there is no inherent authority in the sovereign without 
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democratic backing. In this sense, ADRTs must have individual choice at their core in order 
to remain in line with advanced liberal programmes of government, but also to offer support 
to those programmes of government. Thus medical experts can be drawn upon to explain the 
potential consequences of reading the end of life without an ADRT and those with an expert 
understanding of ADRTs can provide technical advice as to how to create an ADRT that will 
be clinically effective. The use of expertise in this way is paradigmatic of modern 
governmentality’s proclivity for ‘governing at a distance’1031 and facilitates alignment of 
individual choices with programmes of government at a broader level.1032 In this way, expert 
advice can be used to promote the kinds of individual choice and active consumerism on 
which advanced liberalism depends.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to explain how ADRTs function within modern governmentalities. 
This discussion built on the work of the previous chapter on the development of modern 
governmentalities, and liberal governmentalities in particular. It was explained that modern 
liberal and advanced liberal governmentalities can be understood as operating through the 
technologies of the self (i.e. conducting the conduct of the self) and the technologies of 
government (i.e. conducting the conduct of others). The effects of ADRTs can be examined 
in these terms too, with this chapter focussing on ADRTs role within the technologies of the 
self. 
The cases of W v M and Re E were discussed in detail in order to illustrate how ADRTs 
both foster and require self-directed practices of government. It was not suggested that these 
cases are representative of the case law on ADRTs, but rather they were drawn upon to 
demonstrate the distinction an analysis grounded in governmentality and one grounded in 
traditional bioethics.  
From an orthodox bioethical standpoint it might be asked whether the autonomy of M 
and E had been given adequate respect in these cases. The failure of the ADRTs in both 
cases might suggest a negative answer. However, a governmental analysis is aimed at 
consideration not only of the effect of ADRTs, but also the kinds of practices that they 
institute. Thus, in terms of self-directed practices, both M and E expressed wishes that 
addressed their existential dispositions as they decided that they would rather forego medical 
treatment in certain circumstances rather than receive the treatment. Both purported ADRTs 
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were created as the product of certain reflective processes undertaken with an awareness of 
the possibility of being treated in a manner that neither would desire, should that treatment 
to become clinically indicated when mental capacity was lacking. In expressing their wishes 
in this manner, both M and E constituted themselves as responsible, ethical subjects, with an 
interest in their own state of health and of existence. The ultimate purpose of this form of 
self-government was to provide a clearer, more legitimate, basis for end of life decisions and 
to reduce ethical dilemmas and problematics of government at the end of life.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ADRTS AS TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The current chapter builds upon the analysis of the theoretical precepts of 
governmentality, set out in Chapter Five in examining the role played by ADRTs in the 
government of others as part of the technologies of government and the securitisation of the 
population. The idea that governmentality can operate through interplay between the 
technologies of the self and the technologies of government was discussed in chapter six.1033 
These two technological groupings operate together in an overlapping manner,1034 and to that 
extent, many practices relating to ADRTs will comprise techniques which might fit under 
both technological banners. However, in this final chapter the focus will be on the 
development and operation of ADRTs as part of the technologies of government and of 
security. The goal of this analytic approach is to situate ADRTs within a broader advanced 
liberal political project of government. As such, it can be distinguished from more 
conventional analyses of ADRTs within the fields of law and bioethics, discussed earlier in 
this thesis, which tend to emphasise the project of ethical rationalisation and development of 
a legal framework on ADRTs as part of the vindication of individual rights.  As a critical 
rejoinder to the view that ADRTs constitute legal instruments designed to enhance 
individual rights and advance the cause of the individual, it is argued in this chapter that 
ADRTs play a role among the practices aimed at shaping the conduct others as part of the 
technologies of government.1035  
Far from suggesting that individuals are required to create ADRTs, what is argued here 
is that the establishment of the possibility for individuals to take binding decisions over their 
future medical treatment, individual behaviour can be augmented and channelled. Moreover, 
it is suggested that the establishment of a framework to permit the creation of ADRTs is not 
merely aimed at individuals, but is also directed towards the population as whole.  
 
                                                     
1033 M Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ (n 952) 225; G Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and 
Techniques of the Self’ (n 682) 20 
1034 M Dean, ‘Governing the Unemployed Self in an Active Society’ (n 679) 563 
1035 M Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (n 7) 341 
 184 
 
The focus on the population is faithful to a critique couched in governmental terms, 
because as will be recalled from Chapter Four, following the ‘governmentalisation of the 
state’,1036 the population became the chief referent of government and its defining object.1037 
Such a perspective will also provide an opportunity to analyse the operation of ADRTs at a 
public health level.  
In considering ADRTs’ effects on the population, discussion will be given to the 
securitising role played by ADRTs. Security techniques, in this sense, are aimed at achieving 
a kind of homeostatic order1038 in respect of the vital processes of the population.1039 This 
part of the chapter will emphasise the emergence of ADRTs in an advanced liberal political 
rationality, which relies upon individuals who are subjectivised in a certain manner such that 
they are attuned to govern their own interests. Those who lack mental capacity at the end of 
life and whose lives could be sustained through the intervention of advanced medical 
technology are, by definition, incapable of the kind of self-government upon which 
advanced liberalism depends and therefore, at one level, the existence of such persons in 
such situations represents a ‘threat’ to the prevailing rationality of government. Foucault 
discussed the emergence of such ‘threats’ to the population in terms of racism1040 and thus 
the possibility that ADRTs effect a kind of racism will be discussed.  
In addition to the role that ADRTs can play in the government of population, it will be 
suggested that ADRTs can also be employed in the government of two additional categories 
of ‘other’. Firstly, it will be suggested that ADRTs can play a role in the government of the 
‘future self’, who was discussed in the fourth chapter, if this person can be considered as an 
entity which is separate from the present self in a sense. This discussion will offer a novel 
perspective on the problem of the ‘future self’ through an engagement with Foucault’s idea 
of the formation of subjectivities through objectification.1041 However, in order for any 
person to come to think about the future self as a kind of separate entity will often require a 
kind of intermediate governmental action at the interpersonal level. This is where experts 
can be drawn on to inform individuals and assist them in creating their own ADRTs with 
legal effect. 
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Before examining the role of ADRTs in the government of these various varieties of 
government, it is opportune to reconsider the emergence of ADRTs in light of the preceding 
discussion of governmentality. This will allow the emergence of ADRTs to be presented to 
be understood as a result of the co-emergence of a number of factors which have resulted in 
combination to a crisis of government. It will be argued that the traditional accounts, 
couched in bioethical terms, fail to take adequate account of the governmental aspects of 
ADRTs, which become visible when thinking about ADRTs in terms of their role in the 
government of others and in addressing the ‘crisis of government’,1042 which arose as the 
product of multiple factors. The object of this discussion will be to emphasise the congress 
of factors which have combined to make ADRTs possible and to distinguish the analysis 
presented here from analyses which suggest that ADRTs are to be understood as the product 
of a bioethical rationalisation and extension of the concept of autonomy.1043 Viewed as a 
crisis of government, it can be argued that one of the most significant drivers for developing 
a legal framework for ADRTs is the need to address this crisis.  
CONDITIONS OF EMERGENCE OF ADRTS 
In the second part of this thesis it was suggested that the orthodox account of the 
development of ADRTs posits that the right to create ADRTs was primarily developed as a 
relatively straightforward extension of the individual right to personal autonomy and self-
determination (those concepts being used interchangeably in medico-legal discourse).1044 
Although it is not disputed that the conceptual development and extension of autonomy has 
been important for the development of ADRTs, it should also be remembered that the 
manner of the autonomy’s conceptual development in English law has been highly contested 
and somewhat inconsistent.1045 
Many consider that the idea of autonomy has been interpreted in a ‘thin’ way, i.e. as 
being used synonymously with mere choice (as it is frequently presumed to be) in medical 
law, and thus, in a sense closely linked to ideas of ‘self-determination’, ‘empowerment’ and 
‘liberty’.1046 Assessing the recognition of ADRTs against this benchmark would suggest that 
they are a rather limited and unreliable means of ‘extending autonomy’, in this sense. There 
are a number of cases in which purported ADRTs not been upheld (because of the way they 
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have been interpreted with respect of the formalities of the MCA).1047 In addition to the 
uncertainty surrounding the court’s willingness to recognise to recognise ADRTs, there are 
important structural limitations1048 which bear upon the capacity of ADRTs to extend choice 
and empower their creators. One reason for this is that the operation of ADRTs is restricted 
to the refusal of treatment; autonomous choices requesting medical treatment are not legally 
binding per se1049 and it is unlawful to provide active euthanasia in England and Wales.1050 
It is, however, easier to identify a theoretical extension of autonomy, if a ‘thinner’ 
definition is relied upon. In terms of patient empowerment, ADRTs clearly do allow 
individuals to make pre-emptive decisions without the need to be prompted to make a 
decision by another and, in some cases, they can prevent the administration of unwanted 
treatment. Thus, the realm of individual choice is increased by ADRTs, but it is the extent to 
which ADRTs successfully force the practical adherence to individual choices which is 
limited.1051 This is why it is far easier still to identify an extension of autonomy, if autonomy 
is understood as a practice of government, than as a matter of empowerment. On such an 
understanding, ADRTs have opened up a realm of choice and concomitant individual 
responsibility through the practices of autonomy.1052 Regardless of whether those choices are 
ultimately respected, ADRTs have expanded the potential areas in which an individual may 
exercise choice and therefore the areas for which the individual may be considered 
responsible.1053 Although freedom is a sine qua non of advanced liberal modes of 
government, the individuals within such programmes of government do not have an 
unrestricted power to exercise their freedom. Their freedom is to be considered a product of 
proper cultivation of the self through subjectification and must be exercised responsibly.1054 
Negative consequences for the individual may flow from such a categorisation, but the 
existence of those who cannot function in accordance with the expectations of an advanced 
liberal system of government puts a strain on the systems of government and necessitates 
agencies to take decisions on behalf of individuals considered within the proper realm of 
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individual decision-making.1055 This strain might be experienced by other people through, 
for example the idea of the ‘burden of care’.1056 
This aspect of ADRTs may therefore play a role in the subjectivisation of individuals as 
choosing agents, enjoined to make choices and to accept responsibility for themselves.1057 
This is why, although it may seem counterintuitive (given that the word autonomy is 
suggestive of the government of the self)1058, the chief mode in which ADRTs facilitate the 
government of others is through autonomy.  
In addition to these conceptual disputes about the proper meaning of autonomy, it has 
been argued here that other factors have been equally significant in the development of 
ADRTs. The admixture of these multiple factors has resulted in a ‘crisis of governance’1059 
signified by the inadequacy of the pre-existing modes of government and the consequent 
need to find new strategies of government. Former approaches to the administration of 
treatment did not lend themselves well to the new circumstances in which people began to 
find themselves at the end of life. Consequently, in the absence of ADRTs, there was no 
clear way in which to govern the end of life that was truly faithful to the tenets of advanced 
liberalism and their inclusion of individual choice. In this section some of the significant 
factors that have driven the development of ADRTs will be discussed. In particular, it is 
suggested that the advances in the technical medical ability to sustain life, combined with an 
aging population, a financial crisis (with its implications for the funding of healthcare 
services) and the pre-eminence of the advanced liberal rationality of government have all 
been as important to the development of ADRTs as the claim that they have been developed 
pursuant to a bioethical principle.  ADRTs represent a response to this crisis of government 
that is most faithful to advanced liberal programmes of government. 
"[W]e have become so good at keeping people alive that we've succeeded in 
keeping them alive when, in biological terms, they should have been dead 
long ago."1060 
ADRTs have only entered into thought because of the advent of the technical ability to 
maintain life at low levels of functionality for extended periods using life-support 
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machines.1061 This technical capacities for sustaining life has advanced to the point that it is 
relatively common, albeit resource intensive.1062 Currently there are up to 16,000 people in 
vegetative states in the UK and up to three times as many in minimally conscious states.1063 
However, while the technical capacity to sustain life has sustained life has dramatically 
advanced, our ethical capacity to answer the question of whether, and the extent to which, 
such technical measures should be deployed has lagged woefully behind.1064 This disjuncture 
between the technical capacity to sustain life and means of legitimate decision making 
regarding the ongoing sustaining treatment has been a major factor that has influenced the 
development of ADRTs. Without such technical advances, the questions surrounding 
ADRTs would be redundant.  
Coupled with this increase in the technical capacities for sustaining life, it is significant 
that this enhanced ability to save and maintain life has arisen against a background of 
advanced liberalism.1065 These capacities have not arisen in an idealised space abstracted 
from all social and material contingencies. That is why it has been argued throughout this 
thesis that an understanding of the development and operation of ADRTs cannot be 
adequately formed in the absence of an appreciation of their historical context.1066  
A fuller discussion of the significance of the development of advanced liberalism for the 
practices of was provided in Chapter Five with reference to what Foucault termed the 
‘governmentalisation of the state’,1067 but at this stage, when focussing on the operation of 
ADRTs, it is useful to focus the analysis on the move from liberalism to advanced liberalism 
to examine how this governmental shift is reflected in the emergence of ADRTs. It will be 
recalled that liberalism is concerned with an economy of government, which demands the 
avoidance of excessive state intervention.1068 In order to achieve this, programmes of 
government must be kept under constant scrutiny through a process of problematisation.1069 
If state intervention in a particular area is deemed unnecessary, the state could withdraw and 
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leave the matter to other agencies or to the individual. Reducing state intervention over 
individuals provides the opportunity for greater levels of individual choice and therefore, if 
autonomy is taken to be a near-synonym of liberty (which it sometimes is),1070 greater 
individual autonomy too.  
By contrast, advanced liberal programmes of government are characterised by a greater 
proclivity for intervention of a certain kind. The beatified idea of ‘the natural’ gives way to 
the extolment of the market and, on this basis, legitimate interventions can be made to 
establish markets where none exists.1071 A further hallmark of the practices of advanced 
liberalism can be seen in their attempt to govern others through the employment of multiple 
agencies and techniques working together and often ‘at a distance’.1072 Achieving this ideal 
of ‘government at a distance’, advanced liberalism places a heavy reliance on (a certain kind 
of) personal autonomy and the extension of choice.1073 
A considerable discussion of the development of the concept of autonomy was provided 
in the second part of this thesis. From this it will be recalled that there has been much 
criticism of the shift towards a more individualised, ‘thin’ and choice-based conception of 
autonomy of the variety that many suggest has come to represent the predominant 
conception of personal autonomy in medical law.1074 There are various reasons why 
construing autonomy in such a way might be considered problematic in philosophical and 
bioethical terms (e.g. choice might be considered necessary but not sufficient 
justification)1075 and various reasons, underpinned by bioethical rationalities, might be found 
for suggesting that citizens ought not to have access to unrestricted choice over their own 
healthcare. Some of these reasons were highlighted in chapter three, but the acceptance of 
any alternative conception of autonomy, of the broad variety which is putatively recognised 
and which facilitates the operation of ADRTs, would place restrictions on the right of 
individuals to choose between alternatives.1076 Bioethicists might advance arguments which 
suggest that personal autonomy ought to be considered but one among a number of 
important ethical principles1077 which ought to influence decision-making. Such arguments 
have merit in bioethical circles, but viewed from the perspective of advanced liberal 
government, the difficulty with placing such restrictions on the individual ability to choose 
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lies in justifying the basis of the restriction. Such restrictions must not only be justified with 
respect to bioethical principles, but also with reference to the tenets of the political 
rationalities which prevail in the government of society.  
As mentioned, one of the senses in which it has been argued that the concept of 
autonomy is (mis)used is where it is equated with liberty1078 in the sense of conflating a 
greater level of autonomy with a greater freedom from the intervention of government. 
However, this is certainly not the kind of autonomy that Rose and others associate with 
advanced liberalism. Indeed “[p]ersonal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, 
but a key term in its exercise.”1079 More autonomy does not mean less government, rather it 
means government of a different kind. Autonomy here is a call to become an active citizen 
and far from freeing the individual from government it operates as one of the most important 
means by which people are governed in advanced liberal programmes of government. The 
challenge lies in seeking to align the conduct of autonomous individuals towards a particular 
strategic end.1080 From this this perspective, according subjects a kind of decision-making 
capacity and responsibility is well-aligned with the objective of ‘governing at a distance’1081 
and through the practices of autonomy.1082 
Thus, under advanced liberal programmes of government, individual citizens are not 
merely to be understood as passive agents, awaiting direction; nor are they to be considered 
to possess an inherent, natural, kind of autonomy as assumed in classical liberalism.1083 
Instead individuals are to be made into (or subjectivised as)1084 active nodes of government, 
who are both subject to, and complicit in, the practices of government pertaining to 
themselves and others.1085 Within advanced liberal rationalities of government, therefore, the 
idea of autonomy does not simply entail the right to make decisions on questions posed by 
others. It additionally demands individuals taking an active approach in the management of 
their interests, by making decisions for themselves, supported by experts whose role 
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becomes more advisory than directive. Citizens are formed into agents1086 who are not only 
capable of choice but who are expected to make choices for themselves1087 in the furtherance 
of their own interests, because they are deemed to be in the best position to assess their own 
interests. They are to become, as Foucault suggested homines oeconomini:1088 i.e. individuals 
concerned with maximising their own interests through their own choices, expected to act as 
“entrepreneurs of themselves”.1089  
However, mental incapacity exposes an important limitation on the extent to which 
individual choice can be relied upon, because individuals who lack mental capacity are 
incapable of self-government (in respect of specific areas of decision-making) and therefore 
cannot adhere to the standards of homo economicus and the demands the demands of 
advanced liberalism. The MCA does provide a safeguard in such situations for individuals 
who are unable to govern themselves in the form of best interests treatment interventions, 
but such interventions are problematic because of the imperative of modern governmentality 
that the state is only permitted to intervene to ensure individuals can pursue their own 
interests, rather than defining those interests.1090 Although the best interests test allows for 
different interests to be considered, there can be no guidance on the relative weightings to be 
given to those competing interests.  
The alternative to making end-of-life decisions based on ADRTs is for decisions to be 
made on behalf of individuals. While this is possible, and in some sense inevitable 
(particularly in respect of children), it is generally considered as a something to be avoided 
from the perspective of advanced liberal government. Famously, Adam Smith noted that the 
restrictions on the activity of the state were not simply the result of State ignorance,1091 but 
its lack of capacity to know.1092 Expertise cannot be relied on as a source of authority 
because expertise itself is open to question and thus the idea of the individual being the best 
judge of their own interests and homines oeconomini,1093 is closely associated with advanced 
liberal government.1094 The development of this rationality of government has led to the 
                                                     
1086 see I Hacking, ‘Making up People’ (n 882) 
1087 NS Rose, Governing the Soul (n 673) 231; K Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (n 8) 42 
1088 M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (n 674) 225-226; TH Hamann, ‘Neoliberalism, 
Governmentality, and Ethics’ (2009) Foucault Studies 37 
1089 M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (n 674) 226; J Read (n 1084); NS Rose, Governing the Soul 
(n 673) 230; C Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’ (n 689) 41 
1090 M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (n 674) 271–286 
1091 See also Hayek, 1988, 77 cited in MH Nadesan (n 751) 30 
1092 M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (n 674) 280-284 
1093 ibid 225-226 
1094 TH Hamann, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics’ (n 1088)  
 192 
 
commodification of expertise and the presentation of new challenges to expert authority.1095 
Such challenges are especially noticeable in respect of medical practice, where, despite an 
ongoing deferential disposition towards medical practitioners,1096 the authority of 
practitioners, is confronted by the practices of empowered, health consumers,1097 even 
‘expert patients’,1098 and the courts have shown a greater willingness to draw sharper 
boundaries around the areas in which medical expertise holds sway.1099 
The facilitation of ADRTs offers the solution to this dilemma which is most faithful to 
the precepts of advanced liberalism in that it affords individuals the opportunity to make 
future decisions for themselves in an absence of any other clear and legitimate source 
authority regarding the profoundly difficult question1100 of precisely when life-sustaining 
measures should cease or be withdrawn. In the age of empowered patients, such a question 
cannot be reduced to a technical matter to be left to the medical profession.1101  
The challenges presented by the technical capacities and political environment as 
described, have been heightened by demographic changes1102 being experienced in the 
United Kingdom (and other countries such as the United States),1103 often referred to as the 
aging population, which mean that a large proportion of the population is approaching the 
end of life.1104 Impetus is thus added to the need for a satisfactory resolution to this crisis of 
government.  To put this in more specific terms, there has been a considerable increase in 
the number of citizens of pensionable age relative to those of working-age in the population. 
This change may be to a large extent attributable to the surge in the birth rate during the 
post-war ‘baby boom’ years, combined with a trend, in subsequent years towards lower 
fertility rates.1105 The overall effect is that there is high frequency of people within the baby 
boomer generation relative to other generations and as the baby boomers become eligible for 
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retirement the ‘dependency ratio’ (i.e. simpliciter the number of working adults divided by 
the number of non-working persons)1106 is forecast to increase over the coming decades.  
This demographic change is important for a number of reasons germane to the 
development of the law on ADRTs. One is that the elderly demographic puts specific 
demands on the health service, particularly in respect of the increased costs associated with 
caring for people with age-related health conditions, such as dementia. The cost of providing 
care for dementia patients in England alone is set to increase from £15Bn in 2007 to a 
conservative estimate of £26Bn by 20261107 the cost including “real pay and price effect” 
could be £34.79Bn and that estimate rests on the assumption that among this population of 
dementia sufferers, that will increase from 580,000 to 940,000 there will be no loss in rates 
of employment.1108 Although it is much harder to accurately quantify the increase in health 
and social care costs than the increase in pension costs1109 (discussed below) concerns have 
been raised that the likely increases in health and social care costs will create a “substantial 
economic”1110 burden on the UK.  
In addition, those who fall within the elderly demographic are likely to approach the end 
of their lives and will require end-of-life medical treatment in the medium term. It has been 
suggested that “…a significant proportion of healthcare expenditure on an individual is 
concentrated at the end of life”,1111 which has been estimated to amount to around 25% of 
total health costs.1112 This spending is not directly related to people living longer, but the fact 
that more people are living for longer means that there are many people who are 
approaching the end of their lives and thus mortality rates are predicted to increase sharply 
in the coming years.1113 The significance of these increased costs must be read together with 
the fourth condition that has prompted the emergence of ADRTs: the financial crisis. 
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Fourthly, the collapse of Lehman Bros in 20081114 saw the beginning of one of the 
greatest crises of capitalism since the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The fallout from this event 
has caused great and enduring economic pressure globally. Notwithstanding the magnitude 
of this shock to the economic system, the logic of capitalist realism1115 has remained 
apparently unassailable. In that spirit the response of the UK government was to attempt to 
reassure the financial markets of its creditworthiness by reducing its rate of borrowing by 
cutting public spending as part of a ‘deficit reduction programme’.1116 This has meant that all 
government departments have been under pressure to significantly reduce their expenditure.  
This imperative towards ‘austerity’ measures has coincided with the emergence of additional 
costs posed by the ‘aging population’ i.e. the increasing numbers of people in the eldest 
portion of the demographic relative to the rest. One of the most important cost pressures 
arising from an aging population is the increase in pension costs from the increased number 
of people who become eligible for state pension benefits.1117Consequently, even to maintain 
present levels of pension-age-related benefits will require additional public spending.1118 
A considerable portion of overall social security spending in the UK currently goes on 
the payment of pensions and other benefits to the retired population (e.g. the ‘winter fuel 
payment’).1119 For the financial year 2011/2012 pensions accounted for the single greatest 
part of government expenditure at £129Bn, above even the healthcare (at £124Bn) part of 
which will also be consumed by the retired population.1120 The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(“IFS”) have acknowledged that the aging population will put a strain on the money 
available for other departments.1121  
These suggested changes funding changes for social care will not, however, address the 
significant systemic problem of having a healthcare system oriented towards the provision of 
acute care rather than long-term social care that enables people to live independently for 
longer.1122 Such a large scale reconfiguration of an organisation the size of the NHS is likely 
to be a very costly exercise. As a result of all of these financial headwinds, there is more 
pressure than ever to rationalise the provision of healthcare in order to ensure the best value 
                                                     
1114 D Harvey, The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism (Profile 2010) 
1115 see MR Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Zero Books 2009) 16-17  
1116 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pfg_deficit_reduction.htm accessed 11/09/2011 
1117 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=949 [accessed 6/7/2011]; D Demery, and NW 
Duck, ‘Demographic Change and the UK Savings Rate’ (2006) 38(2) Applied Economics 119, 119 
1118 M Mrsnik, DT Beers and I Morozov, Global Aging 2010: An Irreversible Trend (Standard & 
Poor’s Global Credit Portal RatingsDirect, 2010) 
1119 https://www.gov.uk/winter-fuel-payment/overview [accessed 17/01/2014] 
1120 http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/breakdown [accessed 11/09/2011] 
1121 Institute for Fiscal Studies A Survey of Public Spending in the UK (Briefing Note, 2009) 44 
1122 R Humphries, Paying for Social Care: Beyond Dilnot (King’s Fund, 2013) 3 
 195 
 
for money. As a consequence, unnecessarily elongated hospital stays and unnecessary 
medical treatment (and even perhaps unnecessary legal processes concerning the provision 
of treatment treatment)1123 are all to be avoided in the name of efficiency and cost savings. It 
reportedly costs around £122K to provide treatment and care for a PVS patient.1124 For 
patients in vegetative states and minimally conscious states, there is a requirement under a 
Practice Direction1125 to seek declaratory relief from the Court prior to the withdrawal of 
treatment. This process is said to cost £122K per patient based on a nine months of medical 
treatment and legal expenses.  
The pressures of an aging population, at a time of fiscal austerity combined with the 
technical capacity to sustain life at low levels of functionality, at the level of “anatomy in 
motion”,1126 for ever longer periods without an obvious sense of when such treatment should 
cease1127 and the demands of an advanced liberal rationality of government provide scope for 
arguing that we ought to be wary of placing too much reliance on the traditional rationale 
presented for the introduction of ADRTs: i.e. that they have been introduced pursuant to a 
process of ethical rationalisation in extending the well-recognised right of personal 
autonomy into the future. Instead, it is argued that the establishment of the legal framework 
for creating ADRTs is better viewed as part of a governmental strategy aimed at addressing 
the crisis of government arising through the convergence of multiple factors.  
None of this, however, is to deny the importance of ethical argumentation in the 
development of the legal framework on ADRTs, or to suggest that ADRTs cannot extend 
autonomy (although, as discussed, the answer to this very much depends on way this term is 
defined). Certainly there have been cases in which individuals have expressed wishes not to 
be provided with treatment and ultimately have been provided with treatment.1128 Such cases 
demonstrate that ADRTs do not guarantee that express wishes will be honoured or acted 
upon in future. However, there have also been cases in which the courts have been more 
willing to recognise prior wishes as ADRTs even where it appears that the wishes have not 
been expressed in full compliance with the formality requirements.1129 Indeed, as was argued 
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in the previous chapter, ADRTs can be viewed enjoining individuals to undertake certain 
practices on themselves by way of self-government and in this sense do extend autonomy.  
Moreover, affording individuals the possibility to create ADRTs makes visible the end 
of life, through the provision of the opportunity to exercise immediate choice to safeguard 
against future eventualities. However, the kind of end of life decisions which can be made 
through ADRTs are heavily constrained in a manner designed to resolve otherwise difficult 
decisions about the continuation of end-of-life care by the MCA. As such, at the level of the 
population, ADRTs tend towards rendering the end of life more predictable and the 
decisions taken at the end of life more legitimate.  
Having drawn together the most prominent factors that have led to the establishment of 
ADRTs, we can better understand the emergence of ADRTs as a response to a crisis of 
government (i.e. an emergent state of affairs with which the pre-existing mechanisms of 
government failed to address) rather than merely as the logical extension of a pre-existing 
right. As was discussed in the previous chapter, part of the exploration of the involvement of 
ADRTs in the practices of government demands consideration of their operation as 
technologies of the self, but another part of this exploration must include a consideration of 
their role within the technologies of government. This will be the work of the following 
section in exploring the concept of the technologies of government.  
THE TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNMENT 
The concept of a ‘technology’ was described in the previous chapter vis-à-vis the 
technologies of the self. As part of this discussion it should be remembered that the term 
‘technology’ is to be understood as a term of art in governmental analyses. Foucault spoke 
of four ‘main technologies’, which he held to be as technologies of ‘production’, ‘sign 
systems’, ‘power’ and technologies ‘of the self’.1130 However, this list may not have been 
intended to be exhaustive and it has been argued that there are many technologies that can be 
identified, which, of itself, presents challenges for the concept of a technology.1131 It is 
therefore a term which may be accorded a relatively broad meaning in relating to matters 
such as “the technical assembly of a means of judgement… the techniques of reformation 
and cure… the apparatus within which an intervention is to take place”.1132 On this 
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understanding, the concept of a technology houses techniques, technēs,1133 apparatus and 
groupings, which can be put to use for the purposes of government. They “form a crucial 
nexus between the study of forms of knowledge and the ‘regimes of practices’”.1134 
Construed in this way, they are the inverse of the political rationalities, which aim to 
translate realities into thought.1135   
Technologies of government should not, however, be considered merely as instrumental 
means employed by government aimed at achieving a particular result.1136 They also have a 
role in establishing and shaping the various normative positions including “who we are or 
what we would like to become”, 1137 which are to be operationalised. In this way they might 
not only be thought of in terms of directly causing intended outcomes, but also as 
establishing the spaces in which more generalised aims can take shape. This might include 
the establishment of multiple bodies and technical operations which are brought together in 
common cause. In relation to accountancy, for example, Miller describes the creation of 
‘calculable spaces’, which make “visible the hierarchical arrangement of persons and 
things.”1138  
The argument in this chapter is that the recognition of ADRTs both relies upon and 
gives rise to, techniques which fall within the broad category of the ‘technologies of 
government’. This is to say that ADRTs comprise and require techniques which seek to 
shape behaviour, thought and decisions i.e. techniques which govern (i.e. ‘conduct the 
conduct of’)1139 others. These techniques and practices rely on a loose alignment of multiple 
bodies and agencies as an assemblage of power.1140 The law must be disseminated to 
individuals who might wish to create an ADRT, which can be achieved through arms of the 
state government (e.g. the Department of Health), organisations such as health authorities, 
medical practitioners, carers, lawyers, media organisations and charities with an interest in 
matters at the end of life (following training from their respective professional bodies).1141 In 
order to create an ADRT, individuals may require the support of advocates, such as 
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IMCAs,1142 or interpreters. ADRTs may then have to be interpreted and assessed by carers, 
medical practitioners and ultimately by the courts. All of these bodies, and many more 
besides, must operate together in order to offer the mere possibility of individuals being able 
to make legally binding decisions about their future healthcare.  
Thinking about ADRTs in this way invites us to consider how they may be employed, 
not only for the individual to govern their own future, but how others might be governed 
though facilitating this possibility of creating self-directed legislation. Having provided a 
definition of the technologies of government and suggested why ADRTs might have a role 
within this category of government, the next task is to define the target of ADRTs qua 
practices of government i.e. the question of the identity of the other who is to be governed 
through ADRTs. It is to this task that we now turn.  
THREE OTHERS OF GOVERNED BY ADRTS  
Making the case for recognising the operation of ADRTs as part of the technologies of 
government requires a definition of the objects to be governed. Mirroring the broad 
distinction between the technologies of the self and the technologies of government, ‘the 
other’ might be crudely defined as any entity apart from the self. However, at first blush, it 
might be thought a strain to interpret ADRTs as having a role in the government of others 
when they appear to be eminently self-oriented instruments: as set out in the first chapter 
ADRTs are created by the self, for the self, in a self-elected manner and without prompting 
or direction from the medical profession or any third party. Appearances aside, it is argued 
here that ADRTs do play a role in contemporary society in the government of others and 
they might be regarded as governing three categories of other: the population, the ‘future 
self’, and the interpersonal other. These different categories of other will be considered in 
turn. 
THE POPULATION 
“…[M]edicine is a social practice, and only one of its aspects is 
individualistic and valorizes the relations between the doctor and the 
patient”1143  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the orthodox view of the development of ADRTs in 
law and bioethics centres on the individual, a person who’s right to personal autonomy ought 
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logically to extend to decisions about her future healthcare.1144 Some have suggested that the 
development of autonomy which underpins ADRTs, is based on a political project that 
sought to empower patients and problematised the extent of medical control patients and 
sought to limit medical power and the legitimation of legal regulation of the area.1145 Here, 
however, a more complex narrative is provided in asserting that ADRTs have an additional 
role vis-à-vis in respect of the population (man-as-species).1146 This involves paying 
attention to the general tendencies of the law on ADRTs in society, rather than to the effect 
it has in individual cases. Rather than simply seeking to establish the legitimate bounds of 
individual decision making in respect of future healthcare and how to construct a legal 
framework to best protect their wishes, an additional can be identified in respect of what the 
effects the system of ADRTs might have at the level of the population.  Such a consideration 
is crucially important in the context of a governmental analysis, because Foucault made 
repeated reference to the fact that the population became the “end and instrument of”1147 
government during the Eighteenth Century, such that all governmental interventions must be 
refer to the population in some way.1148 And although we have moved beyond the pitting of 
populations against one another for the purposes of expanding the interests of the state, there 
is still an interest creating the conditions under which the population can flourish. In order to 
better appreciate how ADRTs might be concerned with the government of the population, it 
is useful to consider the idea of ‘biopower’.1149 
BIOPOLITICS AND BIOPOWER 
“What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to 
improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, 
and its health.”1150 
Foucault’s work on governmentality and the governmentalisation of the state was set out 
in detail earlier in this thesis.1151 This discussion charted the shifts in power relations and 
strategies of government that occurred in western society, driven by the various crises of 
government that periodically emerged. Foucault devoted considerable attention to the 
changes of this kind that took place in the Eighteenth Century with the advent of modernity 
and the industrial revolution. As a result of these changes, the state became acephalous and 
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the role of sovereignty was changed,1152 and was offset by the new practices of government 
and security that emerged.1153 The most important impetus behind these changes in power 
relations was the recognition of the population as a collective body, man-as-species.1154 
Following this recognition, it was the population, rather than the state, which came to 
represent the central object of government. The need to govern this new body brought with it 
a need to develop knowledges for the monitoring and protection of the population. 
Historically, this need was addressed in different ways. Prussia pioneered 
Staatswissenschaft1155 and enforceable public health measures through the 
Medizinischepolizei1156 that could be activated in order to intervene in the population with 
the goal of protecting and improving health. The ultimate goal of this police action aimed at 
the improvement of health was to strengthen the state powers as part of the raison d’état.1157 
A more liberal approach was developed in England, which did not seek to secure these 
policies through a police model, but rather operated through, techniques such as the 
recording of the rates of births and deaths.1158 This approach was directed towards fostering 
the population, for the sake of the population (rather than to strengthen the state).1159  Since 
then, numerous public health programmes have been developed incorporating different 
strategies and focussing on different aspects of health (e.g. restrictions on the availability of 
tobacco and alcohol, encouragement to lead active lifestyles and eat a certain quantity of 
fruit and vegetables), but all of which are aimed at the maintenance and production of a 
healthy population. 
The development of these practices of government was identified by Foucault as a new 
form of power called biopower, “a continuous, scientific power to make live”,1160 which 
could be exercised both on and through bodies, both individual and collective.1161 
Unfortunately the term biopower was used almost interchangeably with the ‘biopolitics’ in 
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Foucault’s work, which has produced some ambiguity of meaning.1162 Some have developed 
particular readings of biopower based on an idea of the domination and oppression of certain 
groups among the population (e.g. Agamben, Hardt and Negri),1163 but others tend to view 
this form of power as a productive force, entailing “modes of subjection”, “strategies for 
intervention” and “truth discourses about the ‘vital’ character of living human beings”.1164  
On this understanding, biopower can be juxtaposed with the idea of sovereignty. 
Sovereign power has always been concerned with the end of life (and particularly ending 
life),1165 and was always exercised at the discretion of the sovereign.1166 Biopower, by 
contrast, is not merely concerned with the end of life, but brings all of the processes of life, 
from its inception to conclusion, within its purview.1167 It operates in the opposite direction 
to sovereign power in ‘making live’ rather than killing, but does not exclude the existence of 
sovereign power, which still underlies the productive forces of biopower.1168 
It is significant that biopower co-emerged with the political rationality of liberalism.1169 
Liberalism, as an art of government,1170 drew much from the discourse of political 
economy,1171 which centres on a continual questioning of the actions of government in order 
that they may be minimised and confined to their most expedient. Biopower applies this 
logic to biological processes in what might be considered as a kind of economic government 
of life.  
The liberal rationality of government sought, above all, to protect ‘the natural’, as its 
“permanent correlate”.1172 So much so, that the safeguarding of ‘natural processes’1173 (e.g. 
births, deaths, the economy)1174 became a governmental priority through practices of 
security, wherein the corpus of society was to be safeguarded threats both internal and 
external.1175 This proscription of state intervention in natural processes emerged alongside a 
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greater recognition for individual autonomy, as a requisite of liberalism and the need for the 
means to create individuals that do not need to be governed by others, but who "will govern 
themselves, master themselves, care for themselves"1176  through their own freedom.1177 
Two of the fundamental constitutive components of the practices of biopower are 
discipline and security.1178 Discipline is of a venerable ancestry and was used to mould 
individual bodies long before the processes of governmentalisation of the state took shape in 
earnest during the Eighteenth Century.1179 Discipline is a kind of power that operates 
centripetally, with a tendency to break down, focus on smaller and smaller zones, whether 
spatial (e.g. within the barracks, or the school) or temporal (e.g. the precise time for morning 
prayers in the monastery), of normalised action.1180  The exercise of discipline was visible in 
the actions of state institutions,1181 who performed disciplinary techniques as part of an 
‘anatomo-politics’1182  on individual bodies in order to make them docile and useful.1183 The 
importance of these kinds of disciplinary practices increased through their symbiotic 
relationship with the ‘governmental forces’, which were established following the 
displacement of sovereignty (as discussed above).1184  
In contrast to a deductive modus operandi that was characteristic of the exercise of 
sovereignty,1185 techniques of security involved the construction of “regulatory controls”1186 
to guard the populational ‘milieu’1187 against perceived ‘internal threats’.1188 This is achieved 
through the “gentle shaping of reality” rather than the establishment of prohibitions.1189 
These regulatory techniques may also be contrasted with the operation of disciplinary power 
being centrifugal,1190 spreading out to reach the entire population and rather than being 
concerned with the analytical minutiae, focussing on generalities and equilibrium (or 
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homeostasis).1191 The ‘biopower’ that emerged, pertains to a form of power inherently bound 
up with the vital processes of bodies both individual and collective. This kind of operation of 
the government of others through the practices of biopower allows the reach of government 
to be extended into far more intimate aspects of life than was previously possible under 
disciplinary regimes.1192 The expansive reach of biopower can be seen in the establishment 
of a legal framework on ADRTs. 
Thus far, the development of ADRTs has been characterised as the legal manifestation 
of a process of normative rationalisation of the individual right to refuse treatment, grounded 
in ideas of autonomy and self-determination. By contrast, construing ADRTs as a form of 
biopolitcial intervention encourages attention to be paid to the shift in the operation of 
sovereign power which occurred as part of the “governmentalisation of the state”1193 and the 
shift in the manner of interaction between ADRTs and the population.  
As discussed in previous chapters, the considerable obstacles to drafting an ADRT that 
will ultimately be viewed as being both valid and applicable, highlighted in previous 
chapters, limit the capacity of ADRTs to deliver predictable outcomes at the end of life at 
the level of the individual. 1194 However, taking a more generalised view at the level of the 
population, may allow for a more “gentle shaping”1195 of end-of-life processes. This could 
help to increase the predictability of decisions at the end of life. As ‘inscription devices’,1196 
they draw out information about the individual’s end of life decisions through impelling 
their creators to state the state the kind of decisions they would like to take in circumstances 
that they specify. This kind of knowledge facilitates the practices of government at the end-
of-life. As a consequence, ADRTs may strengthen the population and the possibility of 
governing through advanced liberal practices, through relieving some of the difficulties 
associated with making end-of-life decisions on behalf of others.  
One of the ways that ADRTs facilitate the government of the population is through their 
tendency towards the legitimisation and regularisation of medical intervention at the end of 
life. In facilitating refusals of treatment medical treatment at the end of life, ADRTs offer 
one possibility for resolving dilemma of when to cease the provision of medical treatment at 
the end of life and consequently provide one way of regulating the extent of life-saving and 
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life-sustaining medical intervention at the end of life. The strategies of subjectivity which 
valorise homo œconomicus invite prudent and responsible individuals1197 to predict and 
make provision for their end-of-life interests. The simple provision of a framework for 
creating such decisions marks out end-of-life decision-making as an appropriate zone of 
individual decision making, and consequently, a zone of individual responsibility. The legal 
framework for ADRTs will tend towards an increasing visibility and intelligibility of 
possible medical interventions at the end of life for the population. Consequently, the 
tendency of the framework on ADRTs, together with other strategies of government (e.g. 
Quality adjusted life years (“QUALYs”)1198, increasing rights over where a person will die) 
should tend towards an increase in the predictability of end of life care in a homeostatic 
manner1199 characteristic of the practices of security.  
It is opportune to reemphasise the function of ADRTs in that they are simply devices for 
refusing treatment. The possibility of refusing treatment in advance through ADRTs extends 
the range of people who may consider end of life treatment beyond those who are 
immediately confronted by such decisions. As ADRTs can be formed by any member of the 
adult population, because all individuals in society are susceptible1200 to losing mental 
capacity in circumstances in which their lives could be extended through medical 
intervention.  
Granting individuals the right to make ADRTs might be seen as ceding a degree of 
sovereign power in that the individual becomes the master of her own date of expiry.1201 
However, a closer examination of the restrictions in the framing of the law1202some of the 
more contentious decisions that have been reported on ADRTs from the court of 
protection1203suggest that the true amount of control that has been ceded is far from 
complete.1204  A level of residual sovereignty becomes visible at the point of interpretation of 
an ADRT. Although the creator of an ADRT has total discretion in stating the kinds of 
medical treatment they can refuse and the circumstances under which that refusal is to take 
effect. The refusal to uphold a purported ADRT aimed at refusing life sustaining treatment 
on the grounds that it is not applicable or is lacking in validity could be seen as an act of 
sovereignty, because the consequences of such an interpretation would be to make the author 
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of the ADRT live (if accompanied by a best interests assessment), while the recognition of a 
valid and applicable ADRT is tantamount to letting the individual die.1205 This expression of 
sovereignty is masked by the ADRT and the idea that it offers a degree of legitimation for 
the decisions taken.  
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the general tendency for individuals to live longer 
lives is a well-documented phenomenon in England and wales (and in the west more 
generally). Historically, one of objectives of government was to simply increase lifespan in 
the population,1206 and, in terms of that objective, the increased life-expectancy now enjoyed 
by so many is an achievement to celebrate. However, in more recent times, the effectiveness 
of the strategies for increasing lifespan have coincided with the demographic swell created 
by the large-scale repopulation which occurred following the Second World War as the 
elderly population has grown. Some fear that this has created an imbalance in society, with a 
greater ‘dependency ratio’ between those who are capable of gainful employment and those 
who are not. In this sense, the increasing success of medical intervention at the end of life is 
at once “a cause for celebration”1207 and a cause for concern as the ethical guidance on the 
deployment of these life sustaining treatments has lagged behind the scientific achievements, 
which have made it possible to extend ever further.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The strategy of facilitating ADRTs does not ostensibly compel any individual or part of 
the demographic to refuse treatment or to make an ADRT, but enabling that option will 
naturally tend towards more refusals of treatment being made at the level of the population. 
Moreover, unlike Ulysses contracts,1208 ADRTs in English law are specific in respect of the 
event that will trigger their application and in respect of the group of persons to whom they 
apply viz those who have lost mental capacity for particular decisions. It so happens that 
those who lack capacity at the end of life are precisely the group that is unable to be 
governed in accordance with the advanced liberal orthodoxy of governing through 
autonomy.1209   
As discussed above, the realisation that those who lack capacity at the end of life present 
such a difficulty to a system of government based on advanced liberalism and that ADRTs 
are targeted to take effect against this group is suggestive of a certain rational alignment of 
government through ADRTs. However, the legislative identification of a group of society 
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who may wish to consider the possibility of refusing life sustaining treatment accords with 
Foucault’s counterintuitive conceptualisation of racism as an aspect of government that 
emerged with the biopower.   
Foucault discussed racism during his lectures at the Collège de France, but particularly 
in Abnormal1210 and in Society Must be Defended.1211 In this discussion he departed from 
more conventional understandings of racism based on race and ethnicity,1212 as he did not 
define race in biological or ethnographical terms. Consequently, his interest in racism 
centred not on the attitudes and activities that accompanied a period of European colonial 
expansion, (indeed this was an aspect of racism that he neglected),1213 but rather as arising 
from the recognition of the population and the need for government to orient itself towards 
the protection of the population through the identification of persons and groups which 
threaten its flourishing. It was the need to protect the population which made possible the 
categorisation of groups of people being categorised as ‘threats’ to the whole population.1214  
Racist rationalities go further than merely establishing and identifying different 
categories of people. It further suggests that those who can be categorised as threats are to be 
‘killed’ for the protection or the betterment of the population as a whole further to the ends 
of government.1215 However, particular care must be taken at this juncture to appreciate that, 
in Foucault’s usage of the term, ‘killing’ does not necessarily mean killing in a literal sense. 
In addition to the actual ending of life it also includes the exposure of a person to the mere 
risk of death. 
In Society Must be Defended Foucault drew a link between racism, which relies on this 
kind of killing, and biopower.1216 An analytical distinction is made between the operation of 
biopower, wherein the governor aims to foster the health and wellbeing of the populational 
stock1217 and ‘internal racism’, which seeks to draw distinction between the worthy from the 
unworthy lives.1218 That is, the ability to “introduce a break in the domain of life that is 
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under power’s control”1219 between those whose lives should be supported and those who 
should be ‘let to die’. Thus, the idea of ‘killing’ certain sections of the population is not only 
to be identified in the starkest events of mass slaughter, such as the Holocaust, but is also to 
be found in the outwardly innocuous public health decisions which allow some sections of 
society to be exposed to a greater risk of death (e.g. through environmental hazards or crime) 
or through the control of reproduction (e.g. through sterilisation and abortion services).1220  
Another way to approach the identification of ‘internal threats’, would be to give further 
thought to the functional foundations of advanced liberal programmes of government and, in 
particular, their reliance on individuals acting ‘autonomously’, or in a way that is self-
directed, self-determined and responsible. 1221 However, there are sections of the population 
that cannot fulfil these responsibilities. They then present difficulties to the functioning of 
this entire rationality of government. This state of affairs means that decisions which ought 
to be made by the individual (in accordance with the advanced liberal rationality) must be 
made by another party. However, making decisions on behalf of those who cannot make 
decisions for themselves raises a tension within the advanced liberal rationality of 
government, which eschews the dictating of values, other than the obligation to choose.  
Crucially, both ADRTs, and the MCA more generally, are aimed precisely this 
‘ungovernable’ group. Those who can no longer participate as agents within a liberal system 
of government, which depends, as it does, upon individuals making independent, self-
determined decisions. Their inability to make choices stymies the operation of this kind of 
government because those who cannot be taught to govern themselves though their own free 
will fall outside the type of population that can be governed. Moreover, while death may not 
be the optimal result for such individuals, it could still be viewed as being consistent with 
the traditional bio-political goal of maximising wellbeing at the populational level,1222 if that 
were to mean more resources freed up to support those who remain economically active, or 
for the provision of other healthcare resources. By way of example, a recent piece of 
research has analysed the cost of the process of seeking court approval for the withdrawal of 
medical treatment from PVS patients, not simply in terms of the sterling quantum, but also 
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in terms of the number of quality adjusted life years (“QUALYs”) the process would 
cost.1223 
The incidence of people to falling into this category (i.e. being at the end life and lacking 
mental capacity) is set to increase as a result of the UK’s demographic changes noted above 
and this arguably represents not merely a growing mass of individual dilemmas regarding 
end of life treatment, but also a threat to the management of the population, arising from 
within, at the end of life. An appreciation of ADRTs in terms of their alleviation of decision 
making and governmental dilemmas at the end of life presents them as devices which are not 
merely directed to address individual dilemmas, but also the kinds of dilemma posed for 
society more generally. In bioethical parlance, we might say that this perspective emphasises 
the operation of ADRTs as public health interventions.   
This analysis of ADRTs, as practices of government directed towards the population, 
can be contrasted with the more traditional analyses of ADRTs as medico-legal interventions 
aimed at the protection and vindication of individual rights at an individual level. That is, 
where individuals carefully consider their own circumstances and values, and decide 
whether they would wish to be kept alive in those circumstances. This analysis does not 
deny the association of ADRTs with individuals making decisions in accordance with their 
own preferences, but rather it is to suggest that the framework which enables the creation of 
ADRTs has also been shaped in such a way as to enable the government of the population as 
a form of ‘other’.  
ADRTS AND BIOPOWER – RETURN OF THE KING? 
At this juncture, an apparent contradiction must be confronted. Biopower, by nature, is a 
productive force. By contrast, the racism described in the previous section, is 
paradigmatically deductive in that it is enforced through killing. How, therefore, does the 
ethos of biopolitics sit with the deductive operation of racism? 
Having considered Foucault’s discussion on racism, a view can be taken that the 
biopolitical objective of fostering the population need not entail the preservation of each of 
the lives of its constituents. Indeed, there are some lives which, according to Foucault, come 
to be characterised as ‘threats’ to the rest of society through neoracist discourse, in that they 
harm the general prosperity of society.1224 Far from fostering these lives, the ‘proper 
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management’ of the population requires that these lives are brought to an end, or simply not 
supported and exposed to a greater risk of death. Such action could be taken in the name of 
reducing the purported harm caused by the ‘threat’, but it can also be taken in order to foster 
a sense of core identity among the population which is to be fostered.1225 
This mode of thought was writ large in Nazi ideology. The idea that the German Volk 
was a superior to all other races and peoples was manufactured by the and, at the same time; 
those who were not deemed to belong to Volk were portrayed as threat to the prosperity of 
the nation.1226 Propaganda purported to show the cost of educating ‘normal’ children and 
children with disabilities to suggest that there was an increased financial cost associated with 
bringing up children with disabilities which would be borne by the German state. Such logic 
could have been taken directly from Rudolf Goldscheid, who drew analogy between the 
safeguarding of the population, in this way, and the rearing of farmyard animals, wherein the 
whole farm suffers from animals that are sick and non-productive.1227  
This taking of life is traditionally associated with the exercise of sovereign power. As 
discussed above, this is a form of power that Foucault describes as having been displaced 
between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth centuries as part of the so-called ‘governmentalisation 
of the state’.1228 In speaking of the displacement of sovereign power, Foucault maintained 
the view that the King’s head has not been entirely severed and thereby hinted at a 
continuing role for sovereignty in modern society.1229 Having suggested a role for 
sovereignty persisted in the modern era, Foucault, nevertheless, left the precise nature of its 
role tantalisingly undefined. Many commentators have since sought to theorise the role of 
sovereignty (and the law with which it is bound)1230 in contemporary society. 
One of the best known, and most provocative, accounts of the function of sovereignty in 
modern society is offered by Giorgio Agamben. Among others, his thesis draws on the work 
of Karl Schmitt, who suggested that the sovereign can be identified as the person who can 
suspend the ordinary operation of law and define ‘states of exception’ 
(Ausnahmezustände).1231 Individuals within these states of exception lose the rights afforded 
to ordinary citizens and come to be recognised as mere biological entities. Agamben invokes 
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the ancient roman character, Homo Sacer, as an example of a person who could be stripped 
of their political rights as a citizen by the sovereign and reduced to the animal status of a 
‘bare life’ that could be killed but not sacrificed.1232 A more recent example, upon which 
Agamben draws heavily, is that of the concentration camp. Those tortured and murdered in 
such camps were stripped of their humanity. The atrocities carried out within the camps, as 
part of the Holocaust, were facilitated by the designation of spaces in which the normal 
order and ordinary rights could be suspended for particular groups.1233  
Importantly, those examples are not merely to be viewed as egregious historical 
phenomena; rather they are presented to advance an argument about the general nature and 
function of sovereignty. Consequently, the idea of the creation of ‘states of exception’ is a 
practice that Agamben views as taking place within modern forms of liberal government as 
well as within murderous totalitarian regimes. Moreover, Agamben claims that there has 
been a pervasive reliance on the technique of generating exceptions and that this practice has 
developed to the extent that states of exception have been blended into the normal order:  
“instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the 
exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is 
originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to 
coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and 
inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible 
indistinction."”1234 
However, not all commentators are prepared to acknowledge such a role for sovereignty. 
Rabinow and Rose argue that although thanatopolitics of this kind may occur within 
totalitarian regimes, modern biopolitcs is more closely associated with the function of 
sovereignty that Foucault articulated in The History of Sexuality viz the power to make live 
and to let die.1235 They claim that theorists such as Agamben, Hart and Negri have 
overemphasised the role of sovereignty’s killing function within biopower and have 
neglected attention on its productive effects. Rose doubts the historical continuity inherent in 
Agamben’s argument1236 and further raises a strong objection that not all biopolitical 
interventions are made at the direction of the sovereign.1237 
Another invocation of sovereignty (briefly considered in Chapter Two), pertinent to this 
area of study can be found in relation to the individual right to refuse treatment. Joel 
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Feinberg advocates a libertarian account of personal autonomy that he terms “personal 
sovereignty”.1238 This likening of the individual to a state sovereign is productive in that it 
allows the individual to be thought of as having a right of death over herself. If this right is 
exercisable by the individual over themselves pursuant to a sovereign right, its exercise 
would not be subject to some of the more exacting requirements imposed by some of the 
‘thicker’ conceptions of autonomous decision making considered in chapter three.  
This idea of individual sovereignty can readily extend to ADRTs as legal instruments 
purporting to allow individuals to take these kinds of sovereign decisions over life. In turn, 
the idea of extending individual sovereignty through ADRTs can be read with the arguments 
of those, such as Memmi, who claim that there has been a broader devolution or 
democratisation of sovereignty in modernity.1239 According to this claim, the concentration 
of sovereignty in a single head of state has been distributed out and ordinary citizens now 
enjoy some sovereignty over themselves. Such arguments have a strong prima facie 
association with those deployed in support of ADRTs in terms of self-determination.1240 The 
idea of self-determination being enshrined in law and extended through ADRTs can be 
portrayed as the culmination of a process of wrestling part of the ancient right of death from 
the sovereign. Nevertheless, we must also remember the further difficulties with accepting 
the simple proposition that a right to self-determination is extended. In particular, it must be 
remembered so much of the potential of ADRTs is dependent not merely upon the will of 
their creators, but also upon the spirit in which they are interpreted by others. Further, it will 
be recalled from Chapter One that the way the law on ADRTs is framed, supports 
considerable discretion to those charged with the interpretation of ADRTs.  
The ideas of personal sovereignty and self-determination appear therefore to readily 
complement each other as they apply to ADRTs, but the invocation of the idea of personal 
sovereignty quickly invites a reconsideration of the critiques discussed in Chapter Three. 
There the premises of modern individualist forms of autonomy were highlighted and 
questioned. The critical accounts considered in chapter three argued that the kinds of 
assumption made by advocates of individualistic conceptions of personal autonomy are 
problematic in their tendency to overlook the social factors that may inconveniently colour 
decisions about medical treatment, failing to account for the imbalances of knowledge and 
the multitude of motivations which may lie behind decisions, in assuming that everyone is 
free to make a decision and that such decisions are made in idealised spaces that are free 
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from such pressures and imbalances. The reality for many is likely to be a far cry from this 
idealised expectation and thus the appositeness of an individualised conception of autonomy 
as a practical basis for the law on consent and on ADRTs appears questionable. 
In the light of these critiques, though likening individuals to sovereigns is a neat 
analogy, it is also one which fails to fully account for, and perhaps masks, the multitude of 
external pressures and particularly that those who are sovereign over those individual 
sovereigns. On this basis, the utility of the idea that the individual can be treated as 
sovereign over the territory of their body seems questionable. For even accepting that the 
individual can be considered sovereign in a sense, we must surely recognise that their bodily 
territory is landlocked and subsumed within that of the state sovereign, whose territory 
authority is in turn tempered by her membership of international treaties and organisations. 
Sovereignty must be understood in context. 
Thus, even if individual has been ceded the right to end his or her own life, that legal 
right is subject to the adherence to certain formalities and to the interpretation of others. 
Consequently, if we are to regard the individual’s right to create ADRTs as indicative of 
individual sovereignty, that understanding must be understood alongside an understanding of 
the extent to which the effect and practical utility of ADRTs is shaped by others. The 
individual can make a decision that purports to be sovereign over their existence, but it is not 
they who will ultimately decide whether they are to be ‘let die’ through the upholding of 
their ADRT or made to live through the rejection of their ADRT. 
It is in the realisation of the contingent nature of the right of decision-making of the 
individual, particularly in respect of end-of-life decisions, that it is possible to see the 
connection with Foucault’s argument about the modern operation of sovereignty: ‘making 
live and letting die’.1241 The individual plainly does not have a right framed in such terms. 
Individuals cannot make themselves live. This is true both in a practical sense and in the 
legal sense, explored in Chapter One, in which it was stated that there is no right compel the 
provision of treatment. Nor can they command the administration of substances to accelerate 
their own death by another.  
Moreover, the limited right that individuals do have to refuse treatment, and thereby 
control the point of their demise, is subject to the interpretation of others before its practical 
effect can be known. Chapter One drew attention to the fact that a higher evidential burden 
falls on those purporting to treat an ADRT as binding (and thus withhold or withdraw 
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treatment) than falls on those purporting to treat the ADRT as non-binding (and thus provide 
or continue treatment). In difficult cases such as W v M and Re E (considered in detail in 
Chapter Six) the court-sanctioned interpretation of the purported ADRTs as being 
inapplicable led to the continuation of treatment and the prolongation of life. Viewed in this 
way, this act of interpretation appears very much like the exercise of the right to make live, 
the operation of sovereignty. Equally, cases in which ADRTs are upheld, treatment is 
withheld or withdrawn, and death results are capable of being considered decisions to ‘let 
die’ made by those who might have interpreted the ADRT differently. In this sense, ADRTs 
can be thought of as exemplifying the operation of a sovereignty held not so much by the 
individual, newly empowered to assert their rights against the world, but rather by the state 
as a limiting factor on this individual power. 
Consequently, sovereignty and the right of death can certainly be seen as having a role 
within modern biopolitics and the manner in which that role is played out in the context of 
ADRTs. However, given the preceding discussion, it would be too simplistic to conclude 
that the role is simply about giving individuals the right of death over themselves. The right 
that individuals have won is contingent. 
BIOPOLITICS, SOVEREIGNTY AND ADRTS 
In Chapter Six it was argued that the formation of an ADRT necessitates the engagement 
with processes of self-government. ADRTs cannot be created without the contemplation of a 
future state in which capacity is lacking, medical treatment is clinically indicated and a 
certain form of treatment, of a variety that the creator of the ADRT would wish to refuse (in 
all cases, or in whatever further circumstances they may specify), is envisioned. Making a 
decision of this nature, in the knowledge that if the decision should take effect it will 
determine the lifespan of its creator, demands more than trivial thought.  
Given that the creator of an ADRT must engage with his or her possible future medical 
treatment in this prudent and proactive way, the process of creating an ADRT may lead that 
person to engage with other long term questions regarding their lives and their future health. 
In this sense, ADRTs might be seen as part of a constellation of long-term planning 
instruments, such as life insurance, insurance against funeral costs and testamentary 
dispositions. It would be unsurprising if the engagement with such forward-planning acts of 
self-care may also lead to engagement with further practices of self-care pertaining to the life 
and health of the creator. 
Taken together, these kinds of instruments and practices of self-care are likely to have a 
cumulative effect across the population in ameliorating some of the difficulties associated 
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with the dying process. Improving the efficiency of decision making across the population 
has obvious advantages in enabling resources to be freed up to be expended on other aspects 
of life. 
  One sense in which ADRTs foster the life of the population is through the valorisation 
of a kind of health-based prudentialism: a disposition towards actively responsibility for 
future states of health. Encouraging individual constituents of the population to consider 
their future health and can be beneficial to the population as an organism. If the constituents 
of the population become attuned to managing their own responsibilities through creating 
ADRTs, it will lead to a greater engagement with useful forms of behaviour. ADRTs 
necessarily entail an engagement with, and concern for, one’s own health. More than this, 
they entail a concern for future states of health. In consequence, ADRTs demand a kind of 
concern that is not reactionary but proactive. It is not a case of analysing the current state of 
health and contemplating how that state might be improved. Rather it is concerned with how 
one might react to a future state of health. This kind of practice is therefore somewhat 
distinct from a reaction to a state present state of health that one wishes to improve, but 
rather to an anticipated state of health that one would not wish to endure. This proactive 
disposition may make salient the kinds of heath choices which could impinge on the future 
state of health. Concern is not restricted to the present state of health and the problems which 
may attend the individual in their current state, but also includes thefuture state of health of 
their creator  
The discussion of individual sovereignty thus far has centred on a critique of the extent 
to which the individual right to make an ADRT is analogous with the rights of state 
sovereigns. However, an additional line of critique can be pursued in respect the idea of 
individuality. This critique can be produced through a return to the idea of the ‘future self’, 
explored in the Fourth Chapter, in order to analyse the so-called ‘future self’ and the 
challenge it poses to a coherent sense of individuality. In developing this critique, we can 
also begin to view the ‘future self’ as an additional category of other that can be rendered 
governable through ADRTs.  
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THE ‘FUTURE SELF’  
“The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This 
process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and 
the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’.”1242 
A specific and powerful objection to ADRTs, based on the idea of personhood, was 
explored in Chapter Four. The intricacies of the argument in that chapter need not be retold 
here, but the idea of a ‘future self’ will be drawn upon in this section in order to illustrate an 
alternative way of conceiving of the government of others: namely, the construction of the 
future self as ‘other’. 
Much simplified, this personhood critique was premised on the acceptance of the idea 
that the moral authority of ADRTs resided in the proximity of creator of the ADRT to that 
person’s ‘future self’, but suggested that the inevitable personal changes that all individuals 
experience throughout their lifetimes are such that ADRTs should not be capable of binding 
the future self. The argument goes that so much personal change is likely to occur in the 
period between the creation of the ADRT and its application that the ADRT cannot 
legitimately bind the future self.  
The encouragement to construe the ‘future self’ as a kind of other is deeply ingrained 
within the structure of the legal framework on ADRTs. This process of division and 
‘othering’ is arguably a tendency of advanced liberal society and to emphasise its divisive 
nature Deleuze coined the term “dividuals”.1243 Envisioning a ‘future self’, who lacks mental 
capacity for certain medical decisions entails envisioning a person who thereby loses part of 
her or his political rights (bios)1244 to make decisions. As such, the ‘future self’ is held out by 
the law as an entity lacking in full agency and becomes instead someone on whose behalf 
decisions must be made.  
ADRTs bring this legal distinction sharply into focus, by enabling individuals with 
capacity to make decisions on behalf of a future incarnation of their own self who lacks 
mental capacity to make particular decisions. The law invites the possibility for an 
individual to take decisions on behalf of this imagined ‘future self’ and therefore of 
governing that self by restricting the kinds of medical treatment that they may be provided 
with in future. By opening up the possibility of refusing treatment anticipatorily at the end of 
life (and once mental capacity for the decision is lost), individuals are encouraged to 
                                                     
1242 M Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (n 7) 326  
1243 G Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1992) 59 October 3, 5 
1244 see G Agamben (n 625) 9-10 
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conceive of their future self as an alien entity, for whom they, as a competent ancestor-to-be 
of that ‘future self’, are made responsible.  
Thinking about the ‘future self’ in this way entails a number of self-directed practices. 
These were explored in the previous chapter, where the function of ADRTs vis-à-vis the 
technologies of the self was discussed. However, these technologies of the self are facilitated 
by and interact with the technologies of government, which enable such thought processes to 
take place in a practical sense. The legal framing of these kinds of decisions is one way in 
which individuals can be governed across the jurisdiction. In respect of ADRTs, we can see 
the interrelation between the practices that individuals are expected to apply to themselves 
and the practices which apply to them in that citizens require a certain level of information 
knowledge and support in order to conduct these practices to themselves. In order for 
individuals to become aware of their end-of-life treatment possibilities and the possibility of 
creating an ADRT, may require interpersonal governmental techniques.  
THE INTERPERSONAL OTHER  
In order for the individual to become cognisant of their future self, the travails of their 
existence and the possibility of making decisions which may save that future person from 
suffering, they must be informed of these possibilities. Cognisance of these one or more of 
these matters may arise spontaneously, but awareness of the combination of these 
possibilities is only likely to arise through interaction with another agent or institution with 
the requisite kinds of knowledge. However, the MCA fails to identify a relevant body or 
agency with responsibility for informing citizens of their rights.  
In adherence to the rationalities of advanced liberalism, jurisdictions such as England 
and Wales cannot overtly require individuals to make anticipatory decisions about their end-
of-life treatment. Rather they have established a framework, such as that which is brought 
into being by the MCA, in which advance decision making is made possible. However, in 
the United States a statutory duty requires medical facilities to inform patients of their right 
to create an ADRT on admission to a medical facility.1245 There is no equivalent provision in 
England and Wales and this may provide one explanation as to why the uptake of ADRTs 
has been so low. This low uptake was lamented by the House of Lords Select Committee 
which called for urgent action to improve uptake, but which provided no detail on how this 
                                                     
1245 Patient Self-Determination Act 1991 §127.652 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub L 
No. 101-508 (November 5, 1990) 
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should be achieved. A rapid increase in uptake would appear unlikely in the absence of a 
resolution of this difficulty. 
Various possible interventions could be made, which may improve uptake, ranging from 
information campaigns at one end to mandated decisions at the other extreme. However, 
promotion of ADRTs is a sensitive matter and the attitude of this Post-Legislative Scrutiny 
Committee differs markedly from some of the evidence provided to the Joint Committee on 
Medical Ethics prior to the enactment of the MCA,1246 in which fears were expressed over 
the probity of allowing individuals to make these kinds of decisions and whether these 
decisions were in fact a way of introducing a law on euthanasia. Targeting certain groups, 
such as the elderly or those with certain medical conditions runs the risk of suggesting that 
persons in with such conditions ought to make an ADRT and this would destroy the 
voluntaristic foundation of the ADRT. These fears appear to have been rapidly eroded or 
displaced by an international policy drive to encourage the enactment of legislation, such as 
the MCA, which makes provision for individuals to make decisions about their possible 
future healthcare. 
The establishment of such frameworks is internationally mandated through various 
conventions, including the Oviado Convention,1247 which suggest that individuals should be 
given at least the opportunity to make provision for their end of life care in advance. This 
suggests that advance care planning and advance decision making is not a phenomenon 
peculiar to England and Wales, or even to common law jurisdictions. Indeed most developed 
nations have now introduced legislation to establish the possibility of making advance care 
plans or ADRTs. 
In Europe the promotion of advance decision making powers is actively encouraged by 
the major European institutions, such as the Council of Europe (“CoE”), the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Ministers.1248 The 1997 
“Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
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Biomedicine” (Oviedo, 4.IV.1997)1249 (the “Oviedo Convention”) emphasises the 
requirement that medical intervention is to be based on informed consent1250 and states that 
where individuals cannot provide express consent for treatment “previously expressed 
wishes… shall be taken into account” (Art. 9). Shortly afterwards the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the CoE issued Recommendation 1418 (1999) “Protection of the Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Terminally Ill and the Dying”, which inter alia drew attention to the fact 
that it is increasingly possible to prolong the final stages of life and urged member states to 
guard against this1251 and to ensure that advance directives are “observed”.1252 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)11 of the “Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
Principles Concerning Continuing Powers of Attorney and Advance Directives for 
Incapacity” made further recommendations to promote the creation of ADRTs. 
These Conventions are of interest in that they suggest that the concerns regarding end of 
life treatment are not confined to the jurisdiction of England and Wales, but are rather of 
general human concern. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that where a rationale for 
strengthening end of life decision making is explicitly stated, it is often linked to the 
advancement of Human Rights. Indeed, Resolution 1859 of the Council of Ministers 
suggests that the failure to create a legislative framework to enable advance decision making 
means that Human Rights cannot be respected.1253 This suggests that the framework for 
advance decision making represents an essential component in the respect of Human Rights 
at the end of life. In this sense, the Human Rights basis for the recognition of ADRTs is 
folded into the argument for the recognition of ADRTs based on empowerment. 
However, although legal frameworks are promoted, there is a failure to specify any set 
of individuals or groups with responsibility for advising individuals or assisting them in the 
preparation of an ADRT. Medical practitioners might be an obvious candidate, but to 
provide satisfactory advice they would require legal training particularly to enable them to 
distinguish ADRTs from other provisions which might appear in an ACP advanced care plan 
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human rights and dignity by taking into account previously expressed wishes of patients”  “only a tiny 
minority of the Council of Europe’s 800 million citizens actually have advance directives, living wills 
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expressed wishes into account, and thus effectively protect their human rights and dignity” (Art 4) 
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(although arguably this kind of training should be provided in any case).1254 Equally 
important is the question of funding for providing this advice,1255 which is a particularly 
thorny issue in the context of the competing pressure to reduce costs following the financial 
crash of 2008. Discussing the possibility of creating an ADRT may require a lengthy 
conversation and the MCA suggests that such decisions should be kept under review. The 
provision of such a service within the NHS would involve the commitment of significant 
resource (although it may ultimately save resources in the avoidance of the provision of 
unnecessary treatment). 
Another candidate would be solicitors or other professionals specialising in the 
preparation of wills. However, such persons may require some medical training regarding 
the likely causes of incapacity at the end of life to be able to provide good advice. In 
addition, legal fees may prohibit some from accessing this kind of advice through a solicitor. 
The next most likely institutional source of guidance would be a specialist charity, such as 
Compassion in Dying, who provide information leaflets and skeleton forms for creating 
ADRTs1256 or Advance Decision Assistance.1257 However, people are possibly less likely to 
come in to contact with charitable organisations such as these without specific cause to do so 
(e.g. a terminal diagnosis). More prosaically, people may have important discussions about 
their end of life preferences with their loved ones. However, in the absence of the awareness 
of the possibility of creating an ADRT there is little prospect of such discussions being 
converted into the formation of ADRTs. 
Thus, it is likely that the formation of ADRTs may involve contact with a combination 
of actors in these spheres, as part of an ‘assemblage of advanced decision-making’. 
However, if the success or otherwise of these assemblages is to be measured by the uptake 
of ADRTs, it would seem that the lack of coordination across the various limbs of the 
assemblage is responsible for the low uptake at present.    
Having considered three potential objects of government in the population, the future-
self and the interpersonal-self, we can now consider in more detail the way in which these 
objects of government can be governed. As discussed throughout this chapter, ADRTs are 
frequently pitched as instruments aimed at the empowerment of individuals and the 
diminishment of medical control at the end of life. However, in as much as they are 
successful in meeting such aspirations, and are successful in opening up a new domain of 
                                                     
1254 See Chapter One 
1255 Institute of Medicine (n 613) 181, 184-185  
1256 See http://compassionindying.org.uk/library/advance-decision-pack/ [accessed 17th August 2015] 
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individual decision-making, they also invite and expect individuals to exercise self-control. 
The decision to create an ADRT entails the acceptance of certain propositions which tends 
to aid the legitimacy of the law.  
For instance, one must first accept one’s own mortality, the possibility of losing 
capacity, and a system of laws that denies those who lack capacity with the right to make 
binding refusals of treatment. The creation of an ADRT further necessitates the engagement 
with certain thought processes (e.g. reflection, prediction, comparison etc) which pertain to 
the medico-existential conditions of their authors.1258 These kinds of thought processes, the 
weighing of different options and the formation of values, are operations that individuals 
undertake on themselves, and as such can be seen, in Foucault’s terms, as ‘technologies of 
the self’.1259 The manner in which individuals do this in a practical sense can be categorised 
as part of the technologies of the self, but the facilitation of this mode of self-government in 
general terms across the population can be viewed as part of the technologies of government. 
However, the cognisant failure to create an ADRT (i.e. being aware of the possibility of 
creating an ADRT and intentionally not doing so) could also be regarded as entailing the 
tacit acceptance of certain systemic propositions. There are various reasons why a person 
who is aware of the possibility of creating an ADRT may not wish to do so, but ultimately 
the failure to do so in these circumstances indicates, at least minimally, a preference for 
being treated in accordance with the best interests test1260over a self-authored ADRT. In this 
sense, the choice presented by ADRTs cannot be avoided simply through the failure to 
create an ADRT. Having created the framework in which such choices can be made a 
decision not to create an ADRT might also be considered to be a choice. 
Such a conclusion has important consequences for the analysis of the effectiveness of 
ADRTs as a strategy of government. It means that the success of ADRTs cannot be 
measured simply by the frequency of their uptake i.e. by the number of people who have 
actually created ADRTs. In this sense, part of the governmental ends of ADRTs can be 
achieved by merely informing eligible members of the public of their right to create an 
ADRT.  
The ‘decision’ not to make an ADRT may be made cognisantly (i.e. in awareness of the 
possibility of creating an ADRT at all) or not. The former case is effectively a choice to be 
treated in accordance with the best interests test contained in s.4 MCA following the loss of 
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capacity. Admittedly, it is certainly more of a conceptual strain to categorise the non-
cognisant, or ignorant, failure to create an ADRT as a choice. However, the decision to 
categorise this omission as a choice should be read together with the general obligation on 
individuals to take responsibility for maximising their own state of health1261 and to act as 
‘active health consumers’.1262 Those individuals who fail to at least consider the creation of 
an ADRT might be considered to have failed in their obligation to protect their own future 
health interests and arguably in their obligations of citizenship.1263 Seen in this way, 
ignorance is also a choice.  
On such a view, where even the failure to create an ADRT might be seen as a choice, 
ADRTs represent an unavoidable choice that is thrust upon all adult citizens with capacity to 
make any kind of ADRT. From this perspective, the legal framework for ADRTs at once 
empowers and, by the same token, responsibilises citizens. Such an analysis accords with 
Bauman’s view that the degree of choice which opens up through the removal of sources of 
authority ultimately amounts to a “privatization of blame”.1264 The possibility of creating an 
ADRT does not preclude anyone from placing faith in the best interests test to provide them 
with the kind of treatment that they would want at the end of life, but it suggests that doing 
so is itself a kind of choice.   
This reliance on the individual capacity to choose has never been greater in medical law. 
In the first Chapter it was argued that one of the most important legal developments, made 
under the auspices of improving personal autonomy, was to require more information to be 
disclosed about the risks of treatments as part of the consent process. This strategy places a 
responsibility of greater disclosure of information on the medical profession, but it also 
subtly places a responsibility on patients to learn how to cope with and process the 
information with which they are provided.  Programmes of empowerment aimed at 
increasing standards of healthcare explicitly borrow from market principles in offering 
choices between hospitals and providing people with complex care needs with personal care 
budgets.1265 These developments can be regarded as moves towards the empowerment of 
patients or the better recognition of autonomy. However, it is argued here that they can also 
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be viewed as part of a liberal proclivity to exercise “wise restraint”1266 and avoid ‘governing 
too much’.1267 From this perspective, those patients who are unable to deal with the 
increased informational demands are problematic. In this sense, the provision of healthcare 
information can be empowering for some, but can equally be considered burdensome for 
others.1268  At the same time, the advanced liberal challenge to the authority of experts, 
through the subjection of their knowledge and authority to market forces,1269 means that 
those who wish to receive assistance in making choices cannot receive the kind of clear 
direction that they once could. Expert advice itself has become a commodified subject of 
choice within advanced liberal constructs1270 and is subject to technologies of performance, 
calculation and audit, in lieu of trust.1271 This plainly has advantages for the individual who 
is capable of engaging with such decisions, as they are no longer required to fall into line 
behind expert instruction, but can instead follow their own direction in a way that they 
choose and instead seek out advice which accords with their own outlook on life.  
This model also heavily relies on individuals who can operate as active decision-
makers.1272 Advanced liberalism requires individuals who are capable of acting in their own 
interests, as consumers.1273 To operate as an informed and active decision-maker requires 
certain capacities, particularly the ability to absorb information and make decisions between 
competing options.1274 Those who cannot engage with the market in this way, therefore pose 
a fundamental problem to the functioning of advanced liberal government. ADRTs offer a 
mechanism through which those who would otherwise be immune to government can be 
brought the purview of advanced liberal government.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has revisited ADRTs conditions of emergence in light of the theory of 
governmentality set out in the previous two chapters. It has been argued that the 
development of medical capacities to sustain life in circumstances of low functionality has 
arisen in the absence of clear, universalisable, and because authoritative direction on moral 
questions at the end of life. This kind of direction is absent in advanced liberalism precisely 
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because individuals are expected to govern their own interests and outside forces are not 
expected to make these decisions on behalf of others. This situation has emerged at a time of 
increasing rates of mortality due to the aging population and significant financial pressure on 
the provision of healthcare following the great financial crash of 2008. These factors have 
combined to form a crisis of government under advanced liberal regimes of government.  
A governmental analysis of this kind of crisis seeks not only to discover the most 
efficient solution to the problem, but also one which the most legitimate1275 and the continual 
questioning of legitimacy of governmental practices epitomises liberal government.1276 
There is no obvious answer the question of whether, and to what extent, life should be 
prolonged in highly fragile and dependent states (e.g. PVS and MCS) in the absence of an 
indication from the person to whom the decision will apply. It has been argued that a law on 
ADRTs has been developed and the objections considered in the second part of this thesis 
have been unable to prevail.  
Moreover, it has been argued in this chapter that ADRTs should not only be regarded as 
self-directed means of individual empowerment, but also as part of the technologies of 
government directed at ‘others’. Indeed, there may be said to be three levels of the 
government of others through ADRTs, namely the government of population, of 
interpersonal other and of the future self. 
The facilitation of advance decision making enables the transfer responsibility for end of 
life decisions increasingly onto the individuals. This transfer of responsibility is entirely 
consistent with the tenets of advanced liberalism, which foreground the role of the individual 
and individual choice.1277 However, this can also be seen as a biopolitical intervention aimed 
at securing the population through protecting the exercise of ‘responsible freedom’1278 
protecting the population from the ‘threat’ of acquiring a large number of individuals whose 
lives can be sustained and prolonged, but only at great expense and who are unable to make 
medical decisions for themselves. This threat to the prevailing mode of governmentality is 
heightened in the context of limited resources available for healthcare, which has been 
amplified by the financial crisis of 2008; there is an increasing pressure to provide value for 
money in healthcare spending. 
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In addition to this focus on the population, it has been argued that taking a different 
perspective on the problem of the ‘future-self’, which was first considered in Chapter Four, 
can allow us to view our future selves as an object of government as far as ADRTs are 
concerned. The re-evaluation of these personhood arguments involves returning to advanced 
liberalism as a rationality of government. As discussed, advanced liberalism places such 
stock in the autonomous and entrepreneurial individual as an active node of government. 
Therefore the possibility that the individual might one day lose the ability to make their own 
decisions represents a serious problem for advanced liberal programmes of government. 
This possibility not only means that incapacitated individuals will no longer be able to 
govern themselves through their choices, but also that they will not be governable through 
their lost capacity to choose. In this sense, the incapacitated ‘future-self’ becomes a threat to 
the project of the advanced liberal mode of governance at the end of life. 
However, for citizens to begin to think about their ‘future self’ in this way requires an 
intermediate, interpersonal process of government, in which one person can advise the other 
as to possibility of losing capacity at the end of life and the right to refuse treatment in 
anticipation of such circumstances. The MCA does not prescribe any one person or body to 
do this and professional guidance for medical practitioners suggests that discussions on such 
topics should not be instigated by the professional. The lack of individuals or agents tasked 
with having such conversations is perhaps one explanation as to the low uptake of ADRTs 
notwithstanding the aspirations of state government. 
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 CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS 
Orthodox accounts in bioethics and healthcare law tend to assume that the primary 
rationale for the recognition of ADRTs is the extension of the right to autonomy (or self-
determination). This work has problematised that assumption in arguing that the 
development and operation of ADRTs can only be adequately understood through an 
appreciation of the congress of a number of factors of which the extension of autonomy is 
but one.  
A strong moral case can be made for ADRTs using the orthodox doctrinal presumption 
of the extension of autonomy. However, having considered the legal framework surrounding 
ADRTs in detail as well as some of the power interactions and economic considerations 
which attend the operation of ADRTs, the strength of the orthodox claim is far more limited. 
The examination of the legal framework for ADRTs in Chapter One highlighted the 
narrowness of the range of decisions which ADRTs facilitate. Chapter One further 
emphasised the multiple legal routes to the failure of ADRTs in individual cases. Thus, a 
closer and more dispassionate appreciation of the law, beyond the extension of autonomy 
headline, shows ADRTs to be quite precarious instruments, subject in large part to the spirit 
in which they are interpreted by the healthcare professionals and the courts. This rather sober 
conclusion is some way off the expectations that might be derived from some of the glowing 
rhetoric associated with the protection of the right to refuse treatment contemporaneously 
and through ADRTs by extension.  
That said, ideas of autonomy have clearly played an important role in the development 
of the legal framework on ADRTs. However, notwithstanding autonomy’s conceptual 
centrality it has never been furnished with a clear and settled definition in law. Its treatment 
as a well-worn, widely accepted concept in this area belies significant theoretical 
disagreements in the philosophical literature. Given the nature of these disagreements, the 
court might be forgiven for its hesitancy in making proclamations on ethical principles, but 
in the absence of a clearer definition, the suggestion that the law on ADRTs is based an 
extension of autonomy is ultimately an unfalsifiable assertion. At the same time, it is an 
assertion which has a ring of credibility in broad terms, because individuals who have strong 
views about the refusal of treatment at the end of life can at least increase their chances of 
their views honoured and at the least, their voices heard in the discussions about treatment. 
ADRTs might also be seen as empowering in the sense that individuals can become the 
instigators of treatment decisions, rather than having to wait for treatment decisions to be 
presented to them. Nonetheless, given the lack of concrete conceptual content accorded to 
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the term autonomy by those who employ it, the true extent of this empowerment, grounded 
in autonomy, is questionable..  
This lack of clear definition makes terms like autonomy malleable to the needs 
governmental programmes (e.g. the law on ADRTs can be contrasted with the approach 
taken in respect of organ transplantation)1279. One of the most important factors considered 
in this thesis and unexplored in other literature in this area, is the emergence of ADRTs 
against a backdrop of advanced liberalism. A greater understanding of the development of 
advanced liberalism in England and Wales, which can be readily gleaned through the theory 
of governmentality, allows for the development of a richer understanding of the operation of 
ADRTs. This mode of government requires individuals who are capable of making choices 
about their own healthcare. Those who cannot make healthcare decisions present a 
considerable problem to the continuation of government along the lines of advanced 
liberalism.  
Foucault described the operation of programmes of government in terms of an 
interaction between the technologies of the self and the technologies of government. These 
ideas were embraced in the final two substantive chapters. The idea of autonomy lends itself 
well to an analysis based on an idea of self-government. In Chapter Six this idea of self-
government was explored using Foucault’s understanding of the term government, based on 
the ‘conduct of conducts’. An analysis of the interaction that a person must have in order to 
shape their own conduct, specifically in relation to ADRTs, using two prominent cases as a 
concrete basis for analysis. Here it was suggested that individuals wishing to create ADRTs 
must perform several mental processes in respect of their existential disposition, and in so 
doing, subjectivise themselves as responsible, active citizens through their choice and 
through narrating their own values. The telos of this process of self-government is to ensure 
that individuals take active steps to contemplate and express choices about their possible end 
of life treatment. In consequence, they alleviate a potential crisis of government at the end of 
life in which a choice about the continuation of treatment must be made in the absence of a 
clear indication of choice from the individual. 
The practices inherent in advance decision making processes place certain demands on 
their creators. They must firstly recognise themselves as mortal beings, who may, one day, 
find themselves transformed into a state of dependence on medical support for their lives to 
be sustained and, additionally, may lose the ability to make decisions about their treatment. 
                                                     
1279 See T Hayes, ‘Donation and Devolution: The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013’ (n 13) 
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They must consider what kind of treatment they would want (or more specifically, what kind 
of treatment they would not want) and then commit their decision to a text to be read by 
another person in future. Such a manner of thinking necessitates a reflection on personal 
values in order to make such a decision in an imagined scenario. Engaging with advance 
decision-making and performing these exercises reinforces an active consumerist self-image. 
This kind of subjectivisation fits precisely with the kind of subject that advanced liberalism 
requires in order to function. Gone are the days of medical practitioners making all treatment 
decisions, today the patient is enjoined to participate in such decisions and even to do so in 
advance of the presentation of the decision. 
In the final substantive chapter, the rather counterintuitive idea that the concept of 
autonomy can be used for the government of others, through priming individuals to actively 
look after their own interests as homines economici, was explored in detail. The idea of 
fostering an ability to interact with markets actively through choice enables the formation of 
assemblages of government which foster and cater to the needs of individuals with such 
capacities. These kinds of assemblage are depended upon by modern regimes of government 
which cannot intervene in the markets that they help to establish.  
Establishing a legal framework for the creation of ADRTs is akin to the establishment of 
a consumption-based market in end of life preferences, because individuals are free to 
choose how to direct their future treatment within the confines of the law. This is potentially 
empowering for those individuals who can actively engage with such choices and who are 
inclined to do so. However, it underlines a more troubling aspect of advanced liberalism; for 
those adults who find themselves at the end of life, but whose lives could be sustained 
through medical technology (a further material factor in emergence of ADRTs) present a 
tremendous dilemma for advanced liberal governments which abhor intervention in the field 
of individual interests.1280 This dilemma is heightened in circumstances of greater numbers 
of people coming to the end of life and the financial pressures that this brings while still in 
the long shadow of the Financial Crisis of 2008. In this sense, the solution that ADRTs 
present might be seen as a structural reinforcement of a very negative attitude towards the 
disabled, one which sees fit to facilitate the ending of the lives of such people. Indeed, 
returning to the idea of the ‘future self’, which was discussed in relation to the personhood 
critique that was explored in Chapter Four, the idea that the law in the way it is structured, 
invites citizens who wish to avail themselves of it, to objectify their future self and view that 
self as a kind of threat. Thus, although the idea of the personhood critique may struggle to 
                                                     
1280 M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (n 674) 280-283 
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find purchase against in seeking to limit the expansion of market logics, it finds some utility 
when it is conjugated with the theory of governmentality.  
More than this, the challenge laid down by this thesis is to critically reflect on the 
principles and values propounded within bioethics and healthcare law in terms of their 
historical establishment and operation. A failure to heed this call will risk excessive faith 
being continually placed in concepts, such as autonomy, which have become deeply 
ingrained within the orthodoxy of the disciplines. By contrast, it is hoped that through 
embracing the broader view of the development and operation of important normative 
values, as suggested in this thesis, a richer understanding of these values in their social 
context will be attained. 
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